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Abstract 
In response to calls for increased understanding of and solutions to the 
issue of protracted refugee situations, this dissertation examines the social and 
spatial implications of a long history of refugee-hosting in Eastern Province, 
Zambia.   In order to broaden our understanding of displacement and place-
making, I pay particular attention to refugee and host community interaction in 
and around the former refugee settlement in Ukwimi, Zambia.  Established in 
1987, Ukwimi Refugee Settlement hosted over 20,000 Mozambicans for nearly 
a decade.  After the repatriation of Mozambican refug es, Ukwimi evolved into 
a government-run agricultural resettlement scheme until it’s re-opening as a 
refugee camp for Angolan refugees in 2001. Through theoretically-grounded 
fieldwork in eastern Zambia, I explore refugee-hosting as a dynamic interaction 
between and among refugee relief organizations, development initiatives, host 
communities, and refugee populations.  In doing so, I analyze how refugee and 
host community relationships operate, and shift, within particular political, 
gendered, and historical contexts, thereby creating distinct cultural landscapes of 
refugee-hosting and resettlement which are constantly “i  motion” and 
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Critical theoretical practice of ethnography is 
typically long, often meandering, inescapably 
social, and temporally situated 
(Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177) 
 
The first time I approached the entrance gate (Photograph 1) at Ukwimi 
Resettlement/Refugee Settlement (URS) in Eastern Province, Zambia, I felt a 
palpable sense of apprehension and anxiety about adj sting to my new 
surroundings – and I was only planning on a preliminary, three day stay.  I 
distinctly remember wondering how much more overwhelming it must have 
been for the over 23,000 Mozambicans who arrived to the same sign over 20 
years before, or for the 2,000 Angolans who were transferred from a completely 
different environment hundreds of kilometers away, or for the thousands of 








Photograph 1: Ukwimi Refugee Settlement Entrance Sign
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sought refuge at Ukwimi.  Though my migration to Ukwimi was entirely 
voluntary, I could not help but project my own anxieties onto my imaginings of 
those who arrived at Ukwimi under entirely different circumstances.  I wondered 
about the ways in which they altered the place, as well as the ways in which the 
place altered them – and what sort of changes I was in store for during my stay 
at Ukwimi.   
 I begin by giving you a quick glimpse of my own internal (and otherwise 
private) thoughts for two reasons.  First, I think that it situates one of the 
fundamental concerns of this dissertation – that of place-making – with a very 
basic curiosity that I believe motivates any attempt to make sense of the world.  
Secondly, and most importantly, I begin with my personal recollections of a 
particular moment in my experience of Ukwimi because I asked the same of 
those I spent time with at Ukwimi.  Each of the nearly 100 interviews I 
conducted at Ukwimi were intensely personal and although my personal 
experience of approaching Ukwimi may not be as complicated or traumatic or 
confused as those I spent 7 months learning about, it is only fair that I share my 
internal thoughts and dialogues as freely as they sared theirs.  
 In order frame the events which unfolded at Ukwimi through a wider 
lens than my own personal experiences, I utilized a number of tools at the 
disposal of human geographers.  In doing so, I have attempted to weave (and in 
some instances, to unravel) three central threads running throughout the course 
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of Ukwimi’s story.  The first, and perhaps most general, thread links a concern 
with how places are made and given meaning with the changes that become 
apparent in the landscape over time. Drawing from the significant contributions 
of geographers – Tuan, Cosgrove, Entrikin, Harvey, Sauer, Sack– as well as my 
own “meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” experiences, my 
understandings and observations of the construction, deconstruction, and 
reconstruction of landscapes pay particular attention o role that identity and 
concepts of identity and positionality to structures of power play in shaping 
places (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177).  As Tuan argues,  
place is not only a fact to be explained in the 
broader frame of space, but it is also a reality to be 
clarified and understood from the perspectives of 
the people who have given it meaning (Tuan 1974: 
213).   
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 clearly demonstrate some of the extraordinary (as well as 
rather ordinary) ways in which places are constantly made, unmade, and remade 
by those who stay long enough to ascribe meaning to space.     
The second thread woven throughout the history of settlement in Ukwimi 
is the much more overtly politicized exercise of terri orialization.  Subsequent 
chapters provide detailed descriptions of the practices and actions of a variety of 
different players within the context of Ukwimi, from international aid 
organizations to national governments, political led rs, rebel movements, and 
ordinary individuals.  By bringing the practices ofsuch players into the 
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discussion, I reveal the ways in which we can understand their actions within the 
context of the practice of territoriality, defined as “the attempt by an individual 
or group [and states] to affect, influence, or contr l people, and relationships, by 
delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack 1986: 19).  
Ukwimi’s history of transformation is littered with adaptations and 
modifications of the physical and cultural landscape firmly grounded in 
practices of territoriality by a variety of players.   
If territoriality is best understood as a “derivatie…of mobility” (Cox 
2002: 4) then examining the limitations and opportunities surrounding mobility 
in eastern Zambia is illustrative of how territoriality functions on the ground.  
Although the issue of territory and mobility runs throughout this dissertation, 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the institutional actors interested in exerting 
territoriality in refugee situations.  In capturing the forcible re-displacement of 
self-settled refugees from border areas to Nyimba Refugee Camp, Chapter 5 
provides perhaps the clearest depiction of the types of practices that emerge 
from the desire for territorialization and the strategies that arise to resist such 
practices.  Peeling back these experiences within a wider historical and spatial 
lens than is typically employed in a refugee environment shows how political 
power is constantly ‘‘demonstrated, projected, and contested’’ (Wilson and 
Donnan, 1999: 155).   
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By looking critically at refugee-centered research, we can begin to see 
the difficulty in reconciling a discourse couched in terms of the territorialized 
nation-state with the simultaneous struggle to deterritorialize and reterritorialize 
that discourse.  Cathrine Brun has argued that appro ching refugee situations as 
simply another manifestation of deterritorialization leads to a number of 
problems, specifically to a “romanticizing of displacement, exile, and diaspora 
as generalized and often preferred conditions of modern life” that is not 
conducive to effectively addressing the plight of refugees (2001: 19) .   
Brun suggests that exploring the processes of reterritorialization can 
overcome the shortcomings of an essentialist or deterritorialized approach.  
Reterritorialization refers to the way in which refugees construct new networks, 
cultural practices, and daily routines in their new and often changing 
environments.  According to Brun, it is the means by which refugees develop 
strategies to cope with the “contradictory experience of being physically present 
in one location, but at the same time living with a feeling of belonging 
somewhere else” (2001: 23).   
In weaving the third and final thread through this narrative, I am 
particularly focused on concept (and utility) of “refugeeness” and how such 
understandings are related to how the international community manages refugee 
environments.  The tendency within the long history f refugee research was (is) 
to reify the refugee.  Though many have cautioned against such depictions 
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(Kibreab 1991, 1994; Malkki 1995a, 1995b; Jacobsen 1997; Hyndman 2000), 
the trend remains especially prevalent and most obvious in the public discourse. 
My goal in interrogating the assumption that the “rfugee experience” is always 
defined solely by loss and uprootedness is not meant to deny that refugees 
experience loss, but rather to leave room for the reality that loss is not the only 
event that defines a refugee’s experience or their ability to (de)(re)construct 
places.  
The larger argument here is that Ukwimi provides a vi ble position 
through which to examine some of the more complicated questions of 
globalization, identity, territoriality, security, positionality, and sense of place. 
Ukwimi and the people who live there have experienced multiple forms of 
displacements in their lives – displacements from multiple perspectives, at 
different historical times, and at varying scales.  In my attempts to weave these 
threads together, the tapestry I have come to understand Ukwimi through 
concludes with the following patterns:  
1. Expansion of temporal scale: Understanding the 
ramifications of displacement requires a firm grasp 
of the particular political, social, and historical 
context in which displacement occurs.  And this 
type of understanding demands that we expand the 
temporal lens through which we typically examine 
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refugee environments.  We cannot fully interrogate 
places like Ukwimi by beginning the story of 
refugee-hosting areas with the opening of a 
particular camp or settlement and concluding it at 
the closing of said camp.  We must lengthen our 
historical gaze and look both before and beyond the 
operation of a particular camp.  Expanding the 
temporal scale in this way facilitates and contributes 
to understanding how refugee-hosting can alter, 
challenge, and sometime reinforce the cultural 
landscape.   
 
2. Expansion of spatial scale: If the intention is to 
understand the long-term impacts of displacement, 
then it is not enough to simply examine the needs or 
experiences of refugees (Malkki 1995a) or to focus 
only on the legal and institutional frameworks 
operating in the field (Hyndman 2000) or to rely too 
strongly on the often xenophobic attitudes of host 
communities (Crush and Pendleton 2004).  Instead, 
we must widen the spatial lens in which we view 
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forced displacement.  My observations of the 
evolution of cultural landscapes at Ukwimi 
highlighted the ways in which displacement is an 
inherently  geographic experience – meaning that it 
is not simply a process that affects refugees but one 
that affects a whole host of individuals, 
organizations, and communities situated within (and 
part of the construction of) particular landscapes.  
Because of this, geographers can contribute deeper 
understandings of refugee-hosting environments at 
a variety of spatial scales.  
 
3. Emplacement in motion – To be “displaced” 
assumes an attachment to or recognition of being 
“in place”.  Being “in” and “out” in this way also 
implies a specific space within which a person 
belongs or does not belong.  However, the example 
of Ukwimi demonstrates that the degree to which an 
individual is “in” or “out” of place is not static – it 
fluctuates, it shifts, it is, in fact, in motion.  
Ultimately, displacement is not just about the loss f 
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place, but also inevitably about the struggle to make 
new places (Turton 2004: 26).  So although Malkki 
argues that displacement is the “flip-side” of 
emplacement (1995: 517), my conclusion is that 
they are actually one and the same – part of the 
same narrative. 
 
Methodological Approach  
Initially, I was inclined to relegate a discussion f methodology to the 
confines of an Appendix.  This inclination originated not from an aversion to 
disclosing my field methods, but rather from a desire not to disrupt the broader 
narrative.  Yet my own intellectual foundation in feminist theory cautioned me 
against inserting my methods as a mere afterthought or appendix.  It is in this 
realm of methodology that my training as a human geographer confronted my 
understanding and appreciation of feminist geography’s commitment to 
recognizing one’s own positionality.  As a human geographer, I am inclined to 
privilege the narrative, but as a feminist geographer I am also very cognizant of 
the value of methodological disclosure.  At the end of the day, as with many 
things, such commitments are not mutually exclusive though at times they feel 
that way.   
Upon arriving in Zambia, I spent my initial months buried deep in the 
Zambia National Archives and Special Collections at the University of Zambia 
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(UNZA).  I also made use of my time in Lusaka intervi wing administrators, 
employees, and participants in a number of Lusaka-based refugee service 
organizations, such as the Jesuit Refugee Services, Women Refugees 
Community in Zambia, Lutheran World Federation, Africa e, and the Zambia 
Initiative.  Although I was over 500km away from my field site, Lusaka serves 
as the institutional heart of refugee operations in Zambia and became the source 
of much of my exposure to and research of operation of the refugee relief 
regime.  Nearly every NGO operating in Zambia’s refugee camps is 
headquartered in Lusaka, as are all of their institutional reports and records.  
Additionally, many of these Lusaka-based interviews served to connect me to 
several Ukwimi gatekeepers and self-described “relics”, such as Eularia Zulu-
Syamujaye, former URS Director and current Permanent S cretary for Eastern 
Province.   
The majority of my time (from January 2006 through July 2006) was 
spent living at URS in Eastern Province, where my primary methodologies 
included interviewing, focus group discussions, participant observation, and 
cultural landscape interpretation.  After an initial introductory visit in November 
2005, I made a final move to Ukwimi in January.  Once I had settled in at URS, I 
began contacting and interviewing provincial, district, and local leaders in order 
to gauge the political climate and memory concerning refugee-hosting at the 
institutional level in Eastern Province.  Secondly, I began conducting open-
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ended surveys and interviews throughout the Ukwimi area, both inside and 
outside URS boundaries, in order to identify salient themes and perceptions 
regarding the refugee-host-development interface.   
These conversations focused on questions concerning personal 
experiences of living in and near Ukwimi camp, perceptions toward national and 
international refugee programs and policies, and issue  of land use, land control, 
and development.  As a research method, my field interviews constituted 
“conversations with a purpose” (Eyles 1988) and although they cannot be 
replicated, they can be corroborated.   
Later in my stay, I was able to identify and contact those Mozambican 
and Angolan refugees who remained in URS.  Additionally, I travelled to the 
Mozambique-Zambia border to interview self-settled, as well as returned, 
Mozambican refugees.  Discussions with these self-settled refugees, and the 
community of Zambians with whom they reside, proved to be imperative to 
understanding the opportunities and limitations of local integration for self-
settled refugees.   
As observed by prominent refugee studies scholar Harrell-Bond, “one of 
the most serious methodological issues facing a resea cher studying refugees is 
the pervasive distrust which hangs like a cloud over all relationships” (1986: 
378).  Upon my initial visit to Ukwimi in November 2005, I was careful to make 
clear to the appropriate authorities the purpose of my research, the nature of my 
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Photograph 2: Former NGO offices & my new home 
activities in the area, and my affiliation with UNZA.  Upon receiving 
confirmation and clearance from URS Scheme Manager, I returned to Lusaka 
briefly to make arrangements for my extended stay a URS.   
I returned to URS in January and quickly settled into the housing so 
graciously provided by the Scheme Manager in the long-vacated NGO offices 
(Photograph 2).  
Although I was 
anxious to begin 
interviewing 
local Zambians, 
as well as 
remaining 
refugees, I was 
very cognizant of the “cloud” of “pervasive distrust” which Harrell-Bond wrote 
about.  Given my fear of being feared, I decided a slow approach to conducting 
formal interviews and/or asking many questions was the best approach.  Given 
that URS had officially closed its doors to refugees and any who remained 
would be subject to immigration proceedings if discovered, a cautious approach 
was necessary.   
After nearly three weeks of exploration and introduction at Ukwimi, I 
was beginning to worry about whether or not the “cloud” would ever dissipate, 
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and even if it did, how was I suppose to “know” that it had lifted?  All of these 
thoughts were rolling around in my head late one aft rnoon as I returned from 
Petauke where I had been meeting with district representatives.  As I turned 
down the path to my house, I was greeted by the usual cohort of kids from the 
preschool nearby.  As expected, they ran down the path towards me shouting, 
calling out to me both as a greeting and as a neighborhood-wide announcement 
that the Mzungu (stranger/white person – as they called me) had return d.  It 
took me about thirty seconds to realize that they wre calling out to me using my 
first name for first time, instead of the usual “Mzungu!”  That was the moment 
that I didn’t know I was waiting for – the moment when I realized the “cloud” 
had been lifted and I could begin my “real” work.  However, in many ways, I 
learned more about my own personal process of place-making in those first few 
weeks than I did once the “real” work commenced.   
As my interviews began, I was extremely careful in explaining the 
purpose and intention of my research to those who were illing to talk with me.  
I tried to emphasize that I was there as a student and, as such, they were my 
teachers.  I had, in fact, come to them to be taught.  I made it clear upon any 
request for an interview that no one had to cooperate.  I also took some time to 
explain that even those who agreed to be interviewed could refuse to answer 
specific questions at any time.  This often also required an explanation of why 
“no reply” was better than a false response.  I assured each interviewee that I 
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would protect their individual privacy with regard to their personal stories.  As 
such, throughout the text of this dissertation, I have not revealed the names or 
any personally identifying characteristics of the majority of my informants.  I 
made a commitment to the community to articulate and represent them as 
honestly as my skills and the information they gave me permitted.  Although I 
acknowledged their desire to be heard and to have a voice, I cautioned them my 
findings and conclusion would not likely have any immediate impact on their 
present situation.   
Many of these initial precautions were conscious decisions on my part, 
informed by a litany of studies about the politics of power, difference, identity, 
subjectivity, and positionality in the field (Flowerdew and Martin 1997; Hays-
Mitchell 2001; Myers 2001; Stevens 2001). All of the disclaimers I came with 
into the field were attempts to acknowledge and make room for Foucault’s 
assertion that “power…circulates” and is  
never localized here or there, never in anybody’s 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece 
of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through 
a net-like organization. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads: they are always in the 
position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising this power. They are not only its inert or 
consenting targets; they are always also the 
elements of its articulation. In other words, 
individuals are the vehicles of power (Foucault 
1980: 98) 
 
Even though I entered the field well-versed in the messy politics of doing 
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fieldwork and armed with a commitment to remain sensitive to how power is 
wielded and perceived in the field, there were still many moments when I found 
myself extremely uncomfortable with my role as a “vehicle” of power.   With 
Foucault’s observation in mind, however, I was able to recognize those moments 
when power shifted or “circulated”.   
My particular position in Foucault’s “net-like” organization varied daily 
depending on numerous (and constantly negotiated) circumstances.  For 
example, I often felt any sense of power/control circulate away from me on days 
when I took to the field alone, with my limited Chic ewa capabilities and 
general unfamiliarity with the area.  On the other and, there were specific 
moments in which I realized that the community perceived me as enormously 
powerful.  For example, I met with a group of about 40 Zambian women who 
had married Angolan refugees and were subsequently l ft at Ukwimi when their 
husbands repatriated.  The women were convinced that I had the power to find, 
collect, and transport their husbands back to Ukwimi.   
Most days, however, I was able to recognize and appreciate the ebb and 
flow of the shifting power dynamics of fieldwork. For example, while 
interviewing with the aid of interpreters, I most obviously exercised power by 
guiding the nature of the conversation and topics covered.  But I was 
simultaneously subjected to the interpreters’ power of translating my inquiries 
and interpreting interviewee responses.  Yet, whenev r I recognized the meaning 
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of a particular word or turn of phrase or more, I sen ed power briefly circulating 
back through me again.   
Throughout this narrative, you will also encounter stories dug out of the 
archives and institutional reports of actors involved.  I made extensive use of 
such material in an attempt to  
draw upon long-term research that follows what 
happens to people over time, upon close  
comparison using data from other ethnographic 
studies of people exposed to similar difficulties, and 
upon the massive historical and other 
documentation now existing even for what seem to 
the casual visitor to be remote regions of the world 
(Colson 2007: 325) 
 
As a discipline, geography is uniquely situated to help me unravel the 
historical, social, political, and cultural importance of such spaces due to its 
long-standing commitment to understanding how places are ‘made’.  
Geographer’s conceptions of the idea of ‘place’ allow me to de-center refugee 
studies’ privileging of refugees in their understandings of places where refugees 
live.  By taking a geographically informed approach to the study of URS, I am 
able to move beyond static understanding of the dynamics of such places (which 
invariably focus solely on the refugee experience) and acknowledge (and 
investigate) the role that Zambians in the area play in (de)(re)constructing 
Ukwimi as a place. 
It is my hope that these efforts have not been in vai  and by attempting 
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to examine some of these larger questions, we can move beyond refugee studies’ 
fixation with the “refugee” as a seemingly coherent, self-contained category of 
analysis.  By acknowledging that refugees are not the only characters in the 
story of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement, I make new connections between various 
kinds of relationship – between and among refugee rlief/management 
organizations, government officials, refugee policymakers, Zambian 
development initiatives, host communities, and refug e populations – operating 
at a variety of spatial scales. 
In addition to widening the spatial lens, my study also breaks from much 
of the research on refugee-hosting areas (which is overwhelmingly concerned 
with the short-term, crisis stage) by extending the temporal lens to include the 
entire story of URS’s emplacement in Petauke District, beyond its construction 
and its closing.  Extending the temporal and spatial scope of refugee studies 
requires drawing from, challenging, making connections between, and 
contributing to a variety of literatures. 
Drawing on Cindi Katz’s call to produce topographies (thick, historical 
geographies), my project seeks to tell Ukwimi’s distinct story while 
simultaneously “recognizing that it is connected analytically to other places 
along contour lines that represent not elevation but particular relations to a 
process” (Katz 2001: 1229).  The refugee landscape of Ukwimi appears to be an 
appropriate ‘contour’ through which to understand the opographies of forced 
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displacement in Africa.  Just as the epigraph acknowledges that the actual 
practice of ethnography is “meandering, inescapably social, and temporally 
situated”, so too must we understand the actual practices of place-making to be 
“meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” (Cerwonka and 





















 [S]ome are more in charge of it [mobility] than 
others; some initiate flows and movement, others 
don’t; some are more on the receiving end  of it than 
others; some are effectively imprisoned by it 
(Massey 1993: 61) 
 
In order to tackle the complex realities, relationship , and dynamics that 
created (and continue to create) Ukwimi, it becomes n cessary to begin by 
stepping back and grounding the discussion within relevant theoretical 
frameworks, drawing from a variety of disciplines.  As a geographer, I am 
particularly interested in what the discipline of geo raphy has to contribute to 
global discussions of and research concerning forced displacement.  At a very 
fundamental level, geography – with its attention t how people make places 
meaningful – is uniquely situated to grapple with the complexities of human 
migration and mobility.   
Throughout the history of the discipline, numerous scholars have 
proposed a variety of hypotheses, theories, and frameworks through which to 
understand these processes (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966; Zelinsky 1971; King 
1995; Castles and Miller 1998).  In order to “place” displacement, this chapter 
examines the role of migration studies within the discipline, as well as the 
development of refugee studies.  As an Africanist, I am concerned with how all 
of these frameworks play out in an African context, and perhaps more 
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importantly, what the African context can teach us about the wider issues of 
forced displacement.  This chapter makes new connectio s between migration 
studies and refugee studies in the African context, in an attempt to bridge the 
gaps between these sometimes disparate fields of study.  In doing so, this chapter 
sets the stage for understanding the dynamics of refuge -hosting and place-
making at Ukwimi by looking at relationships between those who “initiate 
flows”, those who are on the “receiving end”, and those who are “effectively 
imprisoned” by (im)mobility (Massey 1993: 61).   
 
Migration Studies  
Migration studies are critical to understanding contemporary studies of 
forced displacement.   In fact, many researchers are beginning to advocate that 
forced displacement be given the same analytical tre tment as other types of 
human migration (Richmond 1988; Stein 1981; Black 1991, 2001; Robinson 
2002).  In order to do this, we must have a strong handle on previous analytical 
treatment of voluntary migration.  Examining how voluntary migration has been 
conceptualized over the years provides a basis on which to assess the utility of 
these conceptualizations in situations of forced displacement.  The application of 
(or at the very least, attention to) concepts developed within migration studies to 
situations of forced displacement may also shed newlight on old ideas and 
challenge our notions of the opportunities of and obstacles to human mobility. 
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According to Poole and Whyte (1991), migration studies ask 
fundamental questions of how many, who, where, and why.  However, given the 
complex processes involved in any migration, geographers, sociologists, 
economists, and anthropologists have employed a variety of quantitative and 
qualitative methods to address these questions.  Migration, as the “spatial re-
allocation of human resources” (Poole and Whyte 1991: 168) is:   
…an interesting phenomenon in itself but is also an 
important indicator of differences in the social and 
economic structures of different areas and regions.  
Variations in the social composition of migratory 
flows, temporal and spatial differences in the scale 
and pattern of movement, the motives involved in 
migration, the information flows and personal 
contacts which aided migration, the characteristics 
of source areas and destinations, the official and 
unofficial reaction to population movements 
(favorable and unfavorable), all influence and at the 
same time reflect the nature of society in the areas 
which send and receive the migrants (Poole and 
Whyte 1991: 9) 
 
Because migration occurs at a broad range of temporal and spatial scales, 
many researchers have struggled to identify a single, comprehensive framework 
or theory through which to fully understand the intricacies of migratory 
movement (Ravenstein 1885; Lee 1966; Zelinsky 1971).  Such attempts often 
simplify migratory processes by employing various sy tems of classification.  
Some focus on temporal characteristics of the displacement, such as seasonal or 
periodic.  Others stress points of origin and arrivl, such as rural-urban, while 
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Table 1 
Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration 
1 Most migration is over a short distance
2 Migration occurs in steps
3 Long-range migrants usually move to urban areas
4
Each migration flow produces a counter-flow in opposite 
direction
5 Rural dwellers are more migratory than urban dwellers
6
Within their own country, females are more migratory than 
males, but males are more migratory over long distances
7 Most migrants are adults
8 Large towns grow more by migration than by natural increase
9 Migration increases with economic development
10 Migration is mostly due to economic causes  
still others emphasize motive, such as ecological or behavioral (Cloke et al 
1999).  A brief overview of the major classification systems that have been 
proposed over the years demonstrates the failures and successes of such 
“analytical treatment” in addressing the realities of forced displacement.  
In 1885, British demographer E. G. Ravenstein formulated numerous 
“laws of migration” (Table 1) (Ravenstein 1885, 1889).  He used the British 
census as his database, and therefore, like Rostow's stages of economic growth 
or the demographic transition model, the utility of his formulations to other 
places and under different circumstances is questionable.  In fact, after reading 
Ravenstein’s articles, one critic concluded that “migration was rather 
distinguished for its lawlessness than for having ay definite law” (Humphreys 
1889: 302).  
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Regardless of such criticism, Ravenstein’s work remains the “starting 
point for work in migration” (Lee 1966: 47).  Since their inception, his “laws” 
have stimulated an enormous volume of additional research and have yet to be 
completely rejected.  Still, several of the Ravenstin claims become problematic 
when applied to situations of forced displacement in Africa.  For example, 
children, not the adults observed by Ravenstein, make up more than half of 
forcibly uprooted populations in the world (UNHCR 2003).  Although 
Ravenstein’s “laws” may not be applicable in situations of forced displacement, 
his attempts to create laws for understanding migration framed much of the 
subsequent research in migration studies.   
Seeking to find a more general theory of migration, Everett Lee (1966) 
developed the idea of migration as a response to vari us pushes and pulls from 
the origin and destination (Figure 1).  According to this thinking, “no matter 








Figure 1   
Lee’s Push and Pull Factor Concept of Migration 
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involves an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles” (1966:  
49).   
Lee made the critical observation that important dis inctions exist 
between factors associated with the origin and those as ociated with the 
destination.  He attributed these distinctions to the more immediate and intimate 
relationship a migrant has with his or her place of origin.  Presumably, the 
migrant’s knowledge of the destination is “seldom exact” and elements of 
“ignorance” or even “mystery” inform a migrant’s perc ption of his or her 
destination (Lee 1966: 50).  Lee’s work also acknowledged that obstacles exist 
to any migration.  The most studied intervening factor in geography has been 
that of distance, but various other obstacles exist including physical barriers 
such as mountains or the Berlin Wall and legal barriers such as prohibitory 
immigration laws.  In his conclusions, Lee formulated nineteen hypotheses 
about the nature of migration – six of which were concerned with the volume of 
migration, another six dealing with the nature of migratory streams, and seven 
outlining the characteristics of migrants themselves (Figure 2).   
Although the applicability of Lee’s hypotheses may be debatable, his 
influence on how migration is discussed is not.  The idea of push and pull 
factors has become a fundamental concept taught witin the discipline.  Lee’s 
concept of push and pull factors, and, in fact, his terminology itself, have  
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Figure 2 
Lee’s Migration Hypotheses 
 
Concerning volume of migration 
• Volume of migration within a territory varies with e degree of diversity of 
that territory; the higher the degree of diversity, the more migration 
• Volume varies with diversity of people; the more homogenous the 
population, the less migratory 
• Volume related to the difficulty of overcoming interv ning obstacles 
• Volume varies with fluctuations in economy; the greater economic expansion 
occurring, the greater the degree of migration 
• Volume of migration increases with time (unless checks are put into place to 
minimize migration) 
• Volume of migration varies with the state of progress in a country  
 
Concerning the development of streams and counter-str ams 
• Migration takes place in well-defined streams/routes  
• For every migration stream, there is a counter-stream 
• Efficiency (ratio of stream:counter-stream) is high f major factors of 
migration were push factors at the origin 
• Efficiency is low if origin and destination are similar 
• Efficiency is high if intervening obstacles are great 
• Efficiency is connected to economic conditions 
 
Concerning the characteristics of migrants 
• Migration is selective 
• Migrants responding to pull factors at the destination end to be positively 
selected 
• Migrants responding to push factors at the origin tend to be negatively 
selected 
• Selection is typically bimodal 
• Degree of positive selection increases with increasing difficulty of 
intervening obstacles 
• Propensity to migrate at certain life stages is connected to selection 
• Between the characteristics of the origin and destination population, 




become a standard way of discussing human migration, as evident by the 
continued use of the terms in numerous introductory human geography 
textbooks (de Blij 1997; Knox and Marston 1998; Fellmann et al 1999; 
Rubenstein 1999; Jordan-Bychkov and Domosh 2003).  Introductory textbooks 
often further classify push and pull factors into specific categories such as 
economic, political, cultural, environmental, or technological (de Blij 1997; 
Rubenstein 1999).  Within the context of forced migration, however, the utility 
of conceptualizing all migration as a dynamic relationship between clear push 
and pull factors becomes problematic as push factors often have a significantly 
greater influence in such situations. 
In the 1970s, Wilbur Zelinsky used the demographic transition model as 
a basis to develop a “mobility transition model” outlining the relationship 
between human mobility and processes of industrialization and urbanization.  
Combining ideas about demographic transition with human mobility, this model 
concerned itself with “the fusion of the spatial with the temporal perspective” 
(Zelinsky 1971: 220).  The basic hypothesis argued that “there are definite, 
patterned regularities in the growth of personal mobility through space-time 
during recent history and these regularities comprise an essential component of 
the modernization process” (Zelinsky 1971: 221-222). Zelinsky identified five 




Zelinsky’s Mobility Transition Model 
The Demographic Transition 
 
Phase A – Pre-modern Traditional  
Society 
• High, slightly fluctuating, 
fertility rate 
• Mortality nearly equal to 
fertility 
• Little long-range increase or 
decrease 
 
Phase B – Early Transitional 
Society 
• Slight, but significant, rise in 
fertility 
• Rapid decline in mortality 
• Rapid rate of natural increase 
• Major growth in population 
 
Phase C – Late Transitional Society 
• Major decline in fertility 
• Continuing decline in mortality 
• Continued natural increase, but 
at much slower rate 
 
 
Phase D – Advanced Society 
• Low to moderate levels of 
fertility 
• Stabilized mortality to near or 
slightly below fertility 
• Slight or no natural increase 
 
Phase E – Future Super-advanced  
Society 
• Fertility carefully controlled by 
individuals and perhaps by new 
sociopolitical means 
• Stable mortality pattern  
 
The Mobility Transition 
 
Phase I – Pre-modern Traditional Society 
• Little migration 
• Only circulation as sanctioned by customary 
practice  
 
Phase II – Early Transitional Society 
• Massive movement from rural to urban 
• Major outflows of emigrants to foreign 
destinations 
• Small, but significant, immigration of skilled 
workers from more advanced parts of the world 
• Significant growth in circulatory migration 
 
Phase III – Late Transitional Society 
• Decreasing, but still major, movement from rural 
to urban 
• Emigration on decline 
• Continued increases in circulatory migration 
 
Phase IV – Advanced Society 
• Migration levels off 
• Rural-urban movement continues but at a 
reduced rate 
• Substantial movement from city to city and 
within cities 
• Significant immigration of unskilled workers 
from relatively underdeveloped lands 
• International migration/circulation of skilled and 
professional people 
• Vigorously accelerating circulatory migration – 
particularly economic and pleasure-oriented  
 
Phase V – Super-advanced Society 
• Decline in migration/circulation as better 
communication/delivery systems instituted 
• Nearly all internal migration of 
interurban/intraurban variety 
• Further immigration of unskilled workers from 
less developed countries 
























The work by Ravenstein, Lee, and Zelinsky sought to systematically 
categorize the dynamic processes of human migration.  However, such an 
approach is not the only way that geography has engaged in discussions of 
migration.  Considerable attention also has been paid to developing economic 
models for the extensive rural-to-urban migration that is occurring in the 
developing world.  The first such model, developed in 1954 by W. Arthur Lewis, 
breaks the economy into two sectors characterized as the rural subsistence and 
modern urban industrial.  Lewis argued that as the demand for labor increases in 
the modern sector, the rural labor force migrates in to fill that demand.  In turn, 
this increases urban industrial profits, which then fuels the urban industrial 
sector.  The rural subsistence laborers continually fill the demands of the urban 
industrial sector until the rural labor surplus is completely absorbed (Todaro 
1981: 233-236).   
Lewis built his model by making several critical, and highly 
questionable, assumptions (Figure 4).  Beginning with the contention that rural-
to-urban migration is a much more complicated phenomenon than Lewis 
envisioned, Michael Todaro developed a new model aimed at addressing the 
“the apparently paradoxical relationship (at least to economists) of accelerated 
rural-urban migration in the context of rising urban unemployment” (Todaro 
1981: 239).  Like any good economist, Todaro expressed his theory in 
mathematical terms (Figure 5).  His series of assumptions are outlined below: 
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Figure 5 
Todaro’s Mathematical Migration Model 
 
                                           n 
          V(0) =  ∫    [p(t)Yu(t) – Yr(t)]e
-rt dt – C(0) 
                                         t=0 
 
V(0) = present value of expected urban-rural income 
Yu, Yr(t) = average real incomes of individuals 
n = number time periods in migrant’s planning horizon 























Lewis’ Rural-Urban Migration Model 






Modern Urban Industrial  Sector 
 
Technologically advanced 
Higher levels of investment 
Higher wages 
Profit motivated  
Critical Assumptions 
 
Rural sector has surplus labor 
Productivity in rural sector nearly zero 
Constant demand for labor from urban sector 
People will put higher wages into savings  
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• People base their decisions to migrate on 
rational economic considerations 
• Economic considerations are based on expected 
– as opposed to actual – wage differences  
• There is an inverse relationship between 
probability of obtaining an urban job and urban 
unemployment rates (more likely to get a job 
where there is low unemployment rate) 
• People will migrate even in excess of urban job 
opportunity growth rates because it is rational 
(see first assumption) to expect a higher income  
(Todaro 1981: 241) 
Although Todaro’s model influenced how rural-urban migration is 
conceptualized and discussed, it also has had an enduring influence on the 
promotion of development policy in the developing world.  Todaro argued that 
his model contained significant “policy implications for development strategy 
with regard to wages and incomes, rural development, a d industrialization” 
(Todaro 1981: 241).  The policy implications included, but were not limited to, 
the following: 
• Reduction of the imbalances between urban and 
rural job opportunities 
• Creation of urban jobs is an inadequate means 
by which to reduce urban unemployment 
• Governments reduction of higher education 
investments  
• Government elimination of wage subsides and 
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factor-price distortions 
• Focus development policy in the developing 
world on integrated rural development (Todaro 
1981: 241-243) 
The reduction of such complex migration phenomena to mathematical 
formulas and rational-choice models not only undermines the influence of 
human agency, but also dismisses the impacts of external influences.   
In reaction to these somewhat deterministic approaches to migration 
studies, humanist geography has approached the topic in a much more subjective 
manner.  Its practitioners focus on feelings of particular migrants, 
conceptualizations of home, and sense of place (Tuan 1977; Appadurai 1988; 
Cresswell 1996, 2004; Feld and Basso 1996; Casey 1998).  Yi-Fu Tuan, for 
example, identified migration as a form of escapism.  In general though, many 
sense-of-place-geographers seem to conceive of mobility as the antithesis of 
their interest in place.  But this does not have to be the case.  Consider Tim 
Cresswell’s observation:  
Why geographers have not subjected mobility to the 
same scrutiny as the more allegedly fixed and 
bounded categories of space, time, territory, and 
landscape is curious. Mobility is just as spatial – as 
geographical – and just as central to the human 
experience of the world as place (2006: 3) 
 
Cresswell’s call reveals possible similarities between modern voluntary 
migration and forced displacement in that both are fo ms of escape, albeit at 
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very different degrees.  Much of humanist geography concerning migration is 
anchored in understanding how individuals and groups experience particular 
places and when/why/how such experiences relate to decisions to migrate to 
new places.   
Although no single, comprehensive theory of human migration exists, 
several attempts have been made to integrate migration s udies into economic, 
behavioral, and social theory.  As Poole and Whyte argued, migration studies 
could “benefit from the use of social theory to inform the speculative 
interpretation of scanty migration evidence” (1991: 13).  Other studies have 
examined migration in relation to gender (Chant 1992; Indra 1999), policy 
development (Krtiz et al 1992; Kubat 1993; Crisp 1995, 2000), and global 
significance (Potts and Bond 1990; Castles and Miller 1993; Skeldon 1997).  
Continued engagement by geographers will expand these previous 
studies and open new avenues of studying and understanding the complexities of 
human migration.  In the end, it is evident that migration – within nations, across 
international borders, and between continents – creates distinct geographies, 
determines population dynamics, affects cultural characteristics, and alters 
identities.  In short, migration is an active agent in the construction of place. 
And, as we will see at Ukwimi, the process of place (d )(re)construction is an 




The study of forced migration is a relatively new, albeit growing, area of 
geographic inquiry.  However, geography’s concentration on relationships 
among political, cultural, and environmental issues situates it to be a major 
contributor in the future development of refugee-related research.  For example, 
the discipline’s long-standing interest in migration (as discussed in the previous 
section) provides a substantial theoretical and conceptual framework that could 
potentially be linked to studies of involuntary migration (Black 1991).  In fact, 
many argue (Stein 1981; Richmond 1988; Black 1991, 2001; Robinson 2002) 
that refugee migration “must be placed in the larger context of migration theory, 
whereby the parallels between these refugee experienc s can be compared to 
those of other migratory populations” (Bascom 1994: 2 7).  Prior to examining 
these potential connections, it is necessary to trace the evolution of refugee 
studies as an important and vital field of study, and geography’s engagement 
with it. 
Refugee studies are defined by “a comprehensive, historical, 
interdisciplinary, and comparative perspective which focuses on the 
consistencies and patterns in the refugee experienc” (Stein and Tomasi 1981: 
5).  Given the interdisciplinary nature of refugee studies, scholars from political 
science, anthropology, sociology, geography, and history, have contributed to the 
growing volume of research on forced displacement.  However, the roots of the 
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field are “intimately connected” with international, regional, and national 
immigration and asylum policy development (Black 2001: 58).  Much of the 
early work in the field devoted itself to analysis of and recommendations for 
refugee policy, often with little or no theoretical reflection (Black 1991, 2001).  
Because of the field’s strong connections with policymakers and governmental 
organizations, concern exists within the academic community that “the 
dominance of policy concerns in refugee research will lead to work that is . . . 
undertheorized and orientated towards particular bureaucratic interests” (Black  
2001: 67).   
Seemingly paralleling the significant increase of frced displacement 
itself, the study of refugee movements has grown considerably over the years, as 
evidenced by the establishment of refugee-specific academic centers, scholarly 
journals, and research publications.  Since the 1950s, at least twenty major 
refugee organizations and academic centers have been established across the 
globe (Table 2).   
In an examination of refugee focused bibliographies, Richard Black 
(2001) noted a dramatic increase in the number of refugee-related article 
publications.  A 1939 bibliography contained one hundred entries (Brown 1939); 
by the publication of a 1981 bibliography, that number had grown to 
approximately eight hundred (Stein 1981). In 2001, the RefWorld database 
contained over two thousand articles.  Black’s examin tion of scholarly journals  
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also revealed a sharp increase in refugee-related contents.  For example, 
International Migration Review published twenty-seven refugee-specific articles 
in the last ten years, compared to only seven in the previous decade (Black 
2001).  In addition, the creation of the Journal of Refugee Studies by the Oxford 
Refugee Studies Program demonstrated interdisciplinary, scholarly commitment 
to the exploration of refugee-related topics.   
Given refugee studies’ focus on “the consistencies and patterns of the 
Table 2  
Important Dates in the Development of Refugee Studies 
  
Date  Organization/Academic Center 
1950 Association for the Study of  World Refugee Problem (AWR) 
1958 United States Committee for Refugees 
1963 AWR Bulletin 
1980 Refugee Reports (USCR) 
1981 Refugee Documentation Project;  Refugees; Refugee Review 
1982 Refugee Policy Group - Washington DC;  Refugee Abstracts 
1983 Refugee Studies Programme - University of Oxford, UK 
1985 
Refugee Studies Programme - Juba University, Sudan;  World Refugee 
Survey 
1988 
Centre for Refugee Studies- York University, Canada;  Journal of Refugee 
Studies; Refugee Participation Network; World Refuge Report 
1989   International Journal of Refugee Law 
1992 Moi University Centre for Refugee Studies - Kenya 
1993 Makerere University Human Rights and Peace Centre 
1994   Refugee Study Quarterly 
1995 Palestine Diaspora and Refugee Center 
  University of Dar es Salaam Centre for Study of Frced Migration 
  International Association for the Study of Forced Migration 
1998 Forced Migration Review 
1999 UNESCO/UNITWIN Network on Forced Migration  
  establishes links to the following refugee centers:  
  Oxford 
  An-Najah National University (Palestinian Authority) 
  Yarmouk University (Jordon) 
  University of Western Cape (South Africa) 
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refugee experience,” it is not surprising that researchers have attempted to 
construct classification systems in order to highlit such patterns (Peterson 
1958; Rogge 1979; Kunz 1981).  Like migration studies before it, refugee 
research pays close attention to the causes and effects of refugee movement.  
Conceptual ties can be made from two refugee typologies – one by John Rogge 
and the other by Egon Kunz – to the migration research of Lee.  Because of the 
nature of involuntary migration, refugee typologies generally focus on the 
numerous push factors that stimulate the forced move ent of people.  In 1979, 
John Rogge expanded the migration typology devised by William Peterson in 
1958 to further theorize the nature of refugee movement in Africa. 
Rogge’s typology is based upon the degree of freedom an individual has 
regarding his or her own flight.  The typology outlines the distinction between 
forced refugees and impelled refugees (Figure 6).  According to Rogge, forced 
refugees are expelled by an external force, such as a government, and retain 
absolutely no choice in the matter.  Idi Amin’s expulsion of Ugandan Asians in 
the 1970s and apartheid South Africa illustrate this type of refugee flow.  
Impelled refugees, however, retain some degree of ch ice regarding migration.  
These refugees have an opportunity to weigh factors, both internal and external, 
before migrating (Rogge 1979).  This is not to imply that impelled refugees are 
not forcibly displaced, but rather that they retain some control over the timing 



















influence and power of push factors, yet it also acknowledges the ability of 
refugees to resist and influence some aspects of their own flight.   
Egon Kunz introduced the second major typology intorefugee studies in 
1981.  In it, he classified refugees into three distinct types – self-alienated, 
Figure 6    
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majority identified, and events-alienated – based on their attitude toward their 
own displacement.  Self-alienating refugees are those who feel alienated from 
their society based on a variety of personal, sometimes philosophical, reasons.  
In Africa, self-alienation is a relatively minor occurrence.  Kunz, for example, 
incorrectly classified the expulsion of twenty thousand Jehovah’s Witness from 
Malawi to Zambia as an incident of self-alienating refugee movement (Kunz 
1981; Wills 1985).  Majority-identified refugees are those whose opposition to 
political and social events at home is shared by their compatriots.  These 
refugees typically “identify themselves enthusiastically with the nation though 
not with its government” (Kunz 1981: 43).  In Africa, most of the refugees 
produced during the liberation from colonial rule are classified as majority-
identified refugees (Kunz 1981).  In most cases, majority-identified refugees 
demonstrate a strong desire to return.   
Events-related refugees are those who have been subjected to 
discrimination and often outright violence, thus warranting a feeling of 
insecurity in their own homeland.  Kunz identified vents-alienated refugees as 
those whose “marginality was latent or suppressed but came to the fore in a 
sequence of events” (Kunz 1981: 43).  Events-related refugees “retain little 
interest” in what occurs back home and are “irreconcilably alienated” from their 
fellow citizens such that they only desire to return home when there is 
“substantial change” in the environment from which they fled (Kunz 1981: 43).  
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The majority of recent refugee movements in Africa fit into this category.  For 
example, the massive refugee influx of Burundian and Rwandan refugees into 
Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate a 
movement prompted by specific, often violent, events.  Kunz’s typology went on 
to identify characteristics of host communities, such as cultural compatibility, 
population policies, and social attitudes, and to distinguish between anticipatory 
and acute movements.     
Throughout the growth of refugee studies, there have been numerous 
calls to address refugee issues within the wider context of development 
(Chambers 1982, 1979; Keeley 1981; Stein 1982; Karadawi 1983; Goodwillie 
1983).  In fact, some argue that forced displacement ca  (and should) be treated 
within the context of other types of displacement, such as urbanization, 
globalization, illegal border crossing, international travel, and other forms of 
human mobility, all of which are connected to issues of and consequences of 
development. Robinson (2002: 326) calls for an understanding of development 
as  
processes of uneven accumulation are unfolding in 
accordance with a social and not a national logic, 
and that we may rethink development not as a 
national process, in which it ‘develops’ as a nation, 
but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and 
intermediate population groups occupying 
contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational 
environment 
 
Such treatment of forced displacement is not, however, without 
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difficulties.  For example, in Managing Displacement, Jennifer Hyndman has 
discussed the relationship between refugees and UNHCR workers.  She notes 
that although both are ostensibly “displaced,” the staff members in the camps are 
displaced by choice rather than force.  This creates  more privileged position 
for the staff.  According to Hyndman, “to compare these distinct groups of 
displaced people at all is to risk blurring the acute differences between them” 
(Hyndman 2000: 111). 
 
Bridging the Gap 
From concerns over the construction of “sense of place” to examinations 
of the “production of space,” geographers have become increasingly conscious 
of their own gaze.  They have begun to interrogate, nalyze, and theorize the 
fundamental geographic conceptualizations of space and place (Tuan 1977, 
1996; Entrikin 1991; Cosgrove 1985, 1989; Massey 1991; Cresswell 1996, 
2004, 2006; Sack 1997; Lefebvre 2002).  For example, Cr sswell’s 2004 book, 
Place: A short introduction, lays out the ways in which place plays an active rol
in the construction of society and culture, focusing on the notion of people, 
things, and behaviors having “appropriate” places.   
In the same vein, Sibley’s book Geographies of Exclusion examines how 
places are given meaning by defining who belongs and who does not belong.  
Sibley argues that the practice of spatial differentiation occurs because “power is 
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expressed in the monopolization of space and the relegation of weaker groups in 
society to less desirable environments (1995: ix).  Although the majority of 
Sibley’s book focuses on the geographies of exclusion within Western societies, 
many of his concepts and conclusions remain useful when applied in other 
contexts, such as the geographies of forced displacement within Africa.   
Numerous other cultural geographers have addressed the issue of the 
construction of place at length, paying particular attention to who belongs and 
who doesn’t (Tuan 1977; Harvey 1989, 1996; Massey 1994; Sack 1992; 
Cresswell 2004).  All of these studies represent a growing recognition of the 
need to understand the complex, dynamic processes involved in place-making, 
yet they nearly all do so in North American and European settings.  As noted by 
Myers, “humanistic cultural geographers have paid relatively little attention to 
sub-Saharan Africa” (2005: 21).  By examining similar questions in the African 
context, I aim not only to contribute to geography’s understanding of place, but 
also to answer Myers’ call for more “African humanist approaches to place 
meaning” which combine “detail of the political, material, symbolic, or historic 
struggles of people in places” (2005: 6).  
Although a discussion of place-making may seem “out of place” in a 
study of displacement, the two phenomena are intrinsically linked and mutually 
constitutive.  To be “displaced” assumes an attachment to or recognition of 
being “in place.”  Being “in” or “out” in this way also implies a specific space 
 52 
within which a person belongs or does not belong.  However, as the example of 
Ukwimi will demonstrates, the degree to which an individual is “in” or “out” of 
place is not static – it fluctuates and shifts.   
When examining the breadth of research coming out of migration 
studies, refugee studies, and African studies, one can identify a number of 
“gaps” between each of these disciplines.  In fact, Malkki argues that the 
contemporary category of “refugees” is a “particularly informative one in the 
study of the socio-political construction of space and place” (Malkki 1992: 25).  
It is my contention that the disciplinary concerns of geography provide a means 
through which to bridge some of these gaps.  As stated before, geographers have 
played an important role in the development of migration studies.   
Within the realm of refugee studies, geography's role is considerably less 
discernible.  In an attempt to gain a firmer grasp on the contributions of 
geographers to refugee studies, I expanded Black's 2001 study by recording the 
disciplinary backgrounds of author's contributing to the cornerstone Journal of 
Refugee Studies ince its inception in 1988 until December 2007 (Table 3). 
According to my findings, geographers contributed 23 articles (or approximately 
4%) to the Journal of Refugee Studies over the last two decades.  Although not 
as engaged as anthropologists, sociologists, or political scientists, it appears that 
geographers are speaking to their interdisciplinary counterparts within refugee 
studies much more than they are speaking amongst one another about refugee 
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studies.  To articulate this 
observation, I examined 
the number of articles  
concerning refugee issues 
that have been published in 
major geographic journals 
over the last fifty years.  
As seen in Table 4, the 
discipline’s discussions of 
research on refugee issues 
have been minimal.  I 
contend that this is a very 
serious gap in the 
discipline.  Only Geojournal has anything remotely resembling a commitment to 
refugee geographies.  For the key journals of the discipline, refugees are 
essentially a non-issue.   
Although explicit attention to refugee issues is lacking in geography’s 
key journals, many of the concepts and topics tackled by geographers have 
relevance to my approach to understanding Ukwimi.  In particular, geography’s  
use of landscape interpretation shaped a significant portion of work.  From early,  
descriptive accounts to current calls from more ‘critical’ approaches, the study  
Table 3 
Disciplinary Backgrounds of Authors 












Political Science 31 
International Relations 25 
Geography  23 
Economics 17 
Development Studies  14 
History 11 
Gender Studies 10 
Education 9 
Social Work 4 
Business  2 












of landscapes has played an integral role in the formation, evolution, and 
configuration of the disciple of geography.   
Geographers have long been attentive to importance of landscape in 
shaping (and being shaped by) a multitude of economic, social, cultural, and 
political processes.    From arguments that landscape is a stage upon which the 
impact of human processes can be seen (Sauer) or approaches which conceive of 
landscape as a “way of seeing” (Cosgrove), to those that view landscape as a 
‘text to be read’ (Duncan) or a tool of the masculinist gaze (Rose), geographers 
have not always agreed on how these dynamic processes operate nor on what 
role landscape plays.   
A discussion of Carl Sauer and the Berkeley School’s interpretation of 
Journal # of Articles Date Range Searched 
Geojournal 12 1997 – 2007
Annals (of AAG) 6 1955 – 2007
Professional Geographer 4 1949 – 2007
Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 4 1997 – 2007
Geografiska Annaler B 2 1965 – 2007
Gender, Place, and Culture 2 1994 – 2007
Antipode 2 1997 – 2007
Progress in Human Geography 1 1997 – 2007
Area 0 1997 – 2007
Transactions (of IBG) 0 1965 – 2007
Geographical Journal 0 1893 – 2007
Journal of Cultural Geography 0 1998 – 2007
Table 4 
Refugee-focused Articles in Geography Journals 
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landscape is a necessary starting point as Sauer is often credited with making 
landscape a foci of geography.  With his 1925 essay, Morphology of Landscape, 
Carl Sauer initiated an approach to understanding la dscapes that continues to 
influence how geographers approach the study of landscapes.   
Sauer’s ideas emerged in a time when the discipline was dominated by 
the approaches of environmental determinism, which viewed the environment as 
determinant of the social and cultural processes which took place upon it.  
Sauer’s conceptualization of nature, culture, and landscape sought to reverse the 
ideas put forth by environmental determinists, arguin , instead, that humans 
shaped their environments.  This approach concerned its lf with the material 
landscape and questions concerning the (negative) human impact on the natural 
environment, as well as a focus on tracing the origins and diffusion of cultural 
practices.   
Sauer’s approach to landscape was decidedly historically and culturally 
grounded.  The methods employed by this school of th ught include(d) areal 
description, distinguishing between natural and cultura  landscapes, and the 
examination of cultural artifacts.  Of particular interest to this essay is the idea 
that Sauer’s conceptualization of landscape treated lan scape as a stage for 
human action – in short, landscape was the obj ct to be studied.   
Denis Cosgrove’s contribution to the evolving understanding of 
landscape can be characterized as part of the ‘new cultural geography’ turn in 
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the discipline.  Drawing on the work of Raymond Williams, Cosgrove conceived 
of landscape as a “way of seeing”, rather than an object to be studied, described, 
classified, etc.  It is through landscape, Cosgrove argued, that we are reminded 
that “geography is everywhere”.  Cosgrove’s work can be credited with raising 
an awareness of the symbolic values imbued in landscapes.  In his work, 
Cosgrove called on geographers to begin decoding the symbolic landscapes 
around us.   
In line with much of the critical concerns of feminist geography, Gillian 
Rose’s work on landscapes is also an important contribution to geography’s 
attempts to tackle this important, yet contested, idea of landscape.  Rose’s 
concern with landscape seeks to apply a feminist critique of the tradition of 
landscape (and the practice of landscape interpretation, viewing, and reading) in 
cultural geography.  Rose’s deconstructive take on Thomas Gainsborough’s 
painting “Mr. and Mrs. Robert Andrews”, argues that the process of “looking” 
and “viewing” the landscape employs a masculinist gaze, which, in turn, 
feminizes nature and naturalizes the feminine.  By re-interpreting and 
deconstructing conventional understandings of landscape, Rose challenges 
geography and geographers to turn its gaze upon itself in a self-reflexive project.   
Each of these approaches to understanding landscape shar  a concern 
with the ways in which the landscape is/can be the embodiment of social 
relations.  All share the belief that the idea of landscape is an important 
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component of cultural geography – although they differ on exactly how and why 
that has come to be the case.  In my own interpretation of Ukwimi, I found 
myself utilizing the contributions of each of these geographers, as well as others.  
 
Conclusions 
An overview of the history of geographic thought con erning issues of 
human mobility facilitates a more complete understanding of how migration, 
both voluntary and involuntary, has been conceptualized.  From Ravenstein’s 
laws in 1885 to current calls for the “analytical treatment” of displacement, 
geography has continually engaged in the development of migration studies.  
This chapter has illustrated numerous attempts to simplify and classify what are 
essentially dynamic, fluid, and complex processes.  The theories, typologies, and 
classification systems developed within migration studies have, in turn, 
informed the language and development of refugee studies.   
Refugee studies, as an interdisciplinary and comparative field of study, 
leaves ample room for the participation of geographers.  By examining the 
overriding conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of migration and refugee 
research, we are able to address the current situations in Africa with an historical 
and comparative (and essentially geographic) perspective.  In addition, just as 
the language of migration studies influenced the development of refugee studies, 
so too, have refugee studies informed the mindset of the various national, 
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regional, and international organizations operating  refugee situations in 
Africa.  The following chapter turns its focus to the institutional context which 
mitigate in nearly all refugee situations and how the policies of such institutions 




















UNPACKING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Twenty years ago, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees consisted of some 
lawyers in Geneva revising and amending the 
international conventions concerning refugees.  
Now it is a global rapid-reaction force capable of 
putting fifty thousand tents into an airfield 
anywhere within twenty-four hours, or feeding a 
million refugees in Zaire.  The United Nations has 
become the West’s mercy mission to the flotsam of 
failed states left behind by the ebb tide of empire 
(Ignatieff 1995) 
 
Before examining the specific experiences of refugee-hosting in Ukwimi, 
it is necessary to outline the basic definitions, concepts, organizations, and 
ideologies that come into play in nearly any refugee-hosting environment.  
Within the institutional framework of refugee situaions, a primary concern 
revolves around the somewhat ambiguous and changing definition of the term 
“refugee” itself.  Numerous definitions have been employed across time and 
space, making concise and comparative analysis of various refugee situations 
difficult.  For the purposes of this dissertation, a number of international, 
regional, and national definitions of “refugee” must be examined in order to 
fully understand the legal and operational constrain s (and, in some instances, 
opportunities) facing the Ukwimi community.   
In addition to outlining the evolving operational definitions of the term 
“refugee”, this chapter also examines two other major tasks of the 
international/institutional players – namely, that of counting refugees and 
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settling refugees.  In doing so, I address the problematic nature of refugee 
statistics, describe the multiple organizations involved in assisting refugees, and 
examine the “durable solutions” advocated by such organizations.  In each of 
these discussions – that of defining, counting, andsettling refugees – I pay 
particular attention to how these activities have played out in the African 
context.  
 
Defining Refugees  
 Geographers and other social scientists have shown  analysis of the 
“power of definition” (Western 1981), as a crucial element of discourse, can 
have very practical implications for environmental justice, public welfare, and 
other social issues (Smith 1982).  This idea has direct relevance to refugee 
studies because eligibility requirements to receive refugee status within the 
international community are of paramount concern and re intrinsically attached 
to how a “refugee” is defined and who gets to do the defining (UNCHR 1979; 
Rogge 1979; Kunz 1981; Hathaway 1990, 1991; Chimni 2000).  Although what 
is meant by the term “refugee” can conceivably be determined in a variety of 
ways (via host government policies, international laws, or shared community 
experiences), the legal frameworks devised by the int rnational community 
appear to take precedence in most refugee situations. 
 Careful examination of international and regional legal documents 
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reveals the cautious nature in which such defining has been approached, thereby 
reflecting the significant power retained by the definer.  With regard to the legal 
status of refugees in Africa, three documents provide the foundation: 
1. 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951 UN Convention) 
 
2. 1967 Protocol to the UN Refugee Convention 
(1967 UN Protocol) 
 
3. 1969 Organization of African Unity Protocol 
(1969 OAU Protocol) 
 
 The first, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
remains the primary defining document within international law.  The 1951 UN 
Convention effectively created the office of the United Nation’s High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and established the basic tenets of 
international refugee law.  According to the 1951 UN Convention, a refugee is: 
[any person who] . . . owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence 
. . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it . . . (UNHCR 1951). 
 
The 1951 UN Convention limited its definition to people displaced by events 
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that occurred in Europe prior to January 1, 1951.  Because of these restrictions, 
it is portrayed by some scholars as a Western document with little or no 
relevance to the definition or protection of African refugees (Onyango 1986; 
Chimni 1998).  In addition, the 1951 UN Convention defined refugees as those 
who suffered individual persecution by their own governments, thereby 
considerably minimizing eligibility.  With respect to the African context, this 
particular limitation means that the hundreds of thusands of refugees generated 
in the struggle against colonialism would not qualify as “refugees” because their 
persecutors were outside colonial powers, not their own governments.  Because 
of the significant limitations of the definition outlined above, Hathaway 
described the 1951 UN Convention as “neither historically defensible nor 
practically meaningful” (1991: 65). 
 The second major document, the 1967 UN Protocol to the 1951 UN 
Convention, removed the chronological and geographic limitations of the 1951 
UN Convention and therefore extended the UNHCR’s mandate into Africa and 
the rest of the world.  The removal of temporal andgeographic conditions can be 
read as an acknowledgment that refugee situations were neither a temporary, nor 
solely European, phenomena.     
 In fact, by 1969, two-thirds of the UNHCR’s global program funds were 
being directed to Sub-Saharan Africa (UNHCR 2000).  At the same time, 
however, the 1967 UN Protocol held to the individual, government-inflicted 
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persecution clause of the original 1951 UN Convention.  Most of refugees in 
Africa during this period were fleeing more generalized violence resulting from 
the struggles for independence and, therefore, werenot actually brought under 
the protection of the 1967 UN Protocol (Chimni 2000).  By failing to amend the 
persecution clause, the 1967 UN Protocol left African refugees de facto 
excluded (Hathaway 1990).   
 In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted a refugee 
protocol (1969 OAU Protocol) of its own in response to massive refugee 
movements in the 1960s associated with decolonization, the struggle for 
independence, and civil wars that ensued in several countries.  Over half the 
refugee flows during this period originated in Portuguese colonies, and people 
who fled independent states were often fleeing situations directly related to the 
colonial legacy (Arboleda 1991).  This third governing document in African 
refugee situations incorporated much of the UN thinking, but expanded the 
definition to include anyone who:  
through aggression, occupation, foreign domination, 
or events gravely disturbing public order in part, o  
in all of his country of origin, or the country of 
which he has nationality, is obliged to leave his 
usual place of residence to seek refuge outside his 
country (OAU 1969).   
 
In addition, this broader terminology did not require refugees to justify 
persecution to the degree necessary for Convention s atus, reflecting the more 
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pragmatic nature of the OAU definition (Arboleda 199 ).  For example, the 
OAU definition allows for determination of refugee status by group, rather than 
by individuals.  Additionally, the 1969 OAU Protocol contains an absolute 
prohibition of refoulement (or involuntary return), whereas the 1951 UN 
Convention allows for refoulement in times of national emergency or in the 
name of national security.  However, it is important to note that the 1969 OAU 
Protocol is not binding on the international community, thereby significantly 
reducing many of its intended effects.   
 Many African countries have signed and ratified the OAU Convention.  
Their signatures remain valid even thought the OAU has been transformed into 
African Union (AU).  In addition, these AU countries have also ratified both the 
1951 UN Refugee Convention and 1967 UN Protocol (Appendix A).  The 
ratification of these documents demonstrates widespread acknowledgment of the 
responsibility of individual states, in cooperation with the international system 
and regional alliances, to extend protection to those who are able to establish 
“refugee” status.   
 The 1951 UN Convention, the 1967 UN Protocol, and the 1969 OAU 
Protocol lay the institutional groundwork for determining who receives official 
status as a refugee.  Although many argue that all such definitions and 
distinctions are inadequate, they nonetheless form the framework through which 
refugee situations throughout the world are examined and understood – a 
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discourse that wields considerable power in determining whether specific 
individuals and/or groups are guaranteed refugee protection by the signatories of 
these three legal documents.   
 
Counting Refugees  
 As the previous section highlighted, a lot of thought and caution went 
into establishing definitions and laws prescribing who “gets” to be a refugee and 
who does not.  The institutionalization of such definitions is seen most clearly in 
the practices and politics of counting refugees.  Statistical data is a core 
component in calls for donor assistance, as well as in the refugee studies 
discourse.  Almost every published work referring to refugee situations begins 
with a litany of numerical statements.  Such publications rarely address or 
acknowledge the problematic nature of refugee statistics.  According to refugee 
scholar Jeff Crisp, whereas “all of the standard works on refugees are replete 
with numbers, few even begin to question the source or accuracy of those 
statistics” (1999: 1).   
 To ignore these issues is to assume a degree of clarity and validity that is 
not an operational reality.  Nevertheless, the UNHCR website argues that the 
“complex world of refugees and the work of the UNHCR can often best be told 
through statistics” (UNHCR 2009).  An examination of refugee enumeration and 
intentional data manipulation on all sides serves to counter the claim that 
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statistics provide the “best” story of the complexity and fluidity of refugee 
situations.     
 The UNHCR’s interest in enumerating refugee populations dates back to 
its inception in 1950.  According a UNHCR statute, the High Commissioner 
“shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under the competence of his 
Office by . . . obtaining from governments information concerning the numbers 
and conditions of refugees in their territories” (UNHCR 1951).  In the early 
1990s, the UNHCR established two internal departmens – the Registration and 
Statistics Unit and the Population Data Unit – to cllect, compile, report, 
distribute, and analyze refugee statistics (Hovy 2001).  Their Statistical 
Yearbook, published since 1994, aims to “tell the refugee story on the basis of 
data, trends, and indicators” (UNHCR 2002c: 17).  These developments point to 
an increased reliance on statistics as a mechanism to assess the “true dimensions 
of global forced displacement” (UNHCR 2002c: 11).   
 The previous discussion concerning the shifting definition of the term 
“refugee” hints at the deeply problematic nature of refugee statistics.  Because 
the term itself is subject to various definitions and interpretations, dependable 
and comparable data are hard to generate (Crisp 1995).  “As a result of these 
different approaches, an individual who would be counted as a refugee in one 
part of the world might not qualify for that status in another” (Crisp 1999: 4).  
For example, those who can be granted refugee status under the auspices of the 
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1969 OAU Protocol might not gain status under a different regional framework 
– and vice versa. When the basic unit of measurement is ot clearly defined, 
enumeration exercises become tremendously difficult.   
 To complicate matters further, the UNHCR is commonly required to rely 
on numbers provided by the countries of origin and the countries of asylum 
because the UNHCR mandate does not empower the organization to count 
refugees on its own in every situation (Harrell-Bond et al 1992).  Generally, 
refugee statistics are calculated via the number of pe ple claiming assistance 
with ration cards.  These figures can be easily manipulated by all parties 
involved in the collection process.  For example, many non-camp, self-settled 
refugees do not receive formal assistance and therefor  do not receive a ration 
card.  On the other hand, many people secure numeros ration cards in an 
attempt to survive.  For example, a study in Ethiopia revealed that more than 75 
percent of the Somali refugees carried more than one ration card (Ryle 1992). 
 Governments, both those in countries of origin andthose in countries of 
asylum, are also apt to distort refugee data for many reasons.  To the extent that 
massive refugee movements symbolize the failure of the state, refugee-
producing countries may attempt to minimize the numbers.  Countries of origin 
employ several strategies by which to minimize state responsibility for 
displacement.  For example, Namibia and Rwanda have argued that their 
citizens have fled with the intention of conducting military activities against the 
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state on the behalf of opposition groups and not due to a failure of the national 
government (Crisp 1999).  Significant discrepancies also were apparent during 
mass movement of people between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1980s, with both 
countries accusing one another of number inflation (Crisp 1999).   
 To the extent that returnees signify political success and legitimacy, 
countries of origin have exaggerated the numbers of voluntarily repatriated 
populations.  In 1984, Milton Obote claimed that 400,000 Ugandans repatriated 
from Sudan and Zaire, while the UNHCR’s numbers indicated the Ugandan 
refugee populations in Sudan and Zaire were actually growing (Crisp 1986).  
The various strategies employed by refugee-producing states demonstrate the 
ways in which political interests and maneuvering can significantly affect the 
validity of refugee statistics.   
 Conversely, asylum countries have a tendency to exaggerate numbers in 
order to lighten the burden placed on them by the influx of refugee populations.  
According to Crisp, discussions of the politics of numbers “invariably turn to the 
way in which countries of asylum in developing regions make exaggerated 
claims about the number of refugees in their territory” (1999: 9).  Crisp has 
argued that the following set of assumptions about the motives of asylum 
countries inform the “conventional wisdom” which deems these motives 
“reprehensible”:  
• To embarrass the government of the country of 
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origin 
• To attract large amounts of humanitarian assistance 
• To cast favorable light on the country of asylum’s 
commitment to human rights 
• To provide employment opportunities to numerous 
bureaucrats 
• To ensure generous supplies of food and other relief 
items 
• To maximize the amount of foreign direct 
investment  (Crisp 1999: 9) 
 
Crisp contends that the notion that host countries “always cheat the figures” is 
“a crude and, given its prevalence in expatriate circles, perhaps even a racist 
one” (1999: 9).  In fact, the motives of African governments to inflate the 
numbers may actually stem from the inefficiency of the UNHCR to deliver 
assistance in a timely or adequate manner: 
The belief of all staff and officials involved, that 
emergency relief shipments, at least of bulk 
commodities such as wheat, are likely to take weeks 
rather than days, leads officials to further generous 
overestimates of numbers.  For example, one 
official declared that he usually doubled the figures 
that he had estimated, in the knowledge that by the 
time deliveries were made, there might well be a 
shortfall in quantities delivered and a significant 
increase in the grand total seeking relief as 
inaccurately assessed numbers of daily arrivals 
continued to accumulate.  In a sense, this may be 
described as contingency planning (Romanovsky 
and Stephenson 1995: 4). 
 
The motivation for inflating the numbers, then, does not always stem from 
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“reprehensible” motives.  Instead, it can illustrate a degree of humanitarian 
rationale on the part of host countries.   
 Despite many concerns, UNHCR data remain the princi al source of 
refugee data.  As such, this dissertation also necessarily utilizes UNHCR’s 
numbers in order to provide some indication of the scale of refugee movements.  
The preceding discussion of the inherent limitations and problems associated 
with these numbers seeks to reveal the problematic n ure of such numbers and 
to avoid verbatim citation of UNHCR statistics.  While we must utilize the 
statistical data provided by UNHCR as an indicator of ealities on the ground, 
we must do so with an understanding that such data not derived in a vacuum.  
 The total number of “people of concern” (POC) to the UNHCR reached 
over 34 million at the end of 2008 (UNHCR 2009).  The term “people of 
concern” is used by the UNHCR to describe a range of categories of people who 
may or may not be covered under the previously discus ed legal frameworks, 
but who receive attention (and in some cases assistnce) from the international 
community.  As such, POC numbers include refugees, asylum seekers, returned 
refugees, IDPs, returned IDPs, and various others.  Due to the restrictive nature 
of the legal definition of a “refugee”, 58% of the POC do not receive refugee 
status and instead fall into other categories.   
 Several trends emerge from examining the geographic distribution of 
major refugee-producing and refugee-hosting countries.  The top three producers 
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(Colombia, Iraq, and Afghanistan) generated nearly 10 million of the 32 million 
global population.  Following these three, Sudan, DRC, and Uganda generated 
approximately 2 million each.  As such, those six countries constitute nearly ½ 
of the global population. In terms of hosting, two of top three hosting countries 
(Colombia and Iraq) are also top producers, meaning that most of the POC in 
these countries are internally displaced.  This is true of the fourth, fifth, and sixth 
highest refugee-hosting countries as well (Uganda, DRC, and Sudan).  The fact 
that the lists of the highest refugee-producing andrefugee-hosting countries are 
nearly identical speaks volumes about the unstable environments in which many 
of the UNHCR's POC are residing.  Such levels of insecurity have very real 
practical, as well as policy, implications.   
 Another significant trend in relation to the global dynamics of forced 
displacement is nearly 90% of the world’s refugees originated from developing 
countries.  Furthermore, these developing countries provided asylum to more 
than 70% of the global refugee population.  The United States and Germany, 
hosting nearly 1 million and 700,000 POC respectively, are the notable 
exceptions in the industrialized world.  This unequal distribution of refugees 
emphasizes the responsibilities of developed nations n providing mechanisms 
for increased burden sharing.   
 Approximately 10 million of the 34 million “people of concern” to the 
UNHCR are Africans – 2.33 million refugees and 6.3 million IDPs (UNHCR 
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2009). Of the top seven refugee-producing countries in the world, four are 
African countries – Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
and Burundi (UNHCR 2009). An interesting feature of refugee populations in 
Africa is that major refugee-producing countries are simultaneously major 
refugee-hosting countries, such as Sudan and DRC. Tanzania and Zambia are 
notable exceptions to this trend, generating few refugees while simultaneously 
hosting millions of their neighbors. Sub-Saharan African refugees also face 
unique circumstances with regard to their settlement options and realities. 
Approximately 1/3 of refugee worldwide reside in camp environments, but in 
sub-Saharan Africa an estimated 7 out of every 10 refugees find themselves 
living in refugee camps (UNHCR 2009). 
 
Managing Refugees  
 The practical requirements of managing refugees and their environments 
are what transformed the UNHCR from “some lawyers in Geneva” to a “global 
rapid response force” (Ignatieff 1995).  Countless organizations operate within 
refugee situations across the globe.  However, the main actors are typically 
identified as the UNHCR, a collection of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and particular host governments (Blavo 1994).  The UNHCR, the 
leading international coordinator of refugee relief operations, uses NGOs to 
implement many of its relief operations.  Host governments, as signatories to the 
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international refugee laws, are responsible for providing security to asylum 
seekers.  All three actors operate within refugee situations at various scales and 
configurations.    
 According to B. S. Chimni, a leading scholar of refugee law at 
Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, the “history of an organized 
response to the refugee problem can be traced to the birt  of the League of 
Nations” (2000: 210).  This began in 1921 when Dr. Fridtjof Nansen became the 
first High Commissioner:   
In studying the work of the League of Nations on 
behalf of refugees in the period from 1919 to 1939, 
it is clear that the handling of the refugee problem, 
although it was fundamentally a humanitarian one, 
was constantly complicated and often hamstrung by 
political, economic, and social factors which 
demanded an international authority.  Only the 
League of Nations, including among its members 
most of the countries affected and concerned with 
the refugee problem, could co-ordinate the efforts f 
governments and non-governmental organizations, 
negotiate with the countries of origin, and conciliate 
the divergent economic and social interests of 
different countries  (Holborn 1956: 3-18).   
 
 In 1938, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was 
established to handle the influx of Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria 
(Chimni 2000).  According to John Stoessinger, the history of international 
refugee protection is a “procession of temporary agencies, each established to 
solve what is essentially a long-term problem” (1956: 197).  By the end of 1946, 
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the High Commissioner of the League of Nations transferred his duty to protect 
refugees to the IGCR which retained that responsibility until the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) assumed the job in 1947 (Holborn 1956).  IRO 
policy maintained that the refugee problem was a simple product of war, not an 
enduring, global issue (Salomon 1990).   
 The UNHCR was established by the UN General Assembly under Article 
22 of the UN Charter in 1950.  Originally established to handle refugee 
situations in Europe, it has extended and expanded its mandate since 1967.  
UNHCR’s growing budget reflects the extent of this expansion – $300,000 at 
inceptions, $5 million in the 1960s, $70 million in the 1970s, $1.3 billion in the 
1990s (Zetter 1999).  In addition, the UNHCR has greatly expanded its 
partnerships with NGOs.  In the mid-1960s, the UNHCR worked with fewer 
than 20 NGOs and nearly all of those 20 were large, int rnational NGOs.  Today, 
UNHCR works with more than 600 NGOs, the majority of which are non-
international (local or national) NGOs.  Another indication of the UNHCR’s 
expansion is geographic: the organization now has 268 offices in 111 countries 
and 144 countries are signatories of the UN Refugee Convention and/or 
Protocol.  At its inception, the UNHCR staff numbered 33; however, today, 
UNHCR employs 6,289 people, creating a ratio of UNHCR staff to refugees of 
approximately 1: 5,000 (UNHCR 2000). 
 In most cases, the international community’s respon e to mass 
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displacement via the UNCHR has been reactive in nature, rather than 
preventative or proactive.  The UNHCR reacts in phases, or what Zetter outlines 
as a “classical model.”  Before mobilizing any aid, the UNHCR must obtain a 
mandate agreement with the host country, thereby officially establishing 
international recognition of a refugee emergency (Zetter 1999).  The second 
phase consists of an assessment mission that focuses on defining the scale and 
distribution of the situation.  The mobilization of supplies, the third phase, is 
driven by basic emergency response tactics aimed at reducing disease, 
starvation, and mortality.  The final stage, referred to as “care and maintenance,” 
concentrates on development programs to promote self-sufficiency (Zetter 
1999).  These phases are constantly evolving, especially given the relatively 
recent focus on repatriation and the complexity of new forms of displacement. 
 Generally speaking, the UNHCR is not an operational agency and, 
therefore, depends on its operational partners (NGOs) to deliver and execute 
relief programs.  In 2006, the UNHCR worked with 649 such “implementing 
partners” (UNHCR 2006).  Because of the massive numbers of different NGOs 
that operate in refugee situations, much of the following is, necessarily, a broad 
generalization.  In a sense, NGOs operate as subcontra tors to the international 
community via the UNHCR.  They populate the front li es of relief operations 
and have fewer restrictions than the UNHCR, which is accountable to the UN 
General Assembly.  Lower levels of bureaucracy allow NGOs to react rapidly to 
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refugee movements.  For example, Oxfam installed a water supply system for 
800,000 Rwandan refugees in only eighteen days (Zetter 1999).  According to 
Zetter, the nature of NGOs inevitably gives way to a patron-client relationship 
with refugees (and their hosts – as Ukwimi demonstrates), which has the danger 
of reinforcing a discourse of refugee vulnerability while ignoring the resilience 
of refugee communities.   
 Host governments also play a critical role in relief operations.  Zetter 
(1999) outlined three objectives that drive host policies regarding refugees: 
containment, control, and burden-sharing.  Most of the developed world has 
considerable choice when trying to contain refugee flows, often implementing 
quotas and strict asylum-granting policies.  However, d veloping countries do 
not have this luxury.  Frequently, the only way they are able to contain refugee 
flows is by restricting the population to a specific geographic area, typically a 
borderland near the country of origin (Westin 1999).   
 Control, the second major objective, requires the host government to 
maintain its institutional credibility (Zetter 1999).  However, the increased 
internationalization of relief operations can threaten and undermine state 
authority.  This fragile balance between needing help y t maintaining state 
autonomy leads into the third, and perhaps most important, objective of host 
governments – burden-sharing.  Although the causes of refugee movements are 
often global in nature, the burden is generally heaviest on host governments, 
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which are typically some of the poorest countries in the world themselves.  
Burden-sharing was formally institutionalized by the International Conference 
on Assistance to Refugees in Africa II (ICARA II) in 1984 (Blavo 1994).  
ICARA II sought to secure additional assistance for refugees in order to meet 
needs without depriving host countries of existing development resources.  As 
we move into the details concerning Ukwimi in subsequent chapters, it will be 
evident that ICARA II was more than just a meeting of words and 
proclamations.  In fact, ICARA II funds actually built the road upon which I 








Settling Refugees  
 Although refugees themselves ideally should make decisions to resolve 
their own situations, the language of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other dominant players controls the discussion of 
Photograph 3: ICARA II-funded road to Ukwimi 
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potential solutions for the African refugee crisis, and such policies effectively 
dictate the future settlement patterns and opportunities of most refugee 
populations.  Within that context, three options typically exist for handling a 
given influx: resettlement to a third country, local integration, and voluntary 
repatriation.   
 Generally speaking, local integration has been the least-problematic 
solution, although it becomes more difficult as the sheer scale of displaced 
people increases.  Voluntary repatriation involves the autonomous decision by 
refugees to return to their country of origin.  It is the latest “best solution” 
according the UNHCR, NGOs, and host governments.  However, voluntary 
repatriation has yet to prove a durable solution because of questions of the 
“voluntariness” of said repatriation.  The third and least utilized option is 
resettlement to a third (typically Western) country.  The three options are not 
mutually exclusive, and refugee populations often employ variations of each.   
 Many factors influence the degree to which refugees integrate into and 
affect the local community.  These include, but arenot limited to, length of 
displacement, size of displaced population, ratio of refugees to locals, 
appropriateness of aid, and ways in which refugees s ttle.  Two distinct patterns, 
self-settlement and organized settlement, emerge following the massive influx of 
refugees into a community (Kuhlman 1994).  According to the UNHCR, 50 
percent of African refugees reside in refugee camps while 10 percent live on 
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their own in urban areas (2002).  The advantages and disadvantages of each type 
of settlement strategy have been debated within refugee studies, with some 
scholars clearly on one-side or the other.  I would however suggest that it takes 
careful consideration of events on the ground to assess the feasibility or value of 
either system.   
 The disadvantages, advantages, and effects of self-settlement are difficult 
to assess because of limited study and the unregulat d nature of such 
settlements.  Self-settled refugees rarely register with any entity and, therefore, 
must rely on the local, rather than global, community for assistance.  
Relationships with local people enable self-settled r fugees to rent or borrow 
land and other common property resources (Jacobsen 1997).  Additionally, the 
pressures on the environment and community are less concentrated when 
refugees self-settle.  
 The UNHCR and their NGO partners advocate the settlement of refugee 
populations into organized communities.  Proponents of such settlements cite the 
merits of concentrating and containing the environme tal impacts placed on the 
land by a sudden influx of people (Jacobsen 1997).  Generally, organized 
settlements emerge in one of two forms – an agricultural settlement or a refugee 
camp.   
 Agricultural settlements were strongly encouraged by the UNHCR and 
host governments in the 1960s as alternatives to camps.  In fact, between 1971 
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and 1988, over 155 agricultural settlements for refug es were established 
throughout Africa (Jacobsen 1997).  The objectives of agricultural settlements 
are threefold: to encourage self-sufficiency, to relieve donor countries of long-
term financial responsibility, and to promote rural development.  There are, 
however, some negative consequences to agricultural settlements.  The 
allotments of land are often insufficient in meeting the needs of individuals and 
families.  As a result, refugees engage in continuous cultivation that degrades the 
soil quality and thereby decreases yields.  In the end, the insufficient becomes 
decreasingly sufficient.   
 In his study of the socioecological consequences of agricultural 
settlements in Kenya, Asmarom Legesse demonstrated the problematic nature of 
settlement schemes that do not take into account “proxemic, social, or ecological 
imperatives” (1998: 235).  Legesse revealed stark contrasts between the 
traditional Borana built environment and the one constructed in response to the 
influx of displaced populations.  The planned settlement, Olla Hiyyessa 
(“Village of the Poor”) did not incorporate the traditional settlement principles 
and relied instead on “modern” designs and technologies.  The result was a 
disruption of customary social and spatial organization, and thereby a loss of 
community and increased dependence on missionary aid (Legesse 1998).  
According to Legesse, the incompatibility of these planned settlements 
demonstrated that “economic aid, agricultural and technical expertise, and good 
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intentions are not enough to effectively rehabilitate uprooted communities” 
(1998: 243).   
 Camp settlements, which dominate the refugee landscape in Africa, are 
typically constructed as temporary, emergency relief centers near borderlands.  
However, many have become permanent fixtures and some observers argue that 
they constitute “virtual cities” (Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000).  
Present-day camps are comparable to cities with regard to their population 
density, layout, infrastructure, and trading activities.  The infrastructure and 
amenities developed by the UNHCR/NGOs instigate the economic development 
of the refugees and local population.   
 Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja’s examination of the Kakuma and 
Dadaab camps in northern Kenya revealed that the camps had better health and 
educational facilities than the rest of the region.  I  the Dadaab settlement, the 
population had access to electricity, running water, a slaughterhouse, and 
numerous health facilities.  In fact, the presence of refugees can stimulate trade, 
create jobs, and attract humanitarian aid.  According to Perouse de Montclos and 
Kagwanja, these camps “emerge as urban enclaves in a sparsely populated and 
economically underdeveloped part of Kenya” (2000: 206).    
 The challenge of organized settlements lies in their degree of 
sustainability.  Governments tend to favor organized s ttlements because then 
international NGOs have the responsibility to meet th  needs of the displaced 
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population.  This diminishes the strain on the local population.  From an 
environmental perspective, organized settlements hinder local integration and 
thus inhibit the transference of local knowledge.  In situations where refugees 
are displaced to environments that are not similar to the environment they are 
fleeing, the dispersion of local knowledge regarding appropriate land use 
practices becomes important (Jacobsen 1997).   
 The sustainability of large-scale organized settlements is debatable.  
Jacobsen has argued for the construction of smaller, mo e widely dispersed 
settlements.  She suggested that host governments r-evaluate their current 
preference for large organized settlements because it would be in their best 
interests to promote the dispersion of developmental i puts such as health 
clinics, improved water supplies, roads, and other infrastructure.  However, this 
process cannot and should not occur overnight.   
 A major obstacle to the reduction and dispersion of organized settlements 
is the inherent outlook of the UNHCR, which sees itself as an apolitical, 
humanitarian organization rather than as a development organization, and even 
less so as an environmental organization.  Additionally, Jacobsen has urged that, 
“just as refugees have access to local resources, so local peoples should be able 
to benefit from the assistance provided to refugees such as health care and clean 
water”.  However, the UNHCR’s mandate and commitment to being apolitical 
virtually eliminates the feasibility of such cooperation.   
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Conclusions 
After providing a brief overview of the history of the international 
response to refugee situations, this chapter has demonstrated the problematic 
nature of some of the taken-for-granted assumptions inherent in the institutional 
context. The disjuncture between legal definitions of “refugee” and the 
operational realities of displacement exposes some serious flaws in the 
international system and suggests that the international community – the 
UNHCR in particular – may need to employ its “power of definition” to better 
reflect the realities of forced displacement.   
These definitional flaws, coupled with intentional manipulation, feed into 
the unreliability of refugee statistics.  The overvi w of the three major players 
within the refugee system illustrated some of the strategies and objectives held 
by each player and argued that greater attention shuld be applied to a fourth set 
of actors – the most powerful nations of the develop d world.  The final section 
of this chapter examined the “durable” solutions proposed by the UNHCR and 
its partners.  These solutions are informed by ambiguous definitions of the term 
“refugee,” highly questionable statistics, and numerous geopolitical interests.  In 
their failings, such solutions have significant, and often hazardous, 
environmental, social, and geographic consequences.  The task now is to situate 
the preceding chapters into the Zambian context by reviewing Zambia’s 
relationship with the refugee relief regime.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE-HOSTING IN ZAMBIA 
 
 
It is customary to talk about a war ‘breaking out’ as
though it were a bush fire in which a tuft of grass 
begins to smoulder and soon there are flames 
everywhere without any human agency being to 
blame.  But wars do not ‘break out’ in this sense; 
someone causes them although it may sometimes be 
hard to identify the original aggressor.  Equally 
when I read of a nation “drifting into” war I do not 
know what is meant – this is another of those 
phrases which mislead us into thinking that wars 
are not human creations but scourges like the 
plague sent by the gods.  On this reckoning, 
violence has no human agents, only human victims 
(Kaunda 1980: 143) 
 
The overwhelming majority of research conducted within refugee studies 
is focused on the experiences, challenges, and needs of refugees, with little to no 
sustained efforts to understand the experiences, challenges, and needs of their 
hosts.  I maintain that such privileging of the refugee within our research is 
detrimental to our ability to understand the realities on the ground in any place 
that finds itself hosting refugees.   
Whether the goal of a particular research project is to provide a critique 
of refugee relief aid, or to incite policy change at the international level, or to 
contribute to geography's concern with the construction of places, we cannot 
achieve such goals without explicit, direct, and substantiative attention to 
refugee-hosting communities.  As argued by Bakewell:  
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For the people who live in the villages on both side  
of the border, the focus on the ‘refugee problem’ 
deflects attention from the difficulties which they 
share with all the other residents of this isolated 
area of Africa.  For the most part, people’s major 
worries are not special problems for refugees but 
problems shared by all (2000: 371).  
 
By calling for increased attention to hosts, I want to make clear that I am 
not advocating for yet another essentialist representation (Bracken et al 1997; 
Eastmond 1998) which would add “refugee/host” to an already burgeoning list 
of binary (and often oppositional) representations (victim/survivor, 
resilient/vulnerable, bogus/genuine, regular/irregular, 
displacement/emplacement, rooted/uprooted, deserving/undeserving, 
outside/inside, asylum seeker/citizen, problem/resource) which only serve to 
highlight the pervasive influence of Cartesian dualism in our western mode of 
thinking.  Instead, I am simply arguing that nearly every piece of refugee-
centered research would have been better served had it been more inclusive of 
host communities. 
In order to understand the dynamics of refugee-hosting at Ukwimi, we 
must have a general grasp of the national context in which the people of Ukwimi 
were situated.  Just as the previous chapter provided the institutional context for 
refugee situations, this chapter establishes the national context in which refugee-
hosting occurred by providing a basic historical overview of Zambia, outlining 
Zambia's continual commitment to refugee-hosting, turning the gaze away from 
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the concerns of the international and/or institutional players and focusing on 
how particular states manage the burdens (and, in some cases, optimize the 
benefits of) being host to substantial numbers of refugees.   
In setting this national context, I begin by examining precolonial history 
of present-day Zambia with particular attention to migrations into the area.  
Next, I outline Zambia's colonial history, especially in relation to the creation of 
its present-day boundaries.  In the final sections f this chapter, I provide a 
general history of Zambia from independence onwards, alongside a description 
of major inflows of refugees during this time and the subsequent camps and/or 
settlements established to provide them protection.    
 
Pre-colonial Period 
When outlining the pre-colonial history of the people of Zambia, it is 
important to keep in mind that “there is no such thing as a sure point of 
origin...but that doesn't mean there isn't history” (Hebdige 1987: 1).  As such, 
the human history of Zambia is a “continuous history f the movement of 
peoples” (Brelsford 1956: 4).  Archaeological digs are rich with evidence of 
humans in the Early, Middle, and Late Stone Age (Brelsford 1956, Roberts 
1976, Burdette 1988).  The famous human skeletal remains of “Broken Hill 
Man” provided evidence of human presence around Kabwe over 125,000 years 
ago.  However, archaeologist Brain Fagon suggests that a variety of 
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circumstances (tsetse fly, grass shortages during dry season, and problems 
clearing the tropical hardwood forests) kept prehistor c Zambia relatively under-
populated (Fagon 1966).   
Between the fourth and sixth centuries, the first Bantu migrants began 
their southward migration into present-day Zambia.  The gradually Bantu 
expansion continued for about 1,700 years “slowly and no doubt spasmodically, 
but nevertheless quite surely and definitely southwards” (Brelsford 1956: 1).  By 
1500, much of Zambia was populated by farming people who are more or less 
ancestral to the majority of Zambia's present-day inhabitants (Burdette 1988). 
During the 18th and 19th centuries, chieftainship grew into the “most 
important political institution” (Burdette 1988: 80) in Zambia.  There is general 
agreement that the first chiefs came and settled in Zambia from the Lunda and 
Luba people of southeastern and southwestern Congo respectively (Langworthy 
1972; Chipungu 1992).  From this migration, several strong kingdoms and 
dynasties emerged – the Undi Dynasty and the Bemba (under Chitimukulu) in 
the east and the north-east, the Tonga, Lenje, and Il  in the south, and the Luvale 
and the Lozi in the west.   
During the middle years of the nineteenth century, Zambia was 
profoundly changed by external pressures, influences, and intrusions, such that 
“one continual theme of Zambian history is the link between events in Zambia 
and events in neighboring areas” (Langworthy 1972: 10).  From the east 
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(Mozambique) and the west (Angola), the Portuguese arrived, seeking slaves 
and ivory.  East African traders came from the north to compete with the 
Portuguese for slaves and ivory.   
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly for the purpose of our 
coming discussions, an “outpouring of peoples from South Africa, fleeing the 
conflicts of Boer and Zulu over land and cattle” arrived on Zambia's doorstep 
(Burdette 1988: 9).  In 1820, the Ngoni, led by Zwangendaba, fled north from 
Chaka's mfecane in South Africa, conquering and settling in eastern Zambia (as 
well as Malawi and Tanzania).  Additionally, the Kolol , under the direction of 
Chief Sebitwane, fled Chaka's wars, reaching Barotseland in 1823 and 
conquering the Lozi.  Though Chaka is often credited with the “scattering” of 
peoples across southern Africa, the incursions of the Portuguese and Afrikaners 
into Zulu land also played a role.   
The territory of present-day Zambia provided a sense of security due to 
three critical characteristics:  
• It was geographically distant from origin of flight 
(especially with Kololo and Ngoni) 
• Its prior inhabitants were numerically and/or militar ly 
ill-equipped to resist  
• Its environmental conditions suited the agricultural or 
pastoral practices of migrants  
 
These three factors combined to turn 19th century Zambia upside-down, turning 
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it into a place of refuge where a variety of ethnicities regrouped and in doing so 
recreated geographies across the territory.  
As this discussion has demonstrated, Zambia’s pre-colonial history is a 
story of migrations – but not just any kind of migrations.  In fact, if we were to 
use today's institutional framework (as laid out in Chapter 3), Zambia's 
precolonial history would be more accurately described as a story of refugee 
movements.  From the Bantu expansion to the flight of the Ngoni and Kololo, 
the vast majority of Zambian settlers came from areas outside the present-day 
territory of Zambia.  Given these realities, Nyerer (1983) argues that:  
If one looks at what are called African tribal 
migrations over recent centuries, many of the 
movements would today be defined as a 'refugee 
problem'.  Minority groups, or dissident families, 
were fleeing from the dominant authorities and 
moved to what is now a different country.  Very 
many African nations are made up of a lot of waves 
of refugees. 
  
As noted by Nyerere, the majority of these migrants were quite similar to 
refugees of today in terms of the casual (or “push”) factors of their forced 
migrations.  However, unlike their present-day counterparts, precolonial 
migrants' refuge was “provided primarily by geography and ecology rather than 
by sovereign power or international conventions” (Chanda 1995: 18).  However, 
that was about to change with the colonial construction of Northern Rhodesia, 
the imposition of colonial rule, the significant alercations to traditional systems 
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and borders, and the subsequent independence from such rule. 
 
Colonial Period 
The formation of modern-day Zambia into its “colonial present” can be 
traced to the early groundwork of slave traders and missionaries throughout the 
19th century (Gregory 2004).  Although the activities of these groups predated 
formalized colonialism, many of the records, reports, and maps they produced 
provided the necessary details to entice the interests of colonial powers.  The 
Berlin Conference in 1885 carved the continent intoformal holdings, resulting 
in a “patchwork of colonial possessions” (Barratt-Brown 1997: 20).  Britain and 
France were the two dominant colonial powers, in terms of territory and lasting 
impacts, while Portugal, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Belgium claimed other key 
parcels.   
The artificial and geometric borders (and therefore modern African state 
territories) were devised in conjunction with the gopolitical interests of 
particular colonial powers.  The resulting lines therefore had (and have) little to 
no regard for existing nationalities, physical features, or historical legitimacy 
(Aryeety-Attoh 2003).  Clearly, the nature of these borders influences the 
experiences, root causes, and potential opportunities of displaced Africans: 
The geography and history of Africa means that one 
common feature of refugee movements on the 
continent is that the refugees often arrive in the host 
countries in remote rural areas far from the state 
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capital.  The borders imposed by colonial powers 
cut across many ethnic groups and in many cases 
the people of the frontier areas have a loose 
relationship with the distant state whose authority is 
frayed at its edges.  The people of different 
nationalities on either side of the border may have 
more in common with each other than either group 
has with their corresponding co-nationals from the 
capital (Bakewell 2001: 2).  
  
All of the boundaries mapped at the Berlin Conference required each 
potential colonial power to demonstrate some degree of “ ffective occupation” 
and, as such, the post-Berlin Conference period is often referred to as the 
“Scramble for Africa” as each colonial power sought to reinforce the territories 
it had grabbed in Berlin.  For the British, much of this work in southern Africa 
was done by Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BSAC).  In 
1889, Rhodes persuaded the British government to grant him a charter for 
BSAC – a charter which allowed him to use the authority of the British 
government to stake out claims in the region and make treaties with African 
rulers.   
The boundaries within which Rhodes' BSAC was allowed to operate 
were not clearly defined at the time, so Rhodes' set out to fulfill his vision of 
asserting British control from Cape to Cairo.  Rhodes’ vision of coloring the 
African map red from Cape to Cairo put him in conflict with the Portuguese in 
Angola and Mozambique, the Belgians in the Congo Free State, and the 
Germans in east Africa.  A treaty was struck easily w th the Germans; however, 
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the Portuguese, Belgians and British worked quickly in fierce competition with 
each other to obtain treaties with indigenous kingdoms.  
With respect to the region comprising modern-day Zambi , BSAC first 
secured a treaty with the Lozi Litunga [King], Lewanika, in 1890 which granted 
mineral rights in the area to BSAC.  Rhodes later used this treaty (Lochner 
Treaty) as the basis upon which to form North-western Rhodesia out of the 
Barotseland Protectorate.  Treaties with kingdoms and chieftainships in the 
eastern region led to the formation of North-eastern Rhodesia.  The two BSAC 
holdings, divided by the Kafue River and eventually b  a railway were 
administered separately.   
The northern boundaries of BSAC's charter were not explicit and neither 
were Leopold's southern boundaries, and so an intense scramble for the Katanga 
area ensued (Map 1):   
Although Leopold had declared his southern 
boundary, there was virtually no Congo State 
presence of any kind in large parts of the area within 
it. Rhodes, also drawn by the mirage of gold, had his 
own designs on the Katanga region. In 1890, he and 
the Congo State sent separate expeditions to secure 
the submission of Msiri, ruler of that part of Katang  
where gold was thought to exist. The State’s 
expedition got there first, killed Msiri, and 
established what was considered in diplomatic 
circles, though without much concrete evidence on 
the ground, effective occupation (Katzenellenbogen 

















Rhodes’ greatest defeat was not gaining the copper-rich Katanga area 
which comprises the thumb of the Democratic Republic of Congo dividing 
Zambia in the north (Roberts 1976).  Although Rhodes' designs on Katanga 
failed, his success in securing North-western Rhodesia and North-eastern 
Rhodesia at least “enabled him to challenge any attemp  by the Portuguese to 
link up their colonies from east to west” (Roberts 1976: 161).   
Colonial Zambia was officially created in 1911 when North-western 
Rhodesia and North-eastern Rhodesia were formally joined and renamed 
Map 1: Katanga Area 
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Northern Rhodesia.  For much of the BSAC’s rule, Northern Rhodesia was 
merely a supplier of labor and little else.  In fact, Northern Rhodesia's “original 
raison d’etre was as a labor reserve for the developing white areas of Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa” until at least the 1920s (Henderson 1974: 295).  For 
much of its initial control under BSAC, the country ook a back seat to the more 
productive Southern Rhodesia, becoming “an awkwardly shaped piece of debris 
resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga” (Roberts 1976: 175).  
However, BSAC “rapidly discovered what would become th  raison d’etre of 
this territory for the entire twentieth century, its metals” (Myers 2003: 57). 
In 1924, the BSAC’s Northern Rhodesia passed into the possession of 
the British Colonial Office.  At the time, BSAC negotiated to maintain its 
mineral rights in the north-west, which the British Colonial Office considered 
(wrongly) to be a “minor concession” (Roberts 1976: 182).  At the time of hand-
over, the Colonial Office was determined to find a w y for Northern Rhodesia to 
“pay its own way” (Roberts 1976: 183) by encouraging white settlement:  
When the Colonial Office assumed administrative 
responsibilities in colonial Zambia in 1924, the 
white population was relatively small.  However, 
this was soon to change. The man responsible for 
this change was the first governor of the 
protectorate after the BSA Company had 
relinquished its rule on 1 April 1924.  Governor 
Herbert Stanley, who began his African career in 
South Africa, envisaged a large white-controlled 
dominion stretching from the Cape to Kenya in 
which the Rhodesians were to play a key role.  To 
encourage white settlement in Northern Rhodesia, 
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he set aside blocks of land for European use.  
Governor Stanley put in place measures that 
encouraged white settlement of the territory.  This 
development soon brought them into direct conflict 
with African social, economic, and political 
aspiration and interests (Phiri 2006: 15) 
 
Under Stanley's guidance, the government set aside blocks of land for 
European migration.  Following the example of Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa, the Colonial Office created distinctions betw en Crown land and African 
reserves, forcibly moving locals from their land onto native reserves (Roberts 
1976, Chipungu 1992).  Although the creation of native reserves was in some 
ways a response to pressure from Europeans for land, their desire to occupy the 
land did not last.  For example:  
In the Eastern Province, the tobacco industry 
collapsed in 1927, forcing many settler farmers to 
abandon their farms, which reverted to bush. On the 
other hand, the reserves were overcrowded with 
livestock and human beings, contributing thereby to 
excessive soil erosion, poor crop yields, famine, ad 
death (Musambachime 1992: 18 – 19). 
 
According to one resident of Petauke District at the time,  
We were moved away from our homes (so) that 
Europeans might come and live there. No 
Europeans have come and soon there will be none 
of us left here. If we stay here, we shall know that 
the government has destroyed us (NAZ/SEC2/733). 
 
In 1929, the British government introduced the Native Ordinance on Indirect 
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Rule that solidified the system of government begun by the BSAC thirty years 
prior (Hinfelaar 1994: 54).  
During the 1920s and 1930s, the discovery of underground ore bodies 
along the Zambian Copperbelt attracted large scale inv stment from abroad 
(Holmes 2004), eventually making the area one of the world’s most densely 
concentrated mining areas.  The labor demands of mining companies required 
the massive migration of Zambians from across the country into the Copperbelt 
area, laying the foundation for a united opposition  colonial rule.   
As much as colonial authorities promoted 
‘tribalism’ in their system of indirect rule though t e 
chiefs, the Copperbelt broke it down, creating a 
unity of interest that was eventually to be expressed 
in the state motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ 
(Holmes 2004).   
 
As the Copperbelt thrived as an industrial region, politics in Northern 
Rhodesia found a new voice with the formation of the African National 
Congress (ANC) in 1951 under the leadership of Harry Nkumbula (Roberts 
1976; Makasa 1981).  The British embarked on a plan to create a federation 
between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (Malawi), 
which Zambians viewed as an attempt to funnel their copper and mineral wealth 
to the benefit of Southern Rhodesia’s white settlers (Makasa 1981).  The 
formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 fostered intense 
Zambian opposition and nationalism, which set the path for independence 
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(Roberts 1976; Makasa 1981).     
In terms of refugee-hosting during this era, the first officially recognized 
and protected refugees to enter Zambia arrived as a result of conflict very far 
from Zambia’s borders. During World War II, nine Polish refugee camps were 
established in the African continent – four in Tanzia, two in Zimbabwe, and 
three in Zambia.  These camps (Table 5) were home to approximately 2,300 
Polish war evacuees and were under the administration of a Polish delegation 







Although today many of the previously discussed pre-colonial migrants 
as well as forced migrants from neighboring countries during the colonial period 
would qualify to be defined as “refugees”, there is little to no evidence that the 
colonial government concerned itself in any way with the movements (forced or 
voluntary) of Africans from neighboring countries into Northern Rhodesia, 
unless we examine colonial controls over urban areas.  This probably has more 
to do with the operationalization of indirect rule and formal colonialism than it 
Camp Name Total Population Location 
Albercorn 600 Northern Province 
Bwana Mkubwa 849 Copperbelt 
Lusaka 892 Lusaka 
Total 2341  
Table 5 
Polish Refugee Camps in Zambia 
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does with an absolute absence of refugee movements.  As Gould (1974a: 350) 
reminds us:  
Discussion of international migration normally 
assumes the existence of states with fixed and 
internationally agreed boundaries and area, and 
movement between these states is recognized to be 
across these boundaries from one sovereign area to 
another. This essentially European concept of the 
nation-state as the framework within which 
international migration takes place was until about 
1960 inapplicable in Africa. There were no nation 
states, apart from Ethiopia and Liberia, but large 
areas of colonial territory, the antithesis of the nation 
state (Gould 1974a: 350). 
 
As such, the colonial government did not establish any formalized refugee 
camps or settlement schemes for Africans from neighboring countries, 
depending instead on such populations’ abilities to elf-settle spontaneously in 
border regions. 
  
Independence Period (1964 – 1972)  
Although the anti-federation groups lost their initial battle against the 
federation, the momentum and organizational capital developed during the 
struggle against the federation fueled the movement for independence.  One of 
Zambia’s most prominent leaders in the years leading up to independence was 
Kenneth Kaunda.  Born in 1924, Kaunda helped form the Lubwa branch of the 
ANC.  By 1952, he was elected ANC’s Secretary-General.  In 1958, Kaunda 
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broke away from the ANC to form the Zambia African National Congress 
(ZANC).  On March 11, 1959, the colonial regime banned ZANC in an attempt 
to silence the nationalist movement in Zambia (Makas  1981).   
In late August 1959, several nationalist parties (ZANC, United Freedom 
Party (UFP), African National Independence Party (ANIP) merged to become 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and secured the release of their 
leader, Kaunda, from prison (Makasa 1981).  By December 1963, the Federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland dissolved.  Less than one year later, on October 24, 
1964, Northern Rhodesia obtained independence from Britain and became the 
Republic of Zambia (Map 2).  At independence, Kenneth Kaunda became 











Map 2: General Zambia Map 
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As leader of the First Republic (1964 – 1972), Kaunda embarked on a 
political path he would walk until 1991.  Like many of Africa’s nationalist 
founding fathers, Kaunda began this journey with great optimism and faith in his 
country’s future.  Upon his inauguration, Kaunda rallied the people, urging that: 
If we all pull our hands together Zambia cannot fail.  
Zambia has sufficient institutional resources to 
overcome its problems.  Indeed Zambia will 
overcome.  With greater determination, unity, 
cooperation, planning, and effective organization, 
nothing can stand in our way to progress 
(Ranganathan 1986: 41). 
 
Kaunda’s vision for Zambia’s future was embodied in a political 
philosophy he introduced at the National Council of UNIP in April 1967 and 
referred to as Humanism.  Kaunda described Humanism as “African democratic 
socialism” (Roberts 1976: 246).  According to Kaunda, under Humanism, “there 
is no absolute leadership for anyone” and “those who lead are led by those they 
lead” (Ranganathan 1986: 26).   However, the term and the philosophy itself 
were so loosely defined and randomly applied that te term became synonymous 
with the ‘thoughts of Kaunda’ rather than any clearly defined theoretical or 
ideological base.   
Unlike many African countries, Zambia’s situation at independence was 
significantly improved by its vast mineral wealth in Copperbelt Province 
(Roberts 1976; Getzel et al 1985; Myers 2003).  However, Zambia faced a 
number of other problems as an independent state.  To begin, the country was 
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severely lacking in any trained and/or educated citizens who could lead the 
country forward.  At independence, less than 100 Zambi ns held a university 
degree and fewer than 1,000 Zambians had obtained a secondary school 
certificate (education thresholds that were reached by Ghana in 1943 and 
Uganda in 1955 (Getzel t al 1984).  Within the first few years of independence, 
the Zambian government opened over 100 secondary schools (Roberts 1976: 
234).  In addition, the entire mining industry, and therefore the entirety of 
Zambia’s economy, was deeply dependent on foreign tchnical expertise.   
The second major obstacle Zambia faced at independence concerned its 
geopolitical situation.  As a landlocked country in the middle of southern Africa, 
Zambia was (and is) deeply dependent on the stability of its neighbors.  Major 
geopolitical events, such as the Angolan and Mozambican liberation struggles, 
the Zimbabwean war, and the Namibian struggle, all affected Zambia’s political 
and economic position (Burdette 1984: 30).  As Kaunda himself rightfully 
recounted:  
As for Zambia, she has lived with this tragic 
problem for as long as she has been an independent 
state. She was truly a war baby, born to the sound f 
gunfire on her northern, western, and eastern 
frontiers (Kaunda 1980: 158)  
 
In fact, of Zambia's eight neighbors, five were directly involved in 
serious conflicts (Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and Zaire) and only 
one (Tanzania) could be considered an ally or a friend.  According to the US 
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Secretary of the State at the time, Dean Rusk, Kaund 's nation was a “potential 
island of stability in an ocean of angry cross-currents” (Dean Rusk, memo to 
President Johnson, “Your meeting with President Kaund  of the Republic of 
Zambia”, 28 November 1964, “Zambia Kaunda Visit” Box 102 NSF-Country 
File, LBJ, DeRoche 2004).   
Zambia actively supported oppositional forces against colonial and white 
rule and acted as a host for guerrillas (UNITA – Union for Total Liberation of 
Angola, ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People's Union, ANC – African National 
Congress of South Africa, SWAPO (Southwest Africa Peoples' Organization).  
However, the political turmoil surrounding Zambia hd disastrous effects on the 
state’s ability to export its mineral wealth due to the frequent disruption of its 
trade routes.  Geopolitically, Zambia’s new regime struggled with the swirling 
complexities of the conflicts around it and the Cold War dynamics embedded in 
them. 
Zambia’s geographic position and political ideology situated the country 
as a Frontline State committed to the decolonization of its neighbors and the end 
of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa.  Part of Zambia’s 
commitment to this struggle meant hosting those seeking refuge from the 
oppressive governments in their home countries.  As such, major inflows of 
refugees into Zambia came on the heels of Zambia’s independence in 1964.  And 
Zambia was  
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Map 3: 1960s Refugee Flows into western Zambia 
faced with the need to maintain a politically suitable 
stance with its neighbours, protect itself from the
incursion of the rebel forces from these same 
neighbouring countries and at the same time, make 
provisions for a group of refugees who are growing 
not only in number but in length of stay (Brooks 
1988: 1-2) 
 
This was an immensely tall order for a country whose wn geographical sense 
of itself was nowhere near fully formed. 
The first major influx of refugees occurred from December 1965 to June 
1966 as Angolans and Mozambicans fled the beginning of armed conflict in the 
struggle for independence from Portugal.  Nearly 63,000 Angolans crossed into 













In 1966, the government of Zambia (GRZ) attempted (and failed) to open 
and manage a settlement scheme for the Angolans at Lw tembo.  The poorly 
planned settlement was intended to hold 1,500 refugees, but by January 1967, 
only 452 had arrived.  Even with these low numbers, it quickly became clear 
that the site at Lwatembo would not be adequate.  In 1967, GRZ began resettling 
Lwatembo refugees, as well as border-refugees, into independent Zambia's first 
official refugee camp, Mayukwayukwa in Kaoma District (Mijere 1994; Clark 
1985).  By late 1967, the total population at Mayukwayukwa reached 2,200 
(Clark 1985).  Throughout 1969, GRZ conducted a number of “raids” into the 
border areas to round up “defectors”, bringing the population at Mayukwayukwa 
to 5,000.  Like Lwatembo, however, Mayukwayukwa was poorly planned, 
having been sited without a soil survey or adequate consultation with the local 
people.   
It wasn't until a year into its establishment that schools, clinics, water 
towers, or wells were constructed.  Due to space limitations and land pressures 
in and around Mayukwayukwa, Meheba Refugee Settlement was opened in 
1971 in Solwezi District to handle the substantial overflow of Angolans from 
Mayukwayukwa.  By the end of 1971, all but 1,000 Angolans had been 
transferred to Meheba.  However, all of the fluctuations and transfers caused 
problems in Mayukwayukwa.  For example, many of the refugees were aware of 
the plans for establishing Meheba at least a year prio  to its opening which 
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meant that many refugees “did not wish to put effort into a settlement that was 
not going to be their permanent home” (Clark 1985: 172). Those who remained 
at Mayukwayukwa did however benefit from an infrastuc ure designed for a 
larger group, receiving five hectares each for private cultivation.   
The construction of Meheba Refugee Settlement began in 1970 and 
many of the Mayukwayukwa refugees who had received training in carpentry 
and bricklaying participated in its construction.  In contrast to Mayukwayukwa, 
Meheba Refugee Settlement was purposefully sited in a very remote area, away 
from local populations with the “conscious intentio f opening up relatively 
unpopulated areas for further development” (Zulu-Syamujaye 2006).  Although 
the majority of the refugees at Meheba were Angolan, approximately 10% of the 
population came from Namibia and South Africa.   
Throughout the early 1970s, Angolans were rounded up from the border 
areas for resettlement on 5 hectare plots in Meheba (Hansen 1990; Clark 1985).  
However, this process of identifying and relocating Angolans from the border 
regions was deeply problematic. Following the Luvale saying - mutondo watela 
mafwo mwangana atela uatu (a stick without leaves is not a tree) -  local Luvale 
chiefs were reluctant to “out” the refugees staying among them.  In fact, most of 
the “refugees” in the border regions were “not regaded by chiefs as refugees but 
as their subjects who have asked for and been granted the chief's protection” 
(Freund and Kalumba 1986: 301).   
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While Angola won its struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975, 
most of the Angolan refugees did not return to their country due to an almost 
immediate eruption of violence and civil war, aided by foreign interventions.  
Added to this was the complexity that the Kaunda regim  supported UNITA, 
while most its allies in southern Africa supported its victorious rival movement, 
MPLA.  Hence, many of Zambia’s Angolans in the mid-1970s were in all 
likelihood UNITA supporters, or at the very least perceived to be UNITA 
supporters by MPLA forces.  This most certainly heig tened their fear of 
returning home in the midst of the MPLA-UNITA civil war.   
During this same period, the Mozambican refugees were settled at 











Map 4: 1960s Refugee Flows into eastern Zambia 
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situation in Eastern Province is provided in the following chapter.  Unlike their 
Angolan counterparts, the majority of these refugees returned to Mozambique 
when it gained its independence in 1975.   
In terms of internal political arrangements, the multi-party system 
worked relatively well in the early years after independence in Zambia, with the 
UNIP and ANC serving as the main contenders for politica  power, void of the 
violent conflict and civil strife witnessed in neighboring states.  The relatively 
smooth operation of the multi-party system was enabled y relatively high levels 
of economic growth.  With regards to refugee-hosting, Zambia’s economic 
situation meant that it could afford to play host to incoming refugee groups.   
The first five years of independence were marked by substantial wealth 
and economic growth due to Copperbelt profits.  In fact, in the years following 
independence, Zambia’s real GDP grew at 2.3% per yea (Woldring 1984).  
However, the economic growth Zambia experienced “disguised but did not 
overcome Zambia’s dependence upon copper” (Gertzel et a 1984: 6; Roberts 
1976). Copper prices began to fall drastically in the 1969 and Zambia’s 
underdevelopment in every other sector began to show (Gertzel et al 1984).   
The realization of its dependence on copper, coupled with the 
consequences of uneven colonial development, placed enormous pressure on the 
First Republic.  Although Zambia remained a multiparty state until 1973, many 
of the political parties maintained very little national support.  The only party 
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with any claim to a national constituency, the UNIP, suffered from internal 
factionalization. For example, in 1968 the UNIP explled its Lozi leader 
Nalumino Mundia who later formed the United Party (UP) (Roberts 1976; 
Makasa 1981). The major opposition parties of the early multi-party era were 
Simon Kapwepwe’s United People’s Party (UPP), Mwaang  Nkumbula’s 
African National Congress (ANC), and Nalumino Mundia’s UP.  However, 
many of these parties were regionally focused and few, if any, had any larger 
national support.  The ANC dominated in Southern Province, the UP in Western 
Province, and the UPP in Northern Province and Copperbelt Province.  In many 
ways, the regionalization of parties during the First Republic was a remnant of 
the uneven penetration of colonial development (Gertzel et al 1984).   
The regionalization of opposition parties, the factionalization of UNIP, 
and perhaps most importantly, the drastic fallout of copper prices in the world 
market placed tremendous pressures on the government and threatened UNIP’s 
hold on the state apparatus.  In 1971, a splinter group within the UNIP, led by 
Kapwepwe, formed the United Progressive Party (UPP).  UNIP leaders “seized 
the opportunity of the formation of the UPP to demand introduction of a one-
party state in Zambia” (Mwanakatwe 1994: 58).  Pressure also instigated major 
economic reforms which gave the government ultimate control over all major 
sectors of the economy, including the mining industry (Mwanakatwe 1994; Kees 
van Donge 1998; Saasa 2002; Rakner 2003).   
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The Second Republic 
All of the threats and pressures, along with the desire to remain in power, 
instigated a regime transition in the early 1970s.  A regime transition is defined 
as a “shift from one set of political procedures to another, from an old pattern of 
rule to a new one” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 10).  In the case of Zambia, 
the regime transited from a multiparty system to a competitive one-party state.  
In early February 1972, the UNIP government banned the UPP and the UP.  
Kaunda jailed his longtime friend and UPP leader Simon Kapwepwe as a 
warning to other opposition leaders (Sakala 2000).   
On February 23rd, citing the need for unity as a necessity for 
development, the government announced plans to create a de jure one-party state 
in Zambia by appointing a Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party 
State (Mwanakatwe 1994; Rakner 2003).  Later in the year, the Choma 
Declaration, which cemented the merger between the ANC and UNIP, created a 
de facto one-party system (Sakala 2000).  A December 4th constitutional 
amendment made the UNIP the only legal political party nd on the 13th of 
December, Zambia’s Second Republic was inaugurated with Kaunda as 
President.  The new constitution of the Second Republic intensified the strong 
presidential system put in place at independence, eliminated any organization of 
opposition parties, provided for a unicameral National Assembly, and instituted 
what Kaunda called “one-party participatory democracy”.   
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Using Bratton and van de Walle’s modal regime type categorization, 
Zambia’s Second Republic is best described as a competitive one-party system, 
meaning that it was as inclusive as plebiscitary systems yet allowed for a 
relatively higher degree of competition (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).  As 
with other competitive one-party systems, the state inv sted considerable power 
on its nationalist founding father, Kenneth Kaunda.  Like many other single 
party powers in Africa, UNIP justified its creation of a one-party system by 
arguing that it provided the “institutional base for the unity and greater political 
participation which the development process required” (Gertzel et al 1984: 20).  
However, Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel argue that te one-party state was simply 
a “device to ensure greater central control over factional conflict” (1984: 19).   
Zambians’ support of the one-party system can in some ways be 
measured by evaluating their turnout at the polls.  Prior to the installation of the 
Second Republic, 94% of the population voted in 1964 and 82% voted in 1968.  
Gradually, voter enthusiasm greatly diminished (Mwanakatwe 1994).  
Ultimately, voter turnout fell to less than 40% during the Second Republic 
(Mwanakatwe 1994; Saasa 2002; Rakner 2003).   This trend corroborates with 
Bratton and van de Walle’s observation that competitiv  one-party systems can 
“sustain genuine turnout figures at relatively high, t ough declining, levels” 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 80, emphasis mine). 
The institutional base of the Second Republic suffered from a lack of 
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independence, transparency, and accountability.  For example, the Zambian 
judicature (Supreme Court, High Court, Industrial Relations Court, Subordinate 
Courts, and Local Courts) were directed by and report d to the UNIP and the 
executive such that “in reality they only served to institutionalize the very 
crimes they were meant to eradicate” (Sakala 2000: 22; Mwanakatwe 1994).  
The UNIP party constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia 
gradually fused and the Second Republic took major steps to “bring the latter in 
line with the former” (Chiluba 1995: 44).  Under Kaunda’s “one-party 
participatory democracy”, the government controlled everything.  “Civil society 
outside the design, control, and benefit of the ruling party was considered 
dangerous and with suspicion to the well-being of the state” (Mwinga 2002: 10).  
Government control also extended beyond civil society to the 
management of refugees.  Generally speaking, during the 2nd Republic GRZ was 
increasingly intolerant of self-settlement by refugees, strongly preferring and 
advocating the resettlement of refugees into designated camps.  For example, the 
following transcription of a speech to villagers in the border region of western 
Zambia given by the District Governor demonstrates an effort to divide and 
intimidate border communities and advocates the exclusion of refugees:  
You have allowed a situation in which the border is 
open to anybody, to infiltrators. You people of the 
border have allowed others to come and share your 
houses that are built in Zambia. Zambia 
sympathizes with the freedom fighters and refugees, 
but they should be controlled and taken care of. 
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They are not indigenous inhabitants. I have received 
reports…that some refugees have left Lwatembo 
and are starting to build their own villages. They 
have forgotten their own country. Some people have 
used refugees for cheap labor and exploited them 
and used them to set themselves up as separate 
headmen. Now these people want recognition as 
headmen. Here there are some refugees who haven’t 
even reported and are being sheltered by you 
people! You are encouraging them to delay their 
independence and to become parasites. Freedom 
fighters have been given a place to fight. They 
should not leave there and settle in other 
villages…Only the cowards live in the villages. 
They cheat you by saying they are freedom fighters 
because they ran away from their friends. If the 
Portuguese discover you harbor them in houses, the 
Portuguese will come and bomb you. We do not 
want to endanger the lives of Zambians. I have a list 
of those villagers that are hiding deserters. I have 
talked with the President of M.P.L.A., and he said 
freedom fighters in villages are deserters. If you 
continue to hide them after I talk to you, I warn you 
that you will be in trouble. If you are an anthill, we 
will bring something that can take care of you in 5 
minutes. And if you are not an anthill, but are an 
elephant, we will bring something that can take care 
of an elephant. In fact you are very lucky that I 
warn you, because my intention was to take you by 
surprise. Because I had a list of people, houses and 
villages. But I was a good Humanist and I am 
warning you instead (Hansen 1979b: 376 – 377). 
 
Throughout the 2nd Republic, Zambia’s refugee hosting challenges 
continued to grow.  A new wave of Angolan refugees in the mid-1980s resulted 
in the expansion of Meheba (into “New” Meheba) in 1987.  During this same 
period, tensions flared in Mozambique as well and Eastern Province experienced 
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a new influx of refugees.  Unlike the situation in Meheba, the UNHCR and GRZ 
decided not to re-open or expand Nyimba Refugee Camp to accommodate this 
new influx.  From archival research, it is evident that the GRZ was concerned 
with the proximity of the Nyimba site to the Mozambican border.  These 
security concerns led GRZ to situate the new Mozambican camp at Ukwimi, 
more than 100km from the border. In proceeding chapters, I outline in detail 
how such decisions were made and enforced by GRZ, in relation to the shifting 
political culture from Lusaka.   
 
Third Republic 
After 18 years of one-party rule, the process of reint oducing multi-party 
politics in Zambia was not an easy task.  Like the rest of Africa, Zambia’s 
democratic transition occurred during what Samuel Huntington refers to as the 
“third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991).  Zambia’s transition 
followed the definitional processes of democratization which “begins with 
political challenges to authoritarian regimes, advances through the political 
struggles over liberalization, and requires the installation of a freely elected 
government” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 194).   
The Second Republic experienced a severe lack of legitimacy due to its 
inability to deliver basic political freedoms and economic stability for the 
overwhelming majority of Zambians.  The crisis of legitimacy was exacerbated 
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by popular protests and demonstrations (Makasa 1981; Mwanakatwe 1994; 
Chan and Clancy 2000; Sakala 2000).  For example, in June 1990, protesters 
organized a boycott of the staple maize meal in respon e to its 120% increase in 
price.  The uprising led to the looting of several stores and a government-
imposed 24 hour curfew.  According to Chan and Clancy, the “uprising was 
expressed in violence precisely because no other means sufficed.  The rise in 
food prices, while real income dropped, contrasted harply with the very visible 
wealth of party leaders” (2000: 124).   
These economic and social protests served as a catalyst for political and 
constitutional reform in Zambia.  The Second Republic was further threatened 
by an attempted coup by Lt. Mwamba Luchembe on June 30, 1990.  Although 
unsuccessful at replacing the government, the coup seriously undermined 
UNIP’s position and revealed its weaknesses (Chiluba 1995).   
Initially, the Second Republic responded by jailing and deporting 
numerous labor, union, and opposition leaders.  However, as the demands 
became further politicized, Kaunda was forced to grapple with the realities of 
the situation.  Internal conditions, coupled with an international intolerance for 
authoritarian regimes, meant that he could no longer respond with absolute 
suppression or instigate a regime transition as he did when faced with pressures 
in the early 1970s.   
Kaunda attempted to address the concerns of the masses by 
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implementing several economic reforms and deepening political liberalization.  
Political liberalization requires the “relaxation of government controls on the 
political activities of citizens, with particular reference to civil liberties” 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 108), but it does not require true 
democratization.  True democratization for Zambia became dependent on the 
organizational and cooperative aptitude of the opposition forces.   
The desire for multi-party democracy “crystallized into the formation of 
the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MDD)” at the Garden House Motel 
in 1990 under the leadership of Fredrick Chiluba (Skala 2000: 6).  Fredrick 
Jacob Titus Chiluba was born April 30, 1943 and raised in the Copperbelt.  
Chiluba gained his leadership and organizational skil s serving as a union 
activist and chairman of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).  
During the Second Republic, Chiluba successfully organized a series of strikes 
for which he was detained and released (Sakala 2000).   
The high degree of opposition cohesion was critical to the success of the 
democratic transition in Zambia.  Although some saw the MMD simply as a 
“marriage of convenience formed by people with a range of different 
backgrounds, some pursuing political ideals and others said to be just interested 
in improving the economic outlook” (Chiluba 1995: 73), the marriage 
effectively bridged class, status, linguistic, and ethnic divisions (Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997: 199).  According to Bratton and van de Walle, those who could 
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foster some degree of opposition cohesion were ableto “induce incumbent 
rulers to concede to competitive elections” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 199) 
and often went on to win.  Such was the case in Zambi . 
Initially, Kaunda pushed for a national referendum on multi-partyism. 
Facing a highly mobilized and organized opposition f rce, Kaunda realized that 
a return to multi-party politics was inevitable and on December 17, 1990, 
Kaunda signed a parliamentary amendment which re-legalized political parties.  
A total of 12 parties took advantage of this new opening by registering with the 
government.  A government appointed commission, led by Professor Patrick 
Mvunga, was established to draft a new constitution f r the Third Republic 
(Mwanakatwe 1994: 209).  The new constitution provided for a total of 150 
members of the National Assembly with the Presidential power of nomination of 
up to ten additional members.  Perhaps more importantly, the constitution made 
specific provisions for a democratic transition through free and fair elections 
(Mwanakatwe 1994).  However, the MMD refused to accept the terms of the 
new constitution, threatening to boycott the entire electoral process.   
After several exchanges between UNIP and MMD, Zambi reached a 
“constitutional stalemate” (Mwanakatwe 1994).  The students at the University 
of Zambia (UNZA), long-time opposition voices against the UNIP, offered to 
serve as mediators in the process.  The intervention of the UNZA students, 
coupled with that of the Christian churches in Zambia, roke the stalemate.  
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 On July 23, 1991, the MMD and UNIP struck a compromise at a 
meeting between Kaunda and Chiluba in the Anglican Cathedral in Lusaka 
(Mwanakatwe 1994). Some of the compromises between MMD and UNIP 
included requiring the President to consult the Cabinet before declaring a State 
of Emergency, removing the President’s power to declar  martial law, and 
increasing the number of Presidentially-appointed Parliament members 
(Mwanakatwe 1994; Burnell 2002a, 2002b).  
The agreed-upon constitutional arrangements included a hybrid form of 
government characterized by a strong executive presidency coupled with 
parliamentary traditions inherited from the Westminster model (Burnell 2002a, 
2002b).  According to the constitution, the directly-e ected President serves as 
both the head of state and the head of government and he National Assembly is 
comprised of 150 elected seats and up to 8 Presidentially-appointed seats.  In 
addition, the executive is invested with the power to dissolve the National 
Assembly. 
Founding elections constitute the “first time after an authoritarian 
regime, elected positions of national significance ar disputed under reasonably  
competitive conditions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 196).  Zambia’s 
founding elections occurred in October 1991.  In the first multi-party elections 
since 1972, both the Presidential and Parliamentary seats were contested and the 
MMD emerged with a landslide victory.  Fredrick Chiluba secured the 
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presidential office with 73% of the total votes (Table 6).  In addition, the MMD  
 won 125 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly (Kabwe 1997).  Although 
the MMD demonstrated nation-wide support, several regional variations are 
important to note.  The 
MMD received all of the 
Parliamentary seats in 
Copperbelt, Luapula, 
Western, and Southern 
Provinces and most of the 
seats in Northern, Lusaka, 
and North-western 
Provinces.  By contrast, 
UNIP gained all the seats (19) in Eastern Province (Kabwe 1997). 
 The founding elections marked the success of Zambi’s democratic 
transition.  The elections were declared free and fair by the Zambian Elections 
Monitoring Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), the Carter Center, and the 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (Mwanakatwe 
1994).  However, ZEMCC reported that the elections, although free and fair, 
were “marked with problems in the pre-election phase and on the day of 
elections” (Mwanakatwe 1994: 229).  To begin, in all of the constituencies, less 
than 50% of the registered voters went to the polls (Mwanakatwe 1994).  The 
 Table 6  
 1991 Election Results  
  (% of votes cast)   
       
  Province Chiluba Kaunda   
  Central 72.07% 24.79%   
  Copperbelt 88.39% 9.15%   
  Eastern 24.69% 70.48%   
  Luapula 86.69% 10.64%   
  Lusaka 74.24% 22.76%   
  Northern 81.90% 14.39%   
  North Western 68.35% 29.03%   
  Southern 82.69% 14.34%   
  Western 78.73% 18.03%   
  National Total: 73.37% 23.45%   
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lack of high voter turnout may be explained by voter fatigue in that elections had 
been held less than two years before under the one-party, Second Republic.  
Secondly, low voter turnout also reflected the inefficiency of the administration 
of the electoral process (Mwanakatwe 1994).  The ZEMCC also argued that the 
less-than-average voter turnout was due to widespread rumors of potential 
violence on election day.  
 Nevertheless, on Saturday, November 2, 1991, Kaunda made an 
appearance on Television Zambia (TVZ) to concede his electoral defeat (Kabwe 
1997).  Later that day, Fredrick Chiluba was sworn in as President of Zambia’s 
Third Republic.  As noted by Bratton and van de Walle, democratic transitions 
occur only when the “results are accepted by all participants” (1997: 194).  As 
such, Kaunda’s concession enabled a peaceful transition to democracy in 
Zambia.  In fact, the British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) carried the 
following message on its “Thought for Today” program: 
It is not easy to be gracious to a successor, but some 
manage it…Kenneth Kaunda has been President of 
Zambia for almost 30 years…At the weekend he 
was defeated in a democratic election.  “You win 
some you lose some”, he said.  He showed his 
successor around the State House.  Gave him the 
keys and headed for his home farm.  Whatever other 
contributions he may have made to his nation this 
will surely have been one of his greatest.  To pass 
on his work to his successor without fuss or 
bitterness.  In a continent where bloodshed more 
often accompanies the transfer of power, this is 
statesmanship of the highest order” (Kabwe 1997: 
122 – 123).   
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 Kaunda’s concession, coupled with the amazing degree of opposition 
cohesion fostered by the MMD, resulted in one of the relatively few full and 
peaceful democratic transitions in Africa’s “third wave” democratization project.  
Zambia followed the modal route to democracy which led from protest, through 
liberalization, to free and fair elections (Bratton a d van de Walle 1997).  As 
such, it can be defined as a true democratic transitio . 
 The 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary elections n Zambia provided 
the first opportunity to test the level of democratic consolidation or “slippage”.  
Unfortunately, the 1996 Zambian elections were seriously flawed and the 
“general verdict has fallen on the side of slippage” (Gould 2002: 299).  Perhaps 
the most controversial aspect of the 1996 elections ccurred well before the 
elections were to take place and contributes the ambiguities of identity and 
mobility in Zambia.  Utilizing MMD’s overwhelming majority in the 
Parliament, Chiluba successfully pushed through a constitutional amendment 
barring anyone whose parents were born outside Zambian from contesting the 
Presidential seat (Ihonvbere 1996; Gould 2002).  This move was a deliberate 
attack on Kenneth Kaunda’s prospects for challenging Chiluba in the 
Presidential race (as Kaunda is the son of missionaries from Malawi).  Chiluba 
went further by declaring Kaunda an alien and attempting to deport him to 
Malawi (AP 1995; Ihonvbere 1996; Gould 2002). Several other UNIP leaders 
were successfully deported to Malawi (Amnesty Interational 2001).  The fact 
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that the “father of the nation” Kaunda can be declar d an alien and a non-citizen 
strongly reinforces the argument that the idea of being “Zambian” is a very fluid 
identity – to be taken advantage of and manipulated for political gain.  In fact, in 
the years following this attempt to strip Kaunda of his citizenship, UNIP leaders 
sought a similar course of action against Chiluba, questioning his paternity and 
accusing him of adopting the identity of a schoolmate (McNeil 1999).   
 These moves by the MMD government prompted Kaunda to call for an 
electoral boycott.  In addition, international observers refused to monitor the 
elections due to inconsistencies preceding the vote.  These problems 
notwithstanding, 592 candidates competed for 150 seats (Kees van Donge 
1998).  Chiluba emerged from the 1996 elections with nearly 70% of the vote 
and the MMD secured 131 of 150 available Parliamentary seats (ECZ 1996; 
Table 7).  However, the MMD’s victory was seriously undermined following the 
declaration that the elections were not free and fair by the Committee for a 
Clean Campaign (CCC).  In any case, it was clear tht although MMD could 
claim to be popularly elected, it had also  
reproduced many of the less commendable habits of 
its predecessor (which it strongly resembles not 
least because of the number of ex-ministers who 
have managed to regain power by switching parties 
at the appropriate time), but has also managed to be 
more deeply immersed in the culture of smuggling 





 The MMD’s manipulations leading up to the 1996 elections created 
serious internal and international legitimacy problems for the new government, 
leading Human Rights Watch (1997) to portray the MMD’s first term in office a 
“retrogressive betrayal of the democratic principles that brought it to office”. 
 The events leading up to the 2001 Zambian elections were reminiscent of 
many of the manipulations that occurred prior to the 1996 elections.  For 
example, Chiluba launched a campaign to remain in power for an 
unconstitutional third term (Africa Confidential 2001).  Chiluba’s bid for a 3rd 
term required two major undertakings.  First, he neded to be selected as the 
  Table 7   
  1996 Election Results   
  (% of total vote cast)   
          
    Chiluba Mung'omba Mulemba Mbikusita Chakomboka   
  Province MMD ZDC NP AZ MDP   
  Central 69.62% 13.57% 4.92% 2.06% 5.00%   
  Copperbelt 81.94% 7.30% 3.13% 0.92% 1.61%   
  Eastern 60.28% 18.43% 6.45% 3.27% 5.71%   
  Luapula 82.44% 5.77% 1.61% 4.75% 1.94%   
  Lusaka  69.95% 16.04% 3.47% 2.65% 1.88%   
  Northern 77.38% 11.47% 2.37% 1.19% 3.75%   
  North Western 50.19% 6.08% 36.23% 1.46% 2.19%   
  Southern 63.60% 17.37% 4.92% 4.44% 4.42%   
  Western 40.50% 14.42% 7.63% 27.68% 3.64%   
  
National 
Total: 68.96% 12.11% 6.33% 4.47% 3.13%   
          
          
   MMD = Movement for Multiparty Democracy   
   ZDC = Zambia Democratic Congress    
   NP = National Party       
   AZ = Agenda for Zambia     
   MDP = Movement for Democratic Process    
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presidential candidate by the MMD leadership at the party convention.  Second, 
and perhaps most difficult, Chiluba needed a large majority of Parliament to 
pass a constitutional amendment allowing for a 3rd term in the executive.   
 Although wholly undemocratic in nature and contrary to the principles 
upon which he entered the office, the fact that attention was paid to 
constitutional legalities and requirements demonstrated a respect, albeit 
minimal, for the democratic institutions in place.  Ultimately, Chiluba realized 
the futility of his quest to remain in office, but not before creating serious 
divisions within the MMD concerning the issue.  In the end, the party narrowly 
selected Levy Mwanawasa to serve as MMD’s candidate for the presidency.   
 The second major area of manipulation concerned th date of elections.  
Historically, Zambian elections are held in October, before the onset of the rainy 
season during which a considerable portion of the country is inaccessible.  The 
2001 elections, however, were held on December 27, in the middle of the rainy 
season and during the height of holiday travel, meaning that people were 
traveling outside of the constituency in which they r gistered and were therefore 
unable to vote (Kees van Donge 2001).  Mwanawasa and the MMD emerged 
from the 2001 elections victorious, but not even remotely close to the landslide 
victories they had enjoyed in the past.  Overall, the MMD received 112 
Parliament seats.  The first-past-the-post (FPP) plurality system seriously 
hindered the opposition’s showing on election day.  In fact, Reynolds calculated 
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that under a proportional representation electoral f mula, the MMD would have 
only secured 36 -38 seats (Kees van Donge 2001).   
 The 2001 elections were the tightest elections in Zambian history.  Much 
of this had to do with fragmentation within the MMD, illustrated by the fact that 
5 of the presidential candidate had a history of memb rship in the MMD 
(Benjamin Mwila, Christon Tembo, Godfrey Miyanda, and Michael Stata).  The 
close race is also attributable to the lack of cohesion on the part of the 
opposition.  The unpacked opposition secured 71% of the presidential vote; 
however, their lack of cohesion made Levy Mwanawasa the 3rd President of the 
Republic of Zambia with only 29% of the vote and a slim margin of victory.  
Anderson Mazoka of the newly established United Party for National 
Development (UPND) placed second in the Presidential race with 26.27% of the 
vote – a difference of less than 34 votes.  An examin tion of the MMD’s share of 
votes cast over the three multi-party elections also reveals a considerable turn of 
events (Table 8).   
  Table 8   
 MMD Share of Votes Cast  
     
   Presidential    Parliamentary   
   MMD non-MMD    MMD non-MMD   
  1991 75.21% 24.79%    77.16% 22.84%   
  1996 68.96% 31.04%    62.54% 37.46%   
  2001 28.96% 71.04%    27.48% 72.52%   
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 In September 2006, President Levy Mwanawasa was re-elected by 
securing 43% of the vote (Table 9).  On the surface, Mwanawasa’s victory could 
be read as an endorsement of his management of the country, his very public 
fight against corruption, and his policies of “good governance”.  But for others, 
such as Larmer and Fraser, the 2006 elections were important not because of 
what they resulted in for MMD, but because of the “significant break in 
Zambian politics” and the “new dynamic in urban society” created by the “rapid 
and largely unanticipated emergence” of the opposition party Patriotic Front 
under the leadership of Michael Sata (Larmer and Fraser 2007).  
 The discussion of electoral processes since founding elections clearly 
demonstrates that “political pluralism does not guarantee accountability” 
(Burnell 2001: 259).  Although the reintroduction of multi-partism in Zambia 
       
   Table 9    
   2006 Election Results     
         
   Candidate Party 
% of 
vote    
   Levy Mwanawasa 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) 42.98%    
   Michael Sata Patriotic Front (PF) 29.37%    
   
Hakainde 
Hichilema United Democratic Alliance (UDA) 25.32%   
   Godfrey Miyanda Heritage Party (HP) 1.57%    
   Winright Ngondo All People's Congress (APC) 0.76%    
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did allow for some important changes, such as the altern tion of power and the 
elimination of the de jure one-party state, it also maintained several continuities 
as well.  Perhaps the most obvious and impacting continuity has been the 
persistence of neopatrimonialism, particularly that of presidentialism.  
 Continuities such as these do not only impact Zambi n citizens, they also 
have very real consequences and impacts on the operation and management of 
refugee spaces.  Although refugee camps and settlemnts are nearly always 
thought of or treated as “internationalized” zones, the fact is that these 
settlements are situated in particular nation-state with a whole set of political 
considerations at play.  An understanding of Zambia’s general political history 
and players provides an additional context in which to understand refugee 
spaces in Zambia.  But this national context is not enough to fully understand 
what unfolds at a place like Ukwimi.  Full understanding requires a more 
humanistic, micro-geography.  In fact,  
elections, albeit an important institutional aspect of 
national politics, do not determine the manner in 
which a state operates and are not even the most 
important elements of factional political 
competition…The real stuff of politics…is situated 
in other sites [which are] increasingly informal in 
nature (Ellis 2000: 45 – 46). 
 
It is to these sites that I now turn my attention.  
 127 
CHAPTER FIVE 
REFUGEES AT NYIMBA REFUGEE CAMP  
 
 
Before us lay an undulating valley some miles in 
breadth which, as the heavily timbered hills on 
either side proclaimed, had once been covered with 
forest, but was now denuded of every vestige of a 
tree. Village after village surrounded by waving 
cornfields, and green plains dotted with herds of 
cattle, stretched away in the distance. Never before 
in any of my African wanderings had I seen such an 
extent of land under cultivation; the cornfields 
seemed unending, and the size and number of the 
villages fairly astonished me; and it was not ‘til 
then that I realized what a powerful and prosperous 
people were those whose acquaintance I was about 
to make.  
(Crawford 1889 in A trip to Northern Ngoniland) 
 
 
 Most often, contemporary refugee situations are discussed in the absence 
of their historical context.  It is a basic premise of this dissertation that refugee 
environments must be examined in relation to longer historical lenses than the 
majority of refugee research employs.  It is this longer view that helps us to not 
only understand the host community better but also nticipate the degree to 
which refugees will successfully integrate into their host communities.   
 At the very least, the historical approach provides an appreciation and 
recognition that contemporary refugee situations do not exist in a vacuum – 
refugees do not descend upon a place without a history.  At first this may seem 
like an unproblematic, common-sense assertion.  However, a thorough 
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examination of the refugee relief regime’s discourse demonstrates and reinforces 
time and time again  the notion that refugees have nothing.  Consider the 
imagery and text of the UNHCR poster in Appendix B which states 
characterizes refugees in the following manner:  
Each one has something: a tool or implement here, a 
bicycle or a briefcase there.  All completely normal 
and unremarkable. But wait. Something’s amiss.  
That nice fellow near the bottom – third row down, 
second from the right. He doesn’t seem to have 
anything.  Indeed. You see, he’s refugee. And as you 
can see, refugees are just like you and me except for 
one thing: everything they once had has been 
destroyed or taken away, probably at gunpoint. 
Home, family, possessions, all gone. They have 
nothing. And nothing is all they’ll ever have unless 
we help (Appendix B). 
 
 Much as previous research and humanitarian calls for assistance may 
have us believe refugees come to the table empty-handed, they most certainly 
bring their own histories with them.  So although they may carry little physical 
luggage, they do carry an enormously rich history which if one bothers to ask 
remains very much a part of their oral tradition and identity.  Additionally, the 
places into which refugees arrive are not empty spaces.  More often than not, 
places designated for refugee hosting also have particul r histories and identities 
which should be a part of the discussion.   
 I firmly maintain that our understanding of the contemporary successes 
and failures of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS) is well-served by stepping 
 129 
back and understanding Ukwimi in the wider historical ontext of both its hosts 
and its guests.  Stepping back requires an examination of the wider Ukwimi area 
prior to the establishment of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement, as well as an 
examination of the refugees prior to their placement at Ukwimi Refugee 
Settlement.  In doing so, I am not attempting an exhaustive or comprehensive 
pre-colonial or colonial history of Eastern Province, but rather a deeper (than 
“normal”) look at aspects of that history that are particularly relevant to 
questions of territory, nation, identity, and place – which are in and of 
themselves critical to my wider project.   
 I am not a historian by training, nor is this dissertation intended to 
provide a comprehensive or exhaustive historical account of eastern Zambia.  I 
am, however, very much concerned with situating the contemporary 
circumstances within a wider historical frame than most refugee research 
generally employs.  I find that providing this wider frame is absolutely 
necessary due to my desire to understand Ukwimi geographically – as a place.  
If I were interested solely in the refugees or the hosts or the NGOs or a certain 
moment in Ukwimi’s story, I could arguable bypass the following historical 
narrative.  But because I am interested in Ukwimi as a place, it becomes 
imperative to trace out its evolution as such prior to the official establishment of 
a refugee camp in the area.   
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Historical Background of Area  
As outlined in Chapter 4, the history of Zambia is a “continuous history 
of the movement of peoples” (Brelsford 1956: 4) and the eastern region is no 
exception.  The earliest oral traditions recorded in eastern Zambia relate to the 
establishment and development of Undi’s Chewa kingdom in the late 16th 
century (Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 1976).  Undi’s kingdom ruled throughout 
present-day Malawi, Zambia’s Eastern Province and Mozambique’s Tete 
Province.  Other communities in the area, such as Kalindawalo’s Nsenga people 
in present-day Petuake District “maintained their separate distinction within 
Undi’s kingdom, although aspects of their culture wre greatly modified by 
Chewa influence” (Langworthy 1972: 26).  The degree of cultural modification 
described by Langworthy is evident today when examining linguistic similarities 
between Chichewa and Chinsenga, as well as shared cultural traditions.   
The Ngoni, led by Zwengendaba, first entered Undi’s kingdom from the 
south in November 1835 (Langworthy 1969; Langworthy 1972).  The Ngoni 
settled just at the edge of Kalindawalo’s Nsenga kingdom in the Petauke area, 
often raiding and capturing the Nsenga and their cattle (Langworthy 1969; 
Phillipson 1976).  As tensions mounted between the Ngoni and Nsenga, 
Zwengendaba led his people northward into Bemba territory.  During this 
migration, Zwengendaba died and the Ngoni split into two separate groups 
under different leadership.  The first group followed the leadership of Mbelwa 
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and continued northward into Bemba land.  The second group fell under the 
leadership of Mpezeni and returned south to Petauke (Langworthy 1969; 
Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 1976). It was there, near Petauke, that the Ngoni 
began to challenge the supremacy of Undi’s kingdom in the area.  After a series 
of confrontations, Mpezeni succeeded in effectively destroying Undi’s kingdom.  
As outlined in the opening epigraph, the “powerful and prosperous” people who 
Crawford encountered and described were, in fact, the Ngoni.   
But Ngoni rule was cut short by the arrival of Europeans into the area 
after Mpezeni granted a large mining concession to German hunter and trader 
Carl Wiese, who worked closely with the Portuguese.  “In April 1891, he [Carl 
Wiese] obtained from Mpezeni a general territorial concession covering 25,000 
square kilometers and persuaded the chief to accept the Portuguese flag” 
(Phillipson 1976: 12).  It is important to note here, however, that Mpezeni was 
not fully aware of the symbolic meaning tied to accepting the Portuguese flag.  
As Wiese (1891) himself notes, he had to instruct Mpezeni that the flag was not 
used as an article of clothing. During the next several years, the Ngoni continued 
to dominate the region, with the help of their occasional (less than 10) white 
visitors, and “developed a feeling of self-confidenc  in understanding European 
intentions” (Rau 1974: 240).   
A few years after the original deal between Wiese and Mpezeni, Wiese 
sold his concession to the Mozambique Gold Land and Concession Company 
 132 
(MGLCC) for approximately 1,500 pounds (Zgambo 1983).  To the frustration 
of MGLCC, the colonial administrator of Nyasaland (now Malawi), Harry 
Johnston, refused to issue MGLCC a certification of their claim and instead 
recognized the claims of the North Charterland Exploration Company, firmly 
controlled by British South Africa Company (BSAC), thereby placing Mpezeni’s 
territory “firmly in the British sphere” (Barnes 1954: 71; Phillipson 1976).   
Although this is a somewhat obscure piece of the story, I think it is a 
historical moment that significantly altered how the issue of forced migration 
and refugee-hosting ultimately played out in the ara.  Consider for a moment if 
MGLCC’s claims had been fully recognized.  It is likely that the majority of 
Wiese’s concession, including the Ukwimi area, would have come under 
Portuguese rule and ultimately become a part of Mozambique at decolonization.  
This becomes important in the context of forced migrat on and refugee-hosting 
because it is the existence and exact placement of the Zambia-Mozambique 
border that served to define those fleeing violence as refugees (instead of IDPs).   
The transition of Wiese’s concession into British hands, in addition to the 
increasingly aggressive nature of European involvement in the area led to a 
“crisis of choice” in 1897 (Rau 1974: 240).  The “crisis of choice” for the Ngoni 
revolved around how they were to handle their relations with Europeans. 
Although often depicted as monolithic, ethnic groups in Africa encounter the 
same kinds of internal conflicts and complexities of any other society and the 
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Ngoni were not an exception.  According to Rau:  
Mpezeni and his older indunas… felt that peaceful 
relations [with the Europeans] were possible and 
desirable. Nsingo, Mlonyeni, Kamzembe and other 
younger men feared that the European presence 
within Ungoni [Ngoni land] and to the east was a 
direct threat to their country and security.  They 
urged Mpezeni to kill the locally-based agents of the 
North Charterland Exploration Company, and 
thereby remove the most immediate threat to 
Ungoni. Mpezeni, under strong pressure, resisted 
these demands until January 1898 when an invasion 
by Protectorate troops resolved the issue.  Defeat for 
the Ngoni was quick and definite as a new phase of 
colonial rule was introduced into eastern Zambia 
(1974: 241). 
 
From this point forward, the Ukwimi area fell under the BSAC-
controlled and administered Northeastern Rhodesia.  As early as 1898, colonial 
administrators instituted a five shilling hut tax (Langworthy 1972; Phillipson 
1976; Vail 1977; Chipungu 1992) which most local families were unable to pay.  
In response to the hut tax demands of the colonial administrators, a significant 
majority of the healthy young males in the area headed to Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe) for employment, leaving their families behind typically for periods 
of two years, but frequently longer.  Archival research revealed that the social 
impact of this out-migration significantly altered the local social landscape.  
Ironically, colonial administrators also used the out-migration (necessitated by 
colonial policy) to justify the lack of the development in the region.  As 
explained by the District Officer:  
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It is inevitable that the absence of 60 per cent of the 
able-bodied males…should slow up development. 
Often the actual . . . population of a village is found 
to be a horde of women supported by a handful of 
elderly men and weaklings. Indeed, it is a matter of 
some surprise that so much can be done in the way 
of subsistence production and improved agricultural 
methods when the material is so weak and scanty” 
(NAZ/SEC/NAT/66).   
 
In the eyes of colonial administrators, the lack of development 
throughout the province was the product of the “absence” of able-bodied males.  
Yet there appears to be little to no recognition that such absences were the 
product of deliberate colonial tax policies.  In many ways (and in a different 
era), this out-migration constituted a forced migration of a specific portion of the 
population out of the area and ultimately had “grave results” for the local 
economy (Vail 1977: 137).     
In addition to this significant, gendered out-migration, communities in 
eastern Zambia also faced internal relocation and reconfiguration of social 
networks due to the imposition of colonial laws conerning resettlement to 
native reserves and other very spatial aspects of life and subsistence, such as 
hunting.  In fact, colonial restrictions on hunting and colonial preferences for 
closely settled village communities “led to the development of large areas of 
bush in which an ever-growing animal population dwelled and set the stage for 
one of the major ecological reverses in eastern Zambi 's history – the spread of 
tsetse fly and, with it, human and animal sleeping sickness” (Vail 1977: 138).   
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Although some negative consequences of colonial policies could be 
described as unintended (such as the spread of the tsetse fly), other disruptive 
outcomes were quite consciously pursued and intended.  For example, 
Livingstone Bruce, the General Manager of the North Charterland Company, 
argued that the colonial authorities should restrict Africans access to land 
precisely to force them to enter into the local (and regional) labor market for 
survival.  According to Bruce, 
It would be politic to procure Reserves on the basis 
of the bare subsistence of the Native, giving an 
allowance for that only, assuming that the policy of 
the country is to encourage European development. 
I shall not go so far as to say that the Natives in the 
whole of the Territory should be cut down to a bare 
subsistence allowance, but I do say so as regards the 
Concession (NAZ/ZP 1/1/5)  
  
It is upon such logic that the colonial administration demarcated native 
reserves in 1913 and 1914.  In Eastern Province, approximately 3,500mi2 of the 
lowest quality land was set aside for the entire African population, while 
6,500mi2 of the best land was allocated to the 80 European s ttlers (Kay 1965, 
1968; Vail 1977).  As discussed in Chapter 4, colonial administrators in Eastern 
Province anticipated the arrival of large numbers of Europeans into the area.  
European settler populations never reached anticipated numbers due to the 
crumbling tobacco markets of the 1920s (Roberts 1976; Vail 1977; Chipungu 
1992; Musambachime 1992).  Over the course of several decades, the areas 
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delineated for European settlement returned to bush, while the native reserves 
became “devastated from overuse, severe soil erosion, deforestation, and a 
falling water table” (Vail 1977: 149).   
It is important to note here that this devastation did not occur without 
considerable opposition from the local communities.  For instance, the Ambo 
community residing just outside the Ukwimi area lost an estimate of 54% of 
their population from 1928 to 1938 (NAZ/SEC/2/534).  In response to such 
overwhelming loss and social disruption, Chieftainess Mwape pleaded with the 
Governor for the restoration of her people to their land.  The Chieftainess 
conveyed her people’s desperation to escape the tsetse fly infested reserves 
(NAZ/KSY 2/1).  According to the archival evidence, the Governor concluded 
that he was well “aware of the wish of her people” to return to their lands, but 
“the government could not ask the North Charterland Company to part with their 
most fertile land” (NAZ/KSY 2/1).  
With continued pressure from Chieftainess Mwape and her colleagues, 
colonial administrators at the provincial level began corresponding to colonial 
administrators in Lusaka.  In a 1937 letter to the colonial secretary, the 
provincial Governor wrote that the “reserves are in a woeful plight and 
the...paramount need of the natives is for more land immediately. The natives 
cannot understand the delay and have become embittered” (NAZ/SEC 2/734).   
The District Commissioner wrote to Lusaka about the desire of the local 
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people to acquire the “empty, silent” lands that had been set aside for European 
settlers, but that had now “filled with bush and game and tsetse fly” 
(NAZ/SEC/NAT/363).  Ultimately, the colonial government awarded 154,000 
pounds to the North Charterland Company in exchange for transferring land to 
the government ownership in 1941 (NAZ/SEC/2/734; Chipungu 1992; Vail 
1977).   
This transaction did not immediately or quickly translate into the return 
of people to their lands.  Several major obstacles fell in the way of the people’s 
return to their lands.  First, most of the 6,500mi2 set aside for European 
settlement had reverted to bush land and filled with ild game, as well as tsetse 
fly.  The colonial government began an extensive program in 1943 to clear the 
land and thin out the wild game populations (Vail 1977).  Secondly, the colonial 
government determined that, due to the severe erosion, any agricultural 
production in the region must employ “modern” agricultural techniques – 
techniques which the local communities had neither  capital nor the labor 
supply to engage.  So although the colonial governmnt was interested in 
converting the land to agricultural use, the out-migration to more lucrative 
employment in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Copperbelt was “far 
too high to allow for the sort of agricultural revolution that the Government was 
seeking” (Vail 1977: 151-152).  A 1946 Land Commission Report concluded 
that the end result of this policy created a “profoundly unsatisfactory situation in 
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many of the reserves” and caused much “unnecessary suffering and ill-will” 
(GRZ 1946: 2).  For the people of Eastern Province, th  “unnecessary suffering” 
and land displacement technically concluded in 1941, but the spatial legacies of 
these forced migrations remain today. 
 
Mozambique’s War of Independence and Nyimba Refugee Camp 
Although 1960 was a watershed year for the independence of African 
countries, the Portuguese colonies across the continent were only just beginning 
what would become fifteen year long struggle for liberation.  In fact, in 1960 
Mozambique was only just witnessing the formation of its first political party, 
União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO), led by Adelino 
Gwambe from Harare, Zimbabwe.  In 1961, two additional nationalist parties 
formed in Dar es Salaam, Mozambique National African Union (MANU) and 
União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI).  In September 1962, 
all three parties merged to form Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(FRELIMO).   
FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, was one f a handful of 
black Mozambican graduates, with a degree from the United States.  On 
September 25, 1964, FRELIMO began its long struggle for independence, 
launching a number of attacks in the Mueda area, fifty miles south of the 
northern border with Tanzania (Englund 2002).  Under Mondlane's leadership, 
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with its headquarters in Dar es Salaam, FRELIMO steadily increased its power 
in the two northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, effectively creating 
liberated areas freed of Portuguese control (Henriksen 1976; Nunes and Wilson 
1991).   
In 1968, FRELIMO held its first meetings inside Mozambique, re-
electing Mondlane as president and setting the strategy for the liberation of the 
entire country.  The following year would deal FRELIMO many blows, 
undermining many of the achievements they had made.  In February, Mondlane 
was assassinated by a parcel bomb and a power struggle within FRELIMO 
intensified between those who were fighting for socialist restructuring of society 
and those who basically wanted to substitute Portuguese elites with black elites 
(Hastings 1974).  Ultimately, the military commander Samora Machel emerged 
from the struggle as Frelimo's leader and president.  According to Englund, a 
“new sense of common purpose was embodied by Samora Machel” (2002: 6).  
At the same time, Portuguese General Kaulza da Arriga, “Portugal's hope in the 
Mozambique war”, arrived in Mozambique to combat FRELIMO and bring an 
end to the independence movement (Hastings 1974: 265).   
Zambia remained firmly committed to the anti-colonial struggle of its 
neighbor, demonstrated most vocally in the drafting a d subsequent adoption by 
14 African nations of the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969.  The Lusaka Manifesto is 
probably most noted for laying out the following statement in its opening words  
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By this manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all 
shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that 
all men are equal, and have equal rights to human 
dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, 
religion or sex. 
 
But buried a bit deeper into the Manifesto is an assertion that I believe also has 
something quite significant to add to concerns of bundaries, identities, and 
place-making within the context of the struggle against colonialism.  The 
Manifesto asserts the following about Zambia’s neighbors:  
In Mozambique and Angola, and in so-called 
Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not 
racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in 
Africa.  Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that 
it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to 
settle.  But no decree of the Portuguese dictator, no 
legislation passed by any parliament in Portugal can 
make Africa a part of Europe (Lusaka Manifesto 
1969).   
 
Although indeed Africa could not be made a part of Europe, Portugal’s violent 
resistance to the liberation of its colonies made many Mozambicans 
“Zambians”.  In December 1965, several thousand Mozambicans crossed the 
border into Zambia, either fleeing from or attempting to avoid violence 
associated with the liberation struggle.   
As discussed in Chapter Four, the border between Mozambique and 
Zambia was (and is) a remnant of the colonial era and for many of these 
refugees the “border between the two countries is a fiction” (Aall 1967: 30).  So 
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much so that the archives are filled with correspondence concerned with 
distinguishing between Zambians and Mozambicans and making fiction into 
reality.  For example, several letters grapple with the challenge of determining 
the refugee-status and citizenship of individuals in inter-border marriages.  In 
fact, special attention was needed to discern between “Zambians” and 
“Mozambicans” with regard to the issue of inter-border marriages.  A 1969 letter 
to the Chadiza District Immigration Officer details the common practice of 
deriving the citizenship of women through marriage, rather than birth.  
According to the letter:  
If a Zambian was long ago married to a 
Mozambique in Mozambique, that woman after 
running away from the Portuguese terror in Zambia 
with or without her husband, is a refugee because 
she qualified on the citizenship of the husband in 
Mozambique.  Likewise, a Mozambican woman 
whether to be a refugee or not if married to a 
Zambian man she qualifies on the citizenship of the 
husband and be treated as Zambian (NAZ/EP5676 
4/20/82) 
 
The long history of interaction, intermarriage, and movement across the 
border in the area meant that nearly all of these refugees crossed the border 
intending to stay with Zambian friends and relatives (Hamrell 1967).   
The few who did not have friends or relatives on the Zambian side of the 
border successfully petitioned local chiefs and headmen for protection 
(NAZ/EP5676 4.20.82; Field Interviews).  As the number of Mozambicans 
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seeking refuge in Zambia grew, the Zambian government d cided to transfer all 
the self-settled refugees to one place “for the sake of proper administration” 
(Hamrell 1967: 29).  The government quickly established Nyimba Refugee 
Camp, just south of the Great East Road, and within one year, more than 2,000 
Mozambicans were relocated to Nyimba.   
Refugee research and literature often begins the story at this moment – 
with the establishment and subsequent growth of a particular camp – and rarely 
unpacks the complicated and contested nature of establishing and populating a 
refugee camp.  In beginning the story in such a manner, most refugee research 
obscures the problematic processes which compel refuge s to transition from 
self-settlement to organized settlements/camps. Utilizing archive material as 
well as interviews, I have pieced together some of the complexities that underlay 
the “establishment” of a refugee camp.  In telling such stories, I seek to reveal 
the very real ways in which people challenged and resisted attempts to control 
their movements and settlement choices.   
The transition from self-settlement with friends and relatives into the 
organized settlement of Nyimba Refugee Camp was anything but smooth as 
many of the Mozambican refugees were unwilling to voluntarily move to 
Nyimba.  Several incidents created a refugee population wary of the merits of 
organized settlement at Nyimba Camp.  Zambian police and immigration 
officials were sent into the border areas to convince (and in some cases coerce) 
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refugees to relocate to the camp (Hamrell 1967; NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  Many 
refugees ran into the fields to hide when the police and immigration officials 
approached.   
Reflecting on such difficulties, Mr. Moonga, an Immigration Officer, 
informed the Permanent Secretary of Eastern Province that he had been unable 
to resettled a group of approximately 60 Mozambicans to Nyimba because “each 
time I go there to try to contact them, they run away and hid in the bushes 
towards Mozambique” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  The archives detail extensive 
attempts to identify and relocate Mozambicans to Nyimba Refugee Camp, often 
commenting on the difficulty of such exercises.  
Even after processing, documenting, and transferring (see Chapter 3 on 
defining, counting, settling, and managing) some of the self-settled refugees to 
Nyimba, other factors complicated the success of Nyimba as a viable option for 
Mozambican refugees.  Shortly after an early influx into Nyimba, an outbreak of 
measles caused the death of a significant number of children at the camp 
hospital (Hamrell 1967; Field Interviews).  Many of the refugees connected the 
deaths with the camp itself and as the “rumour about the epidemic spread, [it]... 
made those refugees still in villages even more reluctant to go to the camp … 
[and] many who were [already] at the camp left” (Aall 1967:31). In fact, the 
Portuguese are reported to have used this incident to begin an effective 
propaganda campaign among the refugees, convincing many that if they went to 
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Nyimba Refugee Camp their children would die and their men would be sent as 
forced labor to Kariba Dam (Hamrell 1967; Field Interviews.).  These negative 
impressions and fears of Nyimba Refugee Camp, together with the refugees' 
relatively successful and effective survival among friends and relatives in the 
border areas, coalesced in such a way that sustained resistance to resettlement at 
Nyimba continued (and intensified) throughout the lib ration struggle.  
Judging from the archival material, concern about the presence of self-
settling refugees in the area intensified in the early 1970s.  In a July 14, 1971 
letter from F.S. Kameli to the District Secretary in Chadiza District, the 
Immigration Officer detailed his growing concern with the presence of refugees 
in the border areas.  According to his report, Kameli s nt three Immigration 
Assistants to the border villages to “collect” refugees and recorded his 
“astonishment” when they returned with only two Mozambican refugees 
(NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  The rest of the refugees living in the border villages 
had run into hiding upon the advice of locals. Throughout the letter, Kameli is 
clearly frustrated by the lack of cooperation by village headmen, arguing that it 
is “high time” that the headmen along the Zambia-Mozambique border be 
“shaken-up” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  Kameli stated that upon questioning by 
his Immigration Assistants the village headmen “clearly admitted that they had 
plenty of refugees from Mozambique and that they could not reveal their 
names...for fear they could be taken to Nyimba” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).   
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Kameli explicitly connected the presence of refugees “wandering about 
in the border villages” to larger questions of national security (NAZ/EP/5676 
4/20/82).  He requested that the District Secretary speak to the headmen about 
the “dangers they and the state could face by harbouring new entrants” 
(NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  Kameli further suggested that those refugees who 
refuse to relocate to the “prescribed resettlement” at Nyimba be handed over to 
FRELIMO in Mozambique (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  Kameli's letter provides 
useful insight into the complications involved in trying to “collect” refugees into 
camps, revealing both the frustrations of a district level bureaucrat and the 
coalition between self-settled refugees and their local hosts, especially village 
headmen.   
The archives also revealed significant disagreements within the 
government bureaucracy concerning the proper procedures and methods by 
which to monitor and document Mozambican refugees along the border.  In 
September 1971, the Katete District Secretary, E.C. Nbita, wrote a scathing 
letter to the Chief Immigration Officer in Lusaka to voice his frustration with the 
“collection” methods employed by Immigration Officers in his district 
(NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82). According to Nbita, the Immigration Officers' 
documentation activities were an “unnecessary burden...on my office” 
(NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  The following excerpt from his letter details his 
objections to the way in which Immigration Officers were conducting affairs in 
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his district:  
23 September 1971 
From: E.C. Nbita – District Secretary, Katete 
To: Chief Immigration Officer, Lusaka 
Re: Minute KAT/28/71 of 17th September 1971 
 
I have disagreed with the method [by Immigration 
Officers] of documenting refugees and leaving them 
in villages and then bringing copies of 
documentation forms with a request that I send 
District Messengers to collect them.  This method is 
not effective and has led to a waste of funds withou  
achieving desired results.  Several times when 
District Messengers have been sent on collection of 
refugees upon receipt of the reports from the 
Immigration Officer, it has been proved when 
reaching the place in question, refugees are not 
found and reports in more or less all cases indicated 
that refugees return to their country of origin 
immediately when immigration staff left the place 
after effecting documentation.   
 
In some cases, we find it too expensive to detail a 
Messenger to escort only one refugee to Nyimba.  It 
is further not realized enough that unlike Colonial 
days, a district like Katete has very little number of 
District Messengers and indeed transport and other 
facilities which can assist to keep a refugee for a 
few days before removal to Nyimba can be made.  
 
To cut this minute short, I have to state that the 
present role played by the immigration staff in this 
particular exercise is not a relief but unnecessary 
burden placed on my office… I just wonder why 
immigration staff can not be made to do more 
practical work rather then ending at mere 
documentation, and expect the District Secretary to 
go hunting for refugees who leave convenient places 
after being alarmed as a result of documentation.   
 
Last not the least, the unquestionable need to 
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remove refugees in Zambian villages along the 
borders can not be overemphasized by anybody but 
what is required is to pay attention to the factors 
involved and not merely to end at documentation” 
(NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82)  
 
Upon further investigation into the archives, I discovered that Nbita’s 
letter to the Chief Immigration Officer in Lusaka was in reaction to a complaint 
filed by the Katete District Immigration Officer, L.K. Zimbiri.  Apparently, 
Zimbiri filed a complaint against Nbita due to an incident involving the escape 
of Mr. Olokani Banda, a Mozambican refugee under th guard of one of Nbita’s 
District Messengers at the time of escape.  In respon e, Nbita wrote the 
preceding letter to Lusaka, as well as a letter to Zimbiri himself.  Nbita 
maintains that Zimbiri’s complaint is not “genuine” because Mr. Banda was not 
under arrest and was “merely being moved to the refugee camp with a liberty of 
a free person” (NAZ/EP/5676 4/20/82).  Nbita’s letter to Zimbiri is interesting in 
that it acknowledges a contradiction in the governme t’s conception and 
treatment of refugees – on the one hand, refugees have the liberties of a “free 
person”, yet on the other hand, they are consistently described as needing to be 
“rounded up” or “collected” as though their presenc outside of Nyimba 
Refugee Camp is in fact a crime.   
As the number of Mozambicans seeking refuge in Zambi  accelerated 
throughout the early 1970s, the government of Zambi grappled with both its 
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inability to effectively identify and “collect” refugees and the growing 
inadequacy of Nyimba to sustain such large numbers of efugees.  The approach 
advocated by the Ministry of Rural Development in Lusaka was to maintain the 
status quo and continue pushing refugees into Nyimba Refugee Camp.  This 
decision appears to have been reached without the consultation of local 
bureaucrats, local headmen, and/or Mozambican refuge s.   
According to Chipata Land Use Officer, T.E. Bourne, the proposal from 
Lusaka was “completely and absolutely  unacceptable to us in this province, 
from the economic, agricultural, ecological, political, and humanistic aspects” 
(NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).  In his November 15, 1971 letter to J.D.B. Eerdamns 
(Planning Officer – Social Aspects in Ministry of Rural Development, Lusaka), 
Bourne outlines the shortcomings of Nyimba as the solution to the current 
refugee crisis in the province.  He calculated thatNyimba could handle fewer 
than 400 refugee families, leaving over 600 refugee families with no place in the 
organized settlement at Nyimba (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).  Additionally, Bourne 
cautioned the government against proceeding without c nsultation with the local 
border communities.  He warned that the “local peopl  are already a little 
disturbed by the fact that these people [Mozambican refugees] are pouring in 
and receiving aid, while they themselves have no development projects.  They 
would be even more disturbed if they see vast areas of their land being taken 
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away” (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).  In response to Bourne’s concerns, the Ministry of 
Rural Development began to re-evaluate its plans for Mozambican refugees.   
According to archival evidence, several changes in government policy 
necessitated that alternative land be allocated for M zambican refugees who 
could not be accommodated at Nyimba Refugee Camp.  The most significant 
policy change came in the area of agricultural development.  Prior to 1972, the 
agricultural policy at Nyimba was one of communal frming, with heavy 
“mechanization and intensive use of fertilizers” as managed by the Ministry of 
Projects of the Ministry of Rural Development (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).  According 
to a letter from the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs, each 
refugee family would now be allocated an individual f mily farm plot, which 
was to be cultivated “traditionally” without the use of fertilizers or 
mechanization.   
Due to this shift in policy, the Permanent Secretary concluded (in 
agreement with Bourne) that “the Refugee Settlement at Nyimba is now utterly 
inadequate”.  In his letter, the Permanent Secretary addresses the fact that with 
less than 600 acres of arable land, Nyimba can only support 120 refugee 
families, at 5 acres/family, leaving over 800 refugee families in need of land 
(NAZ/EP483 1/1/90).   
In response to this “insoluble dilemma” (NAZ/EP483 1/1/90), numerous 
alternatives to Nyimba were pursued by various governm nt offices.  The first 
 150 
such alternative is outlined in the following letter from the Planning Officer in 
Lusaka.   
6 January 1972 
From: J.D.B. Eerdamns – Planning Officer (Social 
Aspects), Lusaka  
To: T.E. Bourne – Land Use Officer, Chipata  
Subject: Nyimba Farm  
 
After discussions with the Commissioner for 
Refugees, it appears that the position is as follows: 
• The Ministry of Home Affairs prefers to 
concentrate refugees in large camps of at 
least 2,000 people for administrative reasons 
• At Nyimba not enough arable lands is 
available to settle a large number of families 
• It is not desirable to take over Trust land for 
settling refugees in areas like Nyimba where 
population density is relatively high 
• It is not desirable for political reasons to 
“settle” refugees among people of the same 
linguistic and tribal grouping. The refugees 
may tend to forget their temporary status in 
the country.  
For these reasons it is preferable to move all 
refugees from Nyimba and resettle them at Meheba, 
North Western Province, where about 90,000 acres 
are available. Each family will be given a 10 acre 
plot. Though no final decision has been made yet by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is hoped that at 
least part of the present Nyimba refugees will move 
to Meheba after this growing season. (NAZ/EP483 
1/1/90) 
 
Eerdamns’ response to Bourne is enlightening in many ways.  To begin, 
his first assertion reinforces the preference of refug e-hosting governments to 
consolidate refugees into organized settlements.  If we pause here to unpack the 
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idea of organized settlements, I think it quickly becomes clear that what is being 
advocated is the creation of highly governed spaces. Spaces in which the 
government can, with the assistance of its internatio l partners, monitor and 
govern the activities and, most importantly, the movements of refugees within its 
borders.  The second interesting aspect of the government's approach is found in 
Eerdamns’ fourth point: that refugees should be settled away from hosts with 
whom they share cultural characteristics.  The culmination of Eerdamns’ four 
basic assumptions leads him to advocate that Nyimba refugees be resettled to 
Meheba Refugee Camp, nearly 1,000km away in Western Province.   
The second alternative to Nyimba Refugee Camp sought to find a 
suitable site for refugee-hosting within the province, signaling a repudiation of 
Eerdamns’ contention that refugees should be sent far from those with whom 
they share cultural traits.  Zambian authorities were particularly concerned with 
movement between Nyimba and border regions and increasingly viewed Nyimba 
refugees as “militant supporters” and “carriers” for FRELMIO (NAZ EP5676 
4/20/82).  The following July 14, 1972 letter written by Immigration Officer 
Matalaka in response to a government directive to forcibly resettle a group of 
350 Mozambican refugees to Nyimba explains some of these concerns in detail:  
I interviewed the leaders of the groups on 13th July
1972, including the representatives of Frelimo, who 
explained to me that the reasons to enter the country 
was not to settle permanently in Zambia, but that 
their village in Mozambique was destroyed by 
Portuguese planes and four people were captured.  
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They were therefore advised by Freedom Fighters 
to seek shelter in Zambia.   
(a) Before they entered the country, the 
Frelimo Leaders went to see Chief 
Mwanjawanthu in order to allow them 
to camp near the border and permission 
was granted to them. 
(b) It is a problem to remove them to 
Nyimba Refugee Camp as they 
indicated that they are essential to 
Freedom Fighters in the area by 
supplying food and labour.   
(c)  They also emphasized that should they 
be away from Freedom Fighters, they 
will not be able to support the freedom 
fighters as they do now.  
(d)  These people are willing to go back to 
Mozambique, but it is a risk to them 
because the Portuguese soldiers are 
aware of their movements and their 
villages have on several times been 
bombed.   
Please advise what action can be taken as soon as 
possible (NAZ EP5676 4/20/82) 
My own field interviews with former soldiers confirmed that local border 
communities were “essential to the Freedom Fighters in the area by supplying 
food and labour” (NAZ EP 5676 4/20/82).  The Eastern P ovince archival folder 
(NAZ EP5676) is filled with similar letters and correspondence concerning the 
security risks of Nyimba’s proximity to the border areas.  One final example of 
this concern can be found in another letter written by Matakala on July 21, 1972.  
I have placed it here in its entirety because I believ  that it demonstrates a 
number of instructive points concerning security, community, and resettlement 
away from Nyimba.  
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21 July 1972 
During my tour of inspection in Chief 
Mwanjawanthu’s area in Petauke District and Chief 
Mwangala’s area in Chadiza District, I discovered 
that our people have their villages less than a mile 
from the boundary with Zambia and Mozambique 
where Freedom Fighters are operating [and] 
harassing the Portuguese.  It appears that a day will 
come when Portuguese soldiers will retaliate by 
bombing villages and our people will continually 
subjected to air attacks, even at Nyimba.   
 
Both chiefs mentioned above, Freedom Fighters, 
and their supporters mix with our people in beer 
parties.  When I visited Chief Mwangala’s area 24 
miles from Chadiza boma, I was informed that 
Frelimo are camping 5 miles inside Mozambique 
but their supporters, men and women including 
children, have camps in Zambia in separate groups.  
I failed to see their leaders.  I was informed that all 
men went out assisting in transporting ammunition 
for freedom fighters. This case is similar to that of 
chief Mwanjawanthu’s area in Petauke District.   
In Chief Mwangala’s area Chadiza District, there is 
a hill 5 miles away which serves as a boundary and 
towards Zambia there is a thick bush with big and 
tall trees which makes difficult for Portuguese 
soldiers to track freedom fighters.  I and my officers 
walked to the border but returned after being 
warned of landmines.  We visited another [border] 
camp but it was deserted leaving only two small 
boys of 10 years old who were capable enough to 
answer few questions we asked them.  One of the 
two boys revealed that his father had left in the 
morning to assist freedom fighters and would return 
in the evening. 
 
On my return I was contemplating that women and 
children of those people are certainly not part and
parcel of Frelimo and I fail to understand why they 
should be regarded as supporters of freedom 
fighters.  I felt women and children should be 
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separated away from the area and by kept into a 
refugee camp where children will attend school 
rather than to leave them in the bush starving.  
(NAZ EP5676 4/20/82) 
The push to close Nyimba was also motivated by security concerns and 
frustrations with local authorities.  The District Secretary of Petauke, H.S. 
Lubinda, wrote to the Commissioner for Refugees and stated that “the present 
camp at Nyimba is a security risk” and poses a “danger” to administration of 
refugee relief operations (NAZ EP484 1/1/90).  In the end, officials proposed 
that Nyimba refugees should be transferred to Sasare F ms, a farm block that 
had originally been planned to house Watchtower refug es from Malawi (NAZ 
EP484 1/1/90).  
Throughout May 1973, government officials spent considerable time and 
energy (as evident in the archives by frequent correspondence) planning for the 
relocation to Sasare Farms.  On January 21, 1974, Stokes confirmed the 
governments intentions to begin resettling Nyimba refugees to “Sasare Refugee 
Settlement” after the rains (NAZ EP484 1/1/90).  This resettlement to Sasare and 
the creation of “Sasare Refugee Settlement” did not transpire as events in 
Mozambique began to deescalate throughout 1974, with the signing of a transfer 
of power agreement between Lisbon and Frelimo.  On June 25, 1975, Samora 
Machel became the first president of a newly liberated and independent 
Mozambique.   
With the de-escalation of violence, many of the self- ttled and Nyimba-
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settled refugees crossed back over the border and returned home.  Upon their 
return, Nyimba-settled refugees maintained communication and trade with their 
Zambian hosts on the other side of the border.  According to one Mozambican 
refugee, inter-border trade and communication resumd to levels that existed 
prior to the disruptions of colonialism:  
People from Mozambique used to take meat and 
fish for sale to Zambia in the border area.  After the
sales, they could buy whatever they wanted, mostly 
salt, clothes, soap, ploughs, and other fancy things.  
Again from the Zambian border line people could 
take salt, some sugar, clothes, and soap to 
Mozambique to exchange for fish and meat.  
Sometimes ploughs could be taken in exchange for 
cattle in Mozambique.  This trade became very 
famous so much that is made many people from 
Mfingoe and Maloera bomas in Mozambique 
friends with many people again from Petauke and 
Katete bomas in Zambia. Because of that, 
relationships were being made; marriages across the 
border became famous again” (RSC/MMZ/MZ-43 
UKW – emphasis added).  
 
Returning Nyimba-settled refugees also implemented a series of changes 
to their agricultural practices, changes they had encountered and learned while 
staying at Nyimba.  For example, numerous informants signaled that the 
introduction of extensive plowing on the Mozambican side of the border only 
began when the Nyimba refugees returned from the camp with ploughs and 
other agricultural implements.  Such practices point to another chapter in the 
wider Ukwimi story – that of how certain places in Mozambique evolved and 
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changed as a result of the presence, absence, and return of these refugee 
communities.  Although this extended story into Mozambique is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, it is nonetheless significantly tied to the events which 
occurred in and around Ukwimi.   
 
Conclusions  
Although the creation and populating of a camp like Nyimba is often 
described in very objective, unproblematic language, my reading at he National 
Archives uncovered a much more complex and problematic story.   The 
narrative documented in the archives at the very least points to the contested 
nature of such exercises.  Interestingly, and contrary to the prevalent narrative of 
host-refugee tensions, the archives give evidence of the degree to which local 
Zambians, especially chiefs and headmen, and Mozambic ns resisted efforts to 
be re-displaced to Nyimba.  These types of unexpected partnerships and 
relationships are precisely the stories that go untold in our contemporary 








EMPLACING UKWIMI REFUGEE SETTLEMENT 
 
 
We know very well that that country [Mozambique] 
can never give us peace. It’s only in this country 
[Zambia] where we’ve found it. My parents and all 
my relatives died while we were watching. I saw my 
relatives getting shot. They slaughtered them like 
animals and then loaded them in a pickup truck like 
bags of maize or pigs while we were watching from 
afar. When the UN told us it’s time to go [at 
repatriation], we said we’re not going anywhere. 
Where would we go? Where we don’t have relatives 
or roots? The UN told us that if we remain there 
won’t be any help from anybody. The times of free 
food and free everything was over. We said we’ll 
manage. We’ll do the farming like we used to.  This 
place is home.  
(Field Interview with Mozambican refugee 2006) 
 
 As a civil war broke out in Mozambique and violent conflict intensified, 
many Mozambicans once again crossed the border to seek refuge with their 
Zambian relatives and friends.  Just as they did during the liberation struggle, 
the majority of these refugees self-settled with the border villages, foregoing the 
direct assistance from official refugee relief operations.  As was the case with 
the Nyimba resettlements, the GRZ once again faced considerable resistance to 
their efforts to relocate Mozambicans into organized s ttlements.  This chapter 
examines the creation of Ukwimi Refugee Settlement in 1987 as a ‘new’ place, 
by unpacking the institutional practices involved in the planning and design of 
URS and tackling the evolving landscape and place-making that occurred.  
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Resumption of Violence  
 On June 25, 1975, Samora Machel became the first pre ident of a newly 
liberated and independent Mozambique and FRELIMO now faced a period of 
transition from freedom fighters to ruling party leadership and bureaucracy.  It 
quickly became apparent that the transition would not be a smooth or easy 
transformation.  To illustrate some of the challengs facing FRELIMO, consider 
the following recollection by a village headman in the Chide area:  
People were indeed happy that they were out of the 
bondage of the Portuguese; such things as live 
skinning and the whipping with Chamboko (thorned 
whip) stopped.  However, by 1978 onwards, people 
saw that things became different and difficult, they 
could not even own a shop apart from the 
government.  The government would not allow me 
to start a shop on my own without having to join 
hands with other persons (ten or more) even if these 
people had no money.  This ruined most businesses. 
People at that stage thought Frelimo should be 
kicked out.  During the time of Frelimo, the 
economy was deteriorating; no matter how much 
you sold the money you got could not buy anything 
(Juergensen 1994: 16). 
 
 Shortly after their victory over the Portuguese, FRELIMO faced 
opposition from an externally-funded, but internally-operating rebel force called 
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), under the leadership of 
Afonso Dhlakama.  Although many historians (Isaacman 1987) dismissed 
RENAMO as South African or Rhodesian funded terrorists, Englund cautions 
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that “in actual fact, however, RENAMO could appear in very different guises in 
different parts of the country and at different points in time” (2002: 10).  
According to one former soldier I interviewed no one really knew what it was 
they were fighting over:  
As to why they began fighting each other...In every 
situation there is always a fight to prove who can be 
a man.  But other than that, I wouldn't know the 
reasons behind the fighting – only themselves, those 
at the top positions – can know that answer 
  
 In my interviews with former RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers, both 
groups openly acknowledge using strategies and tactics of war to target and 
attack civilians.  Consider the following narrative of a former FRELIMO 
soldier:  
The Frelimo movement did not allow civilians to be 
involved in giving food to the rebels.  Reports began 
to reach the Frelimo base that civilians are giving 
food to our enemies.  Because of this lawlessness – 
that's how we turned against civilians. 
 
It made our superiors realize that this war would be 
difficult for us because of the civilians. Now we 
must not choose – let us lapula [fire/attack] 
everyone.  So that those who can run will find 
themselves in other countries. So that we remain 
just ourselves – just soldiers.  
 
Then even RENAMO was surprised, saying 
‘ahhh… they are killing even their own people, let 
us now wire them also.’ That's how the war fully 
began. An informer would come into the villages, 
do head counts, learn the way of life there, and take
that back to the base.  Slowly the war was spreading 
 160 
– people were just joining the army anyhow.  Our 
people are suffering/getting hurt too much.  And 
people needed to be free to run to a country near to 
them. The door first opened in Zambia and people 
entered. 
 
 As stated earlier, this is not meant to be a comprehensive exposé on the 
formation of RENAMO or FRELIMO nor a dissection of the anatomy of a civil 
war.  With regard to the wider concerns of this dissertation, I am more concerned 
with the lasting impacts of these politics of violenc  than with an exhaustive 
discussion of the geopolitical concerns, causes, justifications, and/or maneuvers 
of the RENAMO/FRELIMO war.  Given that particular lens, I turn now to the 
impacts that this larger geopolitical game and politics of violence had on 
communities living in proximity to the Mozambique-Zambia border.   
 In his eloquent and persuasive ethnography of confli t and displacement 
in Mozambique, Stephen Lubkemann contends that “in 
Mozambique…migration was one of the most important d common ways 
people coped with violence and its effects” (2008: 2).  As such, intensified 
internal conflict in Mozambique’s Tete Province precipitated an influx of 3,000 
Mozambicans into Zambia in June 1985, seeking refuge rom the ongoing and 
escalating violence on the Mozambican side of the border. Within a year, more 
than 22,000 Mozambicans had “poured” into Zambia, spontaneously settled 
themselves along the border areas (Malatsi e  al 1987: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 
MAL; Beyani 1986; Mijere 1988; Wilson and Shumba 1990 RSC/MMZ/MZ-43 
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UKW ; Anderson 1991).   
 Just as in the decade before, spontaneous self-settlem nt in the border 
areas made sense to the Mozambicans due to the artificial nature of the 
boundary in the first place, the cultural and histor cal affinity of the communities 
on either side of the border, and Mozambicans experiences in the Zambian 
border regions as refugees less than 10 years before during their liberation 
struggle.  Many of these Mozambicans self-settled with their relatives on the 
Zambian side of a colonially constructed border.  In her account of their 
movements at the time, one Mozambican refugee woman reflected on this 
feeling of familiarity in Eastern Province.  According to one Mozambican 
refugee I interviewed:  
First I settled in Chikalaba [in Zambia].  We settld 
in some relative’s village.  The way we live is 
different to here [refugee settlement].  We had 
villages from both sides of the border.  The 
borderline did not make sense to us.  We could 
settle in both areas if you want.  So when I started 
off from there [Mozambique] to Chikalaba 
[Zambia], I knew I had an already existing home 
there [Zambia]. 
 
Consider the following photographs of the Mozambique-Zambia border 
(Photograph 4 and Photograph 5).  What you are seeing in these images is the 
way the border between Mozambique and Zambia appears when you move 
away from controlled-border crossings.  As you can learly see in both images, 
the probability of this “border” holding significant meaning for local people is 
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unlikely. Nearly every Mozambican refugee I interviwed, both those still living 
in the camp and those who had returned to Mozambique, shared her sentiment 
and conceptualization of the Zambian border villages as “existing homes” and 
the irrelevance of the Mozambique-Zambia border to their conceptualizations of 















 Rising security concerns about the risks posed to both Zambians and 
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Mozambique-Zambia 
Border (rocks in center 
mark border) 
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refugees further from the border region.  In order to address these challenges 
(both perceived and real), the government, in conjunction with UNHCR, began 
planning for the construction of a refugee settlement in Eastern Province (Mijere 
1988; Black et al 1990; Anderson 1991).  As it had 10 years earlier, the GRZ 
insisted on resettling refugees into an organized settlement rather than continue 
to tolerate self-settlement along the border.   
 The basic assumption that resettlement away from brder areas and into 
organized (controlled) settlements would “provide greater security for the 
refugees and ...offer them an opportunity for self-r liance” permeated the 
discourse throughout the planning period (Anderson 1991: 4; Lassailly-Jacob 
1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996).  In addition to these public discussions concerning 
the benefits of organized resettlement, Chapter Three also illustrated the 
financial motivation of economically struggling, developing countries to lift 
some of the financial burdens of informal, self-settled refugee-hosting by 
passing responsibility (legal and economic) onto the international community, 
via the UNHCR and its implementing partners.  The ov rwhelming security 
concerns, coupled with severe financial burdens – requi ed GRZ to solicit the 
UNHCR to establish a new refugee camp in Eastern Province.   
 
Site Selection and Needs Assessment 
 By June 1986, GRZ began pushing UNHCR to once again tr nsfer 
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Mozambicans from the border regions to a planned refugee camp, once again 
citing security concerns in the border regions as an argument against the self-
settlement of refugees.  Though firmly committed to the resettlement of refugees 
into an organized settlement, GRZ did not entertain the idea of reopening 
Nyimba Refugee Camp.  Without the detailed history f the Nyimba operation 
provided in Chapter 5, the decision to create an entirely new refugee settlement 
instead of using Nyimba would not make much sense.  But, given the 
deteriorating stability of the Nyimba camp towards the end of its existence and 
the recorded desire to close Nyimba as early as 1972, it should not come as a 
surprise that GRZ authorities were not keen to re-op n Nyimba as an organized 
settlement, especially given its problematic history and its proximity to the 
border.   
 As the Nyimba area was not an option, the GRZ proposed that the new 
camp be located near Sasare Farms in Msanzala constitue cy, Petauke District.  
In response to GRZ demands for the organized settlement of all self-settled 
Mozambican refugees, the UNHCR requested the demarcation of approximately 
5,000 hectares of land in order to settle the estimated 10,000 Mozambicans from 
the border region.  From July 10 to July 13, 1986, UNHCR representatives, 
together with Petauke District authorities, made a preliminary site assessment in 
the proposed area near Sasare Farms.   
 Almost immediately upon arrival, it became clear that the local 
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leadership did not support the demarcation of their land for the purpose of 
refugee resettlement.  To begin, the District Council delineated only 500 of the 
requested 5,000 hectares.  Msanzala leaders made tentativ  commitments to 
delineate more land in the future, but only “if necessary” (Schelhas 1986: 2 
RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH). However, even a very cursory glance at the site 
revealed that any “necessary” expansion would be problematic and highly 
unlikely given that the 500 hectare area was bound on one side by a prison and 
on the other by Zambia National Service (ZNS) land.  Additionally, both the 
ZNS and prison authorities strongly objected to theformation of the camp, 
claiming it to be a potential “security hazard” (Schelhas 1986: 2 
RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).  Perhaps the most decisive blow against the prospects 
of opening a refugee settlement at the Sasare location was struck by the reaction 
of the local community who voiced “intensive opposition” (Schelhas 1986: 2 
RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).   
 After the on-site failures of the UNHCR at the Sasare location, GRZ 
proposed the Ukwimi area as a potential site for the new refugee settlement.  
Like Sasare, Ukwimi is also located in Zambia’s Eastern Province – 500 km 
from the capital of Lusaka, 70 km north of the district center Petauke, and more 
than 100 km from the Mozambican border.  According to Black et al, Ukwimi 
was identified for a refugee settlement “not on grounds of ecological or 
economic suitability, but because it was nearly uninhabited” (1990: 8).  It was 
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not, however, completely uninhabited.  Prior to theplacement of the refugee 
settlement, the area was inhabited by approximately 1,000 people organized into 














According to Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye, former Ukwimi Scheme Manager under 
LWF, the authorities relied on past experiences from other refugee settlements in 
Zambia when planning Ukwimi:  
From the two lessons they [UNHCR, GRZ, and 
implementing partners] had learned – the first one 
removing the indigenous people [Mayukwayukwa 
in 1968] and the second one settling them in 
Map 5: Ukwimi Area Prior to Establishment of Refugee Camp 
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isolation [Meheba 1971] – they said this one we are 
going to settle them together with the people.   
 
It is this sentiment of integration which dominated he discourse on Ukwimi and 
can also be viewed as a precursor to many of the ideas that drive the Zambia 
Initiative, which we will examine in more detail later.   
Although the Ukwimi area is located within the same constituency 
(Msanzala) as the Sasare Farms area, government and UNHCR negotiations 
with the local Ukwimi community were not met with te kind of organized, 
“intensive opposition” that characterized the failed negotiations at Sasare Farms.  
Officials reported that the small local population at Ukwimi seemed to be “quite 
favourable” to refugee resettlement in their area as it promised to provide them 
“better access to markets, work and social services…for which they usually have 
to walk long distances” (Schelhas 1986: 31 RSC/MMZ/-56 SCH).   
Although I found nothing in my research to dispute that the local 
Ukwimi community felt “quite favourable” about the creation of Ukwimi 
Refugee Settlement, I strongly believe that ease of negotiations at Ukwimi was 
not as simple as official reports suggest.  The eas of negotiations at Ukwimi 
was also the result of a general lack of leadership from within the community.  
At Sasare Farms, officials had to negotiation directly with the Chief and his 
ndunas, but at Ukwimi no such clear leadership existed at the time.  From my 
extensive interviews with local villages inside thesettlement, as well as 
Zambian villages just on the outside edge of the scheme, it is clear that officials 
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requested “permission” from individual headmen and headwomen on a village-
by-village level.  Consider the following accounts:  
They came here to ask if they could use this land to 
keep their people since they were coming from a 
place of heavy war, saying “So we’ve been 
wondering where we could put our people and that’s 
what’s led us to your area.” My relative, Mr. 
Chibaba, said “You can come and use my area for 
as long as you want.” The agreement was signed 
between Mr. Chibaba, the Boma, and the UN 
people.  That’s how the refugees were brought here 
(URS border village interviewee)  
 
 
Q: Did anyone come here to ask about bringing 
refugees to settle?  
A: They asked themselves there in the Boma. Us? 
Well, we were just surprised to see that we have 
visitors. (URS village interviewee)  
 
We were agreed because we saw the refugees could 
share.  Tidzadya nao [We shall eat with them].   
 
 Although at the surface this may seem more complicated than 
negotiating with a single Chief (as was the case at Sasare), I would argue that 
this particular negotiating technique worked to thebenefit of the officials.  Let 
me explain. Since the British government abolished the native court for Chief 
Ukwimi in the 1930s and the entire chiefdom in the 1950s, the Ukwimi area has 
had a series of chieftainship wrangles.  Because of this, when officials were 
“negotiating” for use of land in Ukwimi they were not negotiating with any 
individuals who had direct, uncontested authority to make any such decision 
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over the land.  It was an entirely different exercise than the negotiations at 
Sasare because at Ukwimi no clear authority existed.  The difference it seems is 
one of “intensive opposition” and a reaction that is “quite favourable”.  
 Unlike the prior approaches to refugee settlement at Nyimba and in 
western Zambia, this time GRZ and UNHCR made the decision to conduct a 
thorough site assessment in Ukwimi, as well as schedule interviews with 
Mozambicans along the border in order to better anticipate their needs and 
expectations.  As with refugee settlements throughot the world, the planning 
stages of the new settlement involved numerous participants from global and 
national institutions and organizations.  However, no evidence was found as to 
the participation (or lack of) by the potential host community, other than the 
initial “negotiations”.   
 The original site assessment, conducted by planning consultant B. 
Schelhas, resulted in a number of very critical recommendations and 
conclusions concerning the location, land availability, soil suitability, water 
resources, site accessibility, agricultural potential, district development, refugee 
receptiveness, and budget projections.  A detailed r ading of Schelhas’ 
assessment is instructive not only in illustrating the institutional processes at 
work in the creation of organized refugee settlements, but also in foreshadowing 
some of the particular challenges that refugees would encounter during their stay 
at Ukwimi.   
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 With regards to the proposed site location, Schelhas emphasized 
Ukwimi’s distance from the Mozambique border (approximately 150km) as an 
inherently positive characteristic.  This characterization of distance from the 
border as a net positive should not come as a surpri e given the historical 
context and archival discussion of Nyimba’s border proximity as an inherent 
negative.  The second aspect of Schelhas’ site assessment revolved around the 
question of whether the proposed site could support the number of refugees in 
need of resettlement.  In order to tackle this very critical question, Schelhas 
relied on a detailed soil survey conducted in the area.  The soil survey identified 
13 separate soil mapping units, each with varying de rees of fertility and  
agricultural potential (Table 10).   
  Table 10   









Unit         
H       1869 
U1     2329   
U2       321 
G1S     625   
G1 1183       
G2     945   
G3A   1013 423   
G3B     96   
G4     1485   
F1 203       
F2   185     
F3 2025       
Total Hectares 3411 1198 5903 2190 
as % 27% 9% 46% 17% 
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 As mentioned earlier, the UNHCR indicated a need for 5,000 hectares of 
land for the resettlement of Mozambican refugees (when planning for the Sasare 
Farms location).  Given the soil variability and infertility at Ukwimi, Schelhas’ 
report concluded that the request of 5,000 hectares of land would “not be 
sufficient” (1986: 17 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 SCH).   
 Based on his reading and interpretation of the soil urvey, Schelhas 
called for a significant expansion in the amount of land being considered for 
refugee settlement.  In fact, Schelhas estimated that the District Council would 
need to delineate an additional 7,000 hectares of land in order to provide enough 
fertile land for a maximum of 10,000 refugees.  Although this meant more than 
doubling original projections, the District Council agreed to the expansion.  Of 
the now proposed 12,000 hectares, approximately 1/3 was moderately to very 
suitable for agricultural production, while approximately 47% of the soils were 
defined as barely suitable for agricultural development (Anderson 1991).   
 According to this finding, the Ministry of Agriculture suggested that 
Ukwimi be developed as two separate entities, as households assigned to the 
sandier soils would require larger plots (Anderson 1991).  Although Schelhas 
advised that 2 hectares per household would be sufficient, he warned that in 
order for his estimates regarding carrying capacity to be correct, district 
authorities needed to ensure that “no further suitable land will be occupied by 
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Photograph 6: Rocky Plot Allocated for Agricultural Use 











 With regards to water resources in the Ukwimi area, the site assessment 
identified the Lusandwa and Kasangazi rivers as the two main sources of surface 
water.  However, neither river is able to provide a ye r-round water supply as 
both dry up during the dry season (from May to August).  Other methods for 
securing water resources, such as groundwater or dams, were non-existent in the 
area at the time of assessment.  Schelhas suggested tha  groundwater drilling and 
dam construction would be necessary in order to adequat ly provide the refugee 
population with a secure, year-round water supply.   
 In addition to securing and/or developing water resources, the report also 
tackled the issue of site accessibility.  At the time of assessment, the Ukwimi 
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area’s only link to Petauke (and to the Great East Road) was via an 80km dirt 
road, which proved entirely inaccessible for the duration of the rainy season.  
Schelhas’ report advised GRZ and UNHCR that not only would that 80km road 
link need to be realigned, grated,  and graveled, but an additional 40km of 
service roads inside the settlement would also need to be opened, as well as 2 
bridges and at least 20 culverts.   
 Aside from the development of road infrastructure, the resettlement of 
Mozambican refugees to Ukwimi also required development in other areas of 
infrastructure.  For example, the initial site asses ment budgeted for all of the 
following infrastructure developments:  
• 6 administrative office blocks 
• 3 medium cost houses 
• 4 low cost houses 
• 1 general store 
• 1 equipment store 
• 2 machine sheds 
• 1 fuel tank  
• 4 to 5 schools (for estimated 3,000 children) 
• 1 rural health center  
 
 Schelhas also reported that the overall settlement project should be 
implemented in three separate phases.  Phase I (Planning) included all of the 
planning and preparatory activities involved in constructing the basic 
infrastructure needed at the camp.  The actual resettl m nt of border refugees to 
Ukwimi was scheduled to occur beginning April 1987 as part of Phase 2 
(Implementation).  Schelhas made the very critical (and political) assumption 
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that GRZ and UNHCR could begin Phase 3 (Repatriation) by May 1990.   
 Given this projected four year duration, the initial assessment also 
outlined the staffing requirements required to construct, operate, and maintain a 
refugee settlement at Ukwimi.  Assuming his recommendations regarding the 
development of Ukwimi were followed, Schelhas ultimately concluded that the 
idea of refugee resettlement into the Ukwimi area would “fit very well into the 
development plan of the district, in particular with respect to the agricultural 
sector, infrastructure development, and social servic s” (1986: 34).  What we 
will see as the story unfolds are the ways in which many of Schelhas’ basic 
assumptions proved to be false, as well as the manner in which numerous 
institutional actors essentially ignored many of Schelhas’ most critical 
recommendations – which begs the question, why evengo through the motions 
of a preliminary site assessment?  
 Approximately three months after Schelhas conducted the initial site 
assessment at Ukwimi, the UNHCR financed a series of field interviews with 
self-settled Mozambican refugees along the border.  Save the Children 
Foundation (SCF) on the behalf of the UNHCR and GRZ interviewed 
Mozambicans along the border in order to provide a preliminary needs 
assessment survey, with the explicit intention of assessing refugee needs and 
expectations and preparing self-settled refugees for resettlement.  According the 
authors, the SCF study was meant to “illuminate on the refugees’ overall profile 
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and assist in the development of appropriate, realistic, and specific places for 
facilities and services to be provided prior to and during refugee resettlement” 
(Malatsi et al 1987: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 MAL).  
 The SCF study is both rare and useful to the overall concern of this 
project.  It is rare because it was one of the very first (and few) studies of a 
refugee community undertaken prior to their resettlement so as to “anticipate 
their fears, aspirations, and needs in advance” (Malatsi et al 1987: v 
RSC/MMZ/MZ-56 MAL).  It is also very useful to this project because it 
captured the voices of these refugees prior to their resettlement at Ukwimi and 
provides a glimpse of how they processed their experiences as refugees while 
displaced.  It is also a major secondary source affirming the sentiment expressed 
in the opening epigraph that Ukwimi eventually became “home” for many of 
these refugees (See epigraph).  
 My own fieldwork and interviews provide insight asto how the time of 
resettlement is remembered, whereas the SCF report captured not the memories 
of these individuals, but rather their hopes and fears for the future at a very 
critical point in the overall narrative.  In addition to contributing these important 
voices, the survey also provides some baseline data concerning the demographic 
composition, attitudes, and expectations of the Mozambican refugees who were 
ultimately resettled at Ukwimi.  
 SCF conducted approximately 1,000 interviews along the border from 
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December 1 to December 20, 1986.  The refugee population around the time of 
the interviews was approximately 23,000.  According to SCF, 47% of 
respondents crossed the border into Zambia sometime prior to December 1985 
(over one year prior), while the rest of the respondents (53%) had arrived within 
the last year. The overwhelming majority (89%) of respondents lived in rural 
village settlements prior to their displacement.  Only 7% indicated that they 
lived in isolation from others and only 2% had previously lived in urban areas.  
As such, 67% of the men and 85% of the women surveyed categorized 
themselves as farmers by occupation.  The 2nd and 3rd most represented 
professions were fishermen and artisans respectively.  The majority of the 
artisans were engaged in carpentry, bricklaying, welding, and/or weaving.   
 I am not presenting this type of information concer ing these self-settled 
refugees merely because it is available.  I believe that this type of data goes 
some distance in reinforcing one of my central themes – that refugees are not 
nearly as “stripped of their humanity” as a lot of re ugee research presumes.  
Whether fishermen, carpenters, or weavers, these refuge s carried their 
particular skills and knowledge along with them when they crossed into the 
Zambian countryside.  In fact,  
some of the skills which people brought with them 
from Mozambique were useful for earning 
income…Men were able to sell the traditional mats 
and baskets which they wove.  Some women were 
skilled at making clay pots which they sold.  These 
women would accept cash or, in some cases, the 
 177 
amount of maize it took to fill the finished pot.  
Men who felled trees often fired their wood to make 
charcoal for sale.  Both men and women were able 
to earn money through casual labor (Anderson 
1991: 13). 
 
Ignoring this very important aspect of refugees’ humanity by assuming that 
refugees come to the table empty-handed very often b comes a source of 
frustration for refugees, their hosts, and those taked with managing organized 
settlements.   
 The data in the SCF survey confirmed the continued existence and 
maintenance of extended family ties and relationships between Mozambicans 
and Zambians on both sides of the border – ties that had predated colonial 
boundaries and had been strengthened during Mozambique’s liberation struggle.  
A majority (54%) of respondents indicated that they had relatives on the 
Zambian side of the border.  However, when asked whether or not these relatives 
gave them any assistance, a larger percentage (65%) reported that they received 
no assistance from their extended family.  Approximately 20% of the 
respondents acknowledged receiving food and clothing from their Zambian 
relatives.  The majority (63%) of self-settled refugees engaged in piece work 
(day labor) on local farms to make ends meet and provide for their unmet needs.  
 Although the surveyed refugees openly conveyed the day-to-day 
struggles they encountered as self-settled refugees, th y also openly voiced their 
general opposition to the idea of being resettled into an organized settlement far 
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from the border.  Many of the same sentiments and reactions to organized 
settlement during the Nyimba era popped out quite boldly in the SCF interviews 
and interviewee commentary.  In fact, negative memories and experiences 
during their stay at Nyimba 10 years earlier were significant reasons for many of 
the self-settled to express their distain for resettlement to Ukwimi, or 
resettlement anywhere for that matter.   
 However, not everyone in the border area was resistant to being resettled 
at Ukwimi.  One Mozambican refugee still living at URS described to me how 
she became convinced to resettle at Ukwimi:  
The Red Cross brought us here. They came to ask 
whoever was interested in coming to this camp. 
They promised us that if we come we’d be given 
each a piece of land where we’d live freely.  
 
We were the first ones to come. Others refused to 
come here because they heard stories that this place
was full of wild animals. Stories were that there 
were lions and plenty snakes that you wouldn’t even 
come out of the car.  
 
As I said earlier, these people are liars saying if they 
go give you free food and things they will keep you 
like prisoners.  
 
So some of us, we didn’t care – we just wanted to 
come and experience it ourselves. When we came 
here it was fun to note that all that was said was not 
true. Along the way to Ukwimi the Red Cross 
people passed through the nearby villages assuring 
us that we won’t be lonely. That’s why we came 
here to settle. And we were the first bus. 
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 The SCF survey is also instructive because the interviewers asked the 
refugees to express their own views and preferences for resettlement at Ukwimi.  
So although the general sentiment along the border was against resettlement, the 
SCF interviewers solicited a series of “what if” types of scenarios from the 
refugees in order to gauge their preferences with respect to the organization and 
operation of the new refugee settlement.  It appears from the SCF report that the 
refugee respondents cooperated in this exercise by answering the questions, 
regardless of their expressed desire to remain along the border.  For example, 
when asked to choose from four settlement pattern options for their new 
settlement, 75% said they would prefer to have their ouses built in rows but far 
apart, 17% chose a scattered settlement pattern, 4.7% expressed a preference for 
a circular settlement pattern, and 2.8% preferred rows near one another.   
 When asked who they would prefer to have as neighbors in the new 
settlement, a large percentage (35%) indicated a desire to be settled near any 
“close relative”.  When SCF asked about what type of leadership structure the 
refugees wanted at Ukwimi, the majority (47%) indicated a preference for a 
traditional leadership system, while 40% expressed a preference for political 
party leadership.   
 Throughout the SCF interview process, it became obvious that the 
majority of the refugees were already well aware of the plan to resettle them to 
Ukwimi Refugee Settlement.  Due to this, SCF decided to question the refugees 
 180 
about their intentions to remain in Ukwimi “permanently”.  Only 15% of 
respondents indicated a desire to remain at Ukwimi permanently, while over 
60% said no and 24% were unsure.   
 As we will see in the next section, Ukwimi planners did not necessarily 
incorporate the pre-resettlement preferences of these informants when it came to 
a number of the issues they were soliciting opinions on.  Because of this 
disjuncture between the questions solicited/preferences expressed during the 
preliminary needs assessment and the operational realities of URS, numerous 
Mozambican refugees I spoke with expressed a belief that the preliminary needs 
assessment was simply a façade, meant to give border refugees a false sense of 
input/control over their eventual (and inevitable) r settlement to Ukwimi in an 
attempt to alleviate resistance to resettlement.  Though I have no way of either 
confirming nor denying their suspicions, the fact that twenty years later many of 
the refugees so clearly remember the discrepancies between what they expressed 
to SCF representatives and what they observed and experi nced upon arrival at 
URS is testament to their overall disillusionment wi h the preliminary needs 
assessment.   
 After completion of both preliminary reports, the UNHCR and GRZ 
signed a tripartite agreement with Lutheran World Fe eration (LWF) calling for 
and committing to the relocation of 10,000 to 15,000 Mozambicans by 
December 1987 (Anderson 1991; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1 94a, 1994b, 1996).  
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The agreement formally laid out the basic framework f  establishing a 150km2 
Mozambican refugee settlement named Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS).   
 Adopting the recommendation set out by Schelhas, the original Basic 
Agreement planned for a phase-out of aid by 1991 (Mijere 1988; Black 1990; 
Anderson 1991).  While the UNHCR provided about 80% of the total project 
funds to its implementing partners, LWF took the lead role in settlement 
management, responsible for “preparing for the arriv l of the refugees, the 
development of settlement infrastructure, and the promotion of agricultural self-
sufficiency” (Anderson 1991: 6; Mijere 1988).   
 Under the Basic Agreement, several other implementing partners were 
also assigned specific tasks in relation to the operation and management of 
Ukwimi.  The UNHCR hired SCF to organize and direct ommunity 
development within URS.  The Zambian Red Cross Society took responsibility 
for the transportation of refuges from the border villages to Ukwimi.  AustCare, 
based out of Australia, supplemented the training/community development 
efforts of SCF. And, finally, Medecins sans Frontieres (France) worked in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Health in developing and providing health 
services throughout URS.     
 In their role as lead implementing agency, LWF hired three foreign 
specialists – a Project Director, an agricultural specialist, and a civil engineer – 
to begin the process of transforming the Ukwimi area into a model refugee 
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settlement scheme.  LWF’s choice of Project Director, Jere Getachew, came to 
the table with extensive experience in planning and managing agricultural 
resettlement schemes in his native country of Ethiopia, as well as in other 
African countries.  According to all accounts, Getachew arrived on the ground at 
Ukwimi with little more than a tent and some very basic supplies and 
immediately began “consulting with and discussing with people” (Getachew 
2006).  Getachew strongly advocated that when it came to URS “our role was 
not to impose what we know to those people, but to do things both ways”, 
acknowledging that “top-down has never worked and even this [bottom-up] 
struggles”.   
 However, from the very beginning LWF felt tied to he “top-down” 
recommendation of a 1991 phase-out deadline which meant that the some “staff 
felt that to meet this deadline, they would have to complete the Settlement’s 
infrastructural development prior to the arrival of the majority of refugees” 
(Anderson 1991: 7).  Utilizing local labor, LWF threw itself into priority 
construction projects, such as roads, wells, and a temporary clinic/reception 
area.  Planners imposed a new layout and toponymy throughout the settlement, 
dramatically changing the physical landscape of the Ukwimi area (Map 6).   
 The initial 16 villages were numbered and organized in rows along the 
main road, contrary to the preferences expressed in the initial needs assessment 
study.  Villages were grouped under an administrative unit referred to as a 
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satellite.  According to the planning documents, each satellite would be 














shop in its headquarters.  When I arrived in 2006, the changes in the landscape 
that occurred in 1986 were still very much visible.  For example, each satellite 
still had a sign posted with the numbers and names of each village within the 
satellite (Photograph 7).  As the photograph demonstrates, the institutional actors 
had considerable influence over alterations in the p ysical landscape.  Several 
villages were named after UNHCR and NGO staff – Bob White, Don Moss, J. 
Map 6: Ukwimi Refugee Settlement 
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Photograph 7: New Village Name Toponymy at URS 
Getachew.  The disjuncture between such naming mechanisms and the lived 
realities/place meanings of the local communities explains why such village 
names never caught on.  The residents of URS chose then and continue to 















Opening & Operating Ukwimi Refugee Settlement  
 On May 18, 1987, the first bus of Mozambican refuges arrived at the 
newly constructed Ukwimi Refugee Settlement (URS) in Petauke District, 
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Eastern Province, Zambia.  According to one Mozambican who arrived on that 
first bus, “it was a bush when I entered”.  Another recalled that  
there were no permanent structures – no houses, no 
offices. We were kept in tents. The only thing which 
looked permanent was a small wooden clinic. The 
offices were being built as we arrived 
  
 URS’s official opening came two days later on May 20th with an opening 
ceremony (Mijere 1988).  The official statement by the Government of Zambia 
evoked President Kaunda’s humanism by declaring “even though our finances 
and personnel have been taxed to the full, we have no option but to shelter our 
persecuted brothers and sisters in our traditional spirit of humanism” (Beyani 
1986: 9).  While appeals to humanism make for good newspaper coverage and a 
great public relations strategy for GRZ, I believe that it is quite clear from both 
archival and oral evidence that the GRZ’s greatest mo ivation to shelter their 
neighbors had much more to do with geopolitics and security than Kaunda’s 
loosely defined and often arbitrarily applied philosophy of humanism.  In fact, 
as outlined in Chapter 4, Kaunda was plagued with in ernal opposition and in 
need of demonstrating his understanding of and control over complex 
geopolitical questions.   
 Upon arrival at Ukwimi, settlement staff allocated each head of 
household a temporary tent, as well as tools, seeds, f rtilizer, food, household 
items (cooking pots, blankets, clothes), a homestead plot, and 2 hectares farming 
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plot (Kantamati 1990 RSC/MMZ/MZ-51 KAN; Black et al 1990; Anderson 
1991).  According to the refugees,  
we didn’t stay for long in the tents. When we came 
in May, we stayed in tents for two weeks. Then they 
gave us plots. While you’re staying in the tents, one 
was expected to start building our own houses on 
the plot. The tents were just used for arrivals and for 
two weeks. 
 
In my interview with Getachew he confirmed that upon arrival refugees were 
allocated tents which they lived in while constructing their own houses at their 
assigned plots.   
 Contrary to the refugee preferences expressed during the needs 
assessment exercise, the homestead plots were clustered into village 
arrangements and farming plots were allocated according to date of arrival.  For 
those arriving on the initial bus that meant they rceived farming plots close to 
their homestead plots, while later arrivals received farming plots at further 
distances from their homestead plots.  This particular method for allocating plots 
frustrated refugees for a number of reasons.  Most frequently, refugees expressed 
their desire to be allocated plots next to or near their relatives or friends who 
may have arrived at an earlier date, but the allocati n method did not leave room 
for such adjustments (Black et al 1990; Anderson 1991).   
 Disagreement and varied interpretations over who qualified as a “head of 
household” also complicated the allocation procedurs.  As seen in other refugee 
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environments, considerable confusion – and in some cases manipulation – 
surrounded the definition of the designation “head of household”.   The 
designation appeared to be rather arbitrarily applied, often with considerably 
inequitable consequences for various families.  For example, in the case of 
polygamous marriages, some husbands (as “head of house ld”) were assigned 
a single 2 hectare farming plot regardless of the number of wives involved.  In 
other polygamous arrangements, each wife was allocated her own 2 hectare 
farming plot.  According to Anderson (1990), some refugee men married 
additional wives in an attempt (albeit not always successful) to increase their 
land holdings.   
 In addition to these allocation problems, URS administrators entirely 
ignored the advice of Schelhas and the Ministry of Agriculture by allocating 
each household 2 hectare farming plots, regardless of the plot location within the 
settlement.  As detailed in the previous section, both Schelhas and the Ministry 
had suggested that households located in sandy soils would need larger 
allocations, but URS administrators did not follow the soil survey when 
allocating plots and left “almost no land free for those households allocated on 
bad patches of soil” (Black et al 1990: 8).   Judging from the lack of application 
of their recommendations, it appears as though the ext nsive preparatory work 
of Schelhas and SCF was not seriously incorporated in o the operational realities 
of URS.  
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 Aside from GRZ’s geopolitical and national security concerns, the 
UNHCR and its implementing partners also placed their unique stamp on the 
operation and management of Ukwimi.  Each of the international actors 
involved in the design of URS were keenly interested in proving that an 
organized refugee settlement such as Ukwimi could reach self-sufficiency and 
break the ubiquitous “dependency syndrome” observed in other camp 
environments across the continent.   
 In order to push this program of self-sufficiency from the very beginning, 
refugees were informed immediately upon arrival that they would “only be 
eligible for food aid and other free inputs for two agricultural seasons” 
(Kantamati 1990: 2 RSC/MMZ/MZ-51 KAN).  According to Getachew,  
The policy at Ukwimi is to reduce subsidies every 
year.  Thus in their first year, refugees receive 100% 
of their food requirements.  In their second and third 
year, they receive 50% and 25% respectively.  The 
refugees are expected to fend for themselves in ther 
fourth year at Ukwimi” (Mijere 1988: 13; Personal 
Interview 2006) 
 
This window for achieving self-sufficiency was based upon what the 
institutional actors defined as the “average family” – calculated as two adults 
and three children (Black et al 1990).  As you can probably anticipate, the 
majority of Mozambican refugee families were anything except ‘average’, often 
including elderly, disabled, sick, and orphaned memb rs.  Kantamati’s 1990 
study provides a snapshot of the actual, lived realiti s of the refugee families 
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living in Ukwimi Villages 1 – 16.  For example, 44% of these families must 
cope with at least one or more vulnerable characteristics, 21% of the families are 
single-family, female-headed households, and more than 10% care for four or 
more dependent children.  This is quite a stretch from the two-parent, nuclear 
family assumed by international actors.  This erroneous assumption also had 
very real consequences for URS refugees and negativly affected institutional 
actors’ ability to accurately plan and anticipate potential shortcomings.  As 
Kantamati  notes, LWF made its calculations concerning self-sufficiency based 
solely on mathematical equations involving total acre ge under cultivation and 
overall crop sales, “without attention to individual differences in household 
labour supply and capacity to produce” (1990: 2).  Ultimately this meant that 
many of LWF’s expectations and calculations were incorrect and many of the 
needs of the refugee population went unmet.  
 Because much of the infrastructural development was incomplete when 
the first buses began arriving at URS, many of the initial resettled refugees were 
employed by LWF for construction purposes. In fact, pproximately 80% of the 
construction workers were refugees, while 20% were local Zambians (Anderson 
1991).  At the peak of activity, LWF employed approximately 300 men in both 
skilled and unskilled wage labor (Anderson 1991).  Over the course of two 
years, LWF constructed all of the following within the original 150km2 
designated as URS:  
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• 4 schools (plus teacher’s housing) 
• police station 
• guest house 
• office block 
• 4 clinics 
• warehouses/grinding mills in each satellite 
• staff housing in Ukwimi A and Ukwimi B 
• at least 1 borehole in each village (some 3 or 4) 
• 3 dams to address water shortages  
 
The following series of photographs provide images of the infrastructure built in 
Ukwimi at the time (Photograph 8, 9, 10, 11). 
 For its part in fostering and enabling community development, SCF 
outlined the following mandates:  
• Promote refugee self-management via the formation of village 
development committees, clubs, and cooperative societies 
• Assist refugees in identifying and establishing self-h p projects 
according to their own priorities 
• Provide necessary training skills and capital to enable the groups 
to achieve objectives which they themselves set (Anderson 1991: 
9) 
 
 In order to achieve each of these mandates, SCF hired an American 
Project Director and four Zambian social development assistants (Anderson 
1991).  As with the physical landscape, the implementing partners brought in 
their own models of community and social organization.  The settlement was 
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organized into three administrative levels – village development committees 
(VDCs), satellite development committees (SDCs), and the central development 
committee (CDC) – in an attempt to decentralize the provision of services (LWF 
1989).  The VDC was comprised of elected leaders in each village and the 

















Photograph 8: New Secondary School 
Photograph 9: New Primary School 
Photograph 10: Ukwimi Market 




sanitation, education, and women.  Some VDCs also added sports and/or 
cultural sub-committees to the list.  The SDC was, in turn, a collection of the 
leadership of ten to fifteen villages (and their VDCs).  The SDC membership 
consisted of the following representation:   
1. Chairpersons and secretaries from each VDC within t e 
satellite 
2. Two representatives from women’s clubs 
3. One representative from other clubs 
4. One representative from small-scale enterprises 
5. One representative from health services 
6. The chairperson of the Parent-Teacher Association 
7. Chairperson and secretary from the Zambian villages in 
the satellite 
 
By the end of 1989, Ukwimi’s 47 villages comprised 4 satellites and each 
satellite had a school, clinic, warehouse, grinding mill, co-operative shop, and at 
least one borehole (Anderson 1991).   
At the highest level, the CDC was regarded as the main planning body of 
the entire settlement and was comprised of the following members: 
1. Chairpersons and secretaries of each SDC 
2. Sub-chief Sandwe under whose supervision Ukwimi fell 
3. Ward chairperson and secretary 
All of this social reorganization was aimed at fostering an environment 
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of self-sufficiency and local integration.  For example, Zulu-Syamujaye, one-
time RSZ office and eventual LWF Project Director at Ukwimi, reflected on her 
initial understanding of the imposition of URS in the area at the time 
I used to go to Ukwimi as a Program Officer when 
Ukwimi was just opened. So I was part and parcel 
of the opening of all those satellites. When they 
were handing over Mzumwa – you know it’s 
called New Mzumwa School because the school 
was there before. So LWF, together with UNHCR, 
they just renovated it. But all those Haugen, 
Kasangazi, all those new ones [schools]…Those 
were never there.  
 
That place was a jungle. Between Ukwimi A – 
there’s a land that is between Ukwimi A, Sopa, and 
Kasangazi – up to now no crop can grow. You 
know the place? Njoka [Snake] Road… It was a 
jungle. People never lived there. There was those 
small, small villages I don’t even know how they 
survived. And it’s very close to the game 
management area. And they were just setting up 
expanding Mfuwe at the time… Actually, do you 
know that the setting up of the refugee camp there 
saved some of those villages? …because they were 
going to evacuate them and make it part 
of…[Mfuwe].  Because they really wanted to 
expand that. There was very little activity going 
on…human life was not so rife there.  
 
In a follow up interview, Zulu-Syamujaye, who is now the Permanent 
Secretary for Eastern Province, reflected a bit more carefully on how the 
implementing partners’, such as LWF or the UNHCR, quest for integration had 
adverse effects on the local community.  According to Zulu-Syamujaye,  
What happened was the indigenous people – 
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because they wanted to share the social amenities 
– they just kept quiet about their own 
headmanships.  They became a part of Village #4, 
Village #1… Now what the government and 
UNHCR and implementing partners like ourselves 
wanted to promote was unity – but in doing so we 
destroyed the culture of the indigenous people.  
 
 In addition to some initial anxieties and tensions between the refugees 
and their hosts, institutional reports as well as field conversations revealed a 
considerable degree of tension between institutional actors at URS, particularly 
between LWF and SCF.  According to Anderson, SCF staff was “unhappy” from 
the very beginning with LWF’s emphasis on a fixed timetable for withdrawal.   
From their broad experience in community 
organization and development, they were 
convinced that encouraging people to manage their 
own lives and to develop necessary leadership 
skills required more time.  They also felt that 
training in various other income-generating skills 
could not be done according to the tight timetable 
(1991: 10).   
  
 LWF and SCF also disagreed on the acceptable use and role of the 
VDCs.  SCF staff had a general sense that LWF used VDCs to communicate 
settlement-wide messages and elicit labor needs; whereas SCF staff envisioned 
the role of the VDCs to much more integral to the op ration of the settlement, 
whereby VDCs could be empowered to explore their own ideas, agendas, and 
visions concerning the development of URS (Kantamati 1990 RSC/MMZ/MZ-
51 KAN; Anderson 1991).  For example, in early 1989, SCF assigned staff 
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Photograph 12: Ukwimi Farmer’s Association Office 
members to work with the VDCs to establish and develop an agricultural co-
operative with URS in order to sell agricultural products through the Zambian 
Cooperative Union (ZCU) in the belief that a relationship with ZCU could 
provide refugees market access and an income source.  Within 2 months, 200 
refugees joined the Ukwimi Farmers Association (UFA) cooperative and by 
December 1990 UFA membership was at 1,032 (Anderson 1991) (Photograph 
12).  This was the type of activity SCF wanted to see VDCs engage in, not 
simply to “carry water” for LWF.  SCF and LWF also disagreed on the role of 
waged labor with the settlement.  LWF paid wages to refugees in exchange for 
labor, such as construction.  SCF, in contrast, relied on volunteer labor in its 









 As mentioned earlier, in the original Basic Agreement, the UNHCR and 
the GOZ agreed to and budgeted for the relocation of 10,000 to 15,000 
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Photograph 13: Ukwimi B Shop 
Mozambicans by December 1987.  However, by May 1988, only 3,000 refugees 
had been settled at Ukwimi (Anderson 1991).  Numerous delays at the 
institutional level contributed to the slow pace of resettlement, as well as delays 
on the ground in the development of infrastructure (Anderson 1991).  As the 
process dragged on, GRZ began to pressure the UNHCR to speed up the 
relocation process as they faced incursions into Zambi  by RENAMO and 
FRELIMO. 
A decision was made to move as many refugees in 
as short a time as possible, increasing the numbers 
to be settled in Ukwimi from the original 15,000 to 
about 23,000…Virtually the entire population 
along the border (Anderson 1991: 5) 
 
The stepped-up speed and scale of 
resettlement meant that the original 
150km2 allocated for URS would not be 
sufficient to meet the needs of the 
“entire population along the border”.  
The UNHCR secured an additional 150km2 adjacent to the original settlement 
and began construction of what became called “Ukwimi B”.  By 1989, villages 
48 through 64 of Ukwimi B had been constructed, settled, and organized into 
two new satellites.  And what had originally been planned for 10,000 refugees 
quickly became to home to nearly 30,000 Mozambican refugees (Photograph 
13).  
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 In fact, in the span of only two years, the population of Ukwimi equaled 
that of Meheba Refugee Camp, a camp which had been in existence for 18 
years.  With all of this expansion came dramatic changes in the physical 
landscape of Ukwimi, as recounted by a refugee who arrived on the first bus and 
who remains in Ukwimi today:  
It was a bush when I entered and we were kept in 
tents at the start.  They built that wooden 
warehouse – the very one near the trades [Ukwimi 
Trades College]– that’s where they were keeping 
our food.  From here they built that office block. 
Then after the office block, that’s when they started 
building the wooden houses that the lecturers are 
staying in now. When they realized that they’ve got 
too many members of staff and that they’d be here 
for a long time that’s when they started building 
those [prefabricated] houses. Schools were also 
being built. I saw everything with my eyes. Even 
from digging the foundation of all the houses, my 
eyes were open.  The construction started in 1987 
and by 1989 they were through because they were 
fast. 
 
 Construction was not the only thing URS leadership became “fast” at 
doing.  As stated earlier, LWF was deeply committed o its relatively arbitrary 
calculation that URS should achieve self-sufficiency by 1991.  In fact, by June 
1989 settlement authorities declared Villages 1 – 16 (approximately 3,650 
people) “self-sufficient”. By June 1990 a similar declaration was made for 
Villages 17 – 46.  Studies conducted in 1990 found that villages that had been 
declared self-sufficient were only able to grow about 60% of their actual food 
 198 
requirements.  In fact, nearly all of the households to have been declared self-
sufficient had applied for reinstatement into the food program.  LWF responded 
by establishing a committee to review each application on a case-by-case basis. 
By fall 1990, over 3,000 refugees were reinstated into the food assistance 
program (Anderson 1991; Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996).  
 Throughout 1990 several major institutional shifts occurred within URS.  
First, MSF turned over responsibility for the entire Ukwimi project to the 
Ministry of Health (Anderson 1991).  In addition to that transition, SCF phased-
out its participation at Ukwimi, transferring most of its responsibilities to the 
newly formed, Zambian-run organization, Refugee Servic s Zambia (RSZ) 
(Anderson 1991).  RSZ staff established and administered 20 pre-schools 
throughout the settlement, serving nearly 1,500 preschool-aged children, both 
refugees and Zambians.   
 RSZ also provided skills training in carpentry, tailoring, bricklaying, and 
home crafts.  After completion of a particular training program, trainees were 
granted access to a small loan program in order to start-up business.  
Recognizing the unmet needs of women, RSZ designed a number of programs 
targeting women at Ukwimi, but was often met with resistance from male-
dominated VDCs.  For example, RSZ staff designed a female literacy program 
to tackle the extremely high female illiteracy rates (90% compared to 30% for 
men) and planned to hire 12 refugee women to teach literacy to various 
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women’s groups throughout the settlement scheme.  However, the program 
ultimately failed as the  
women who were selected faced a problem in that 
their husbands refused to let them attend the two-
week training of trainers’ course at Ukwimi 
headquarters.  They feared that their wives might 
marry another man while they were away from 
home (Anderson 1991: 13).   
  
 These gender dynamics remained in place even during my own fieldwork 
at Ukwimi, as I faced difficulty finding female field assistants due to resistance 
and opposition from their husbands.  
 Nearly every account I gathered concerning this particular moment in 
Ukwimi’s narrative reflected on the degree to which Ukwimi seemed very 
“alive” at the time.  For example, the now dilapidated and unused Ukwimi 
Social Club was “the” spot to be during this era (Photograph 11).  Those with 
whom I spoke recounted stories of Ukwimi’s nearly cosmopolitan and even 
urban flavor. 
Ukwimi was like a town. Everything was available 
– starting from transport. We used to be given a lot 
of respect from the Mozambicans as Zambians. At 
that time, if you’re planning to travel you wouldn’t 
have any worries to say what time am I going to 
make it back here? You could go to town even 3 
times in a day. And most of the things were free. 
 
This place was a town. There were many people. It’s 
not like it is nowadays where we are staying far 
from each other. The place was like a village. 
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There was life here then. And we moved and we 
shared and we struggled, but we did it in a place that 
was alive.   
 
What you see nowadays are the residues of good 
things. 
 
 Despite the detailed challenges and narrative I have presented in this 
Chapter, according to most sources, the settlement of Mozambicans in Ukwimi 
Refugee Settlement was “one of the UNHCR's most successful programmes for 
achieving a viable durable solution” (Anderson 1991: 3; Anderson 1991; 
Lassailly-Jacob 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2002 RSC/MZ-53.22 LAS).  
Unpacking and assessing this commonly-expressed sentiment has the potential 
to contribute greatly to our understandings of what does and does not work in 
refugee situations and provides a moment in which to reflect upon lessons 
learned – a space from which to emplace our own understandings of 













The plots we’ve been given are for people who are 
homeless, people who suffered where they came 
from, other people living here are rejected people 
from wherever they came from. But still they have 
found refuge and peace in Ukwimi.  
Field Interview 
 
 After approximately ten years in Zambia and eight years at Ukwimi, 
Mozambican refugees repatriated to their country of origin in 1994.   
One-by-one, the large vibrant villages of Ukwimi fell 
silent; the long queues of women at grinding mills 
dwindled to a few patient souls; the clamorous voices 
of children in the seven primary schools were 
replaced by the shrill whistle of local birds and the 
humming of insects; handpump handles which had 
been burnished to a high gloss shine by thousands of 
eager water carriers hung silently down, testimony to 
the diminished use by villagers who had returned 
home” (LWF 1994: 19).   
 
These Mozambican villagers who repatriated left behind undreds of hectares of 
cleared land, 73 villages, 101 boreholes, seven primary schools, and four rural 
health clinics.  Perhaps the most vital component lft at Ukwimi were the nearly 
100 Mozambican families who refused to repatriate.   
 After months of living at URS, several of these families revealed 
themselves to me as Mozambicans and I was able to spend a considerable 
amount of time with these families in the final weeks of my stay.  By and large, 
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the Mozambicans who chose to remain at Ukwimi were those who witnessed (or 
perpetrated) the violence of that time first-hand:  
Going back [to Mozambique] was to a person’s 
choice. We were asked if we wanted to go. As for me, 
I decided to stay because I know those who are going 
back did not actually see the war. They just heard 
about the war from afar and that’s how they ran into
Zambia here. As for us who saw it, for me who even 
killed with my hands, I saw a lot of blood and I did 
not wish to go back. I saw all the wars – beginning 
with the first Portuguese war. So no one would tell me 
that I didn’t see the war. I saw what it means to be at 
war. The first time I set my foot in Zambia I saw tha  
there’s life here and I wasn’t interested in giving that 
up.  
 
Bana tisunga bwino bad [They kept us nicely bad – 
“bad” meaning too good].  Bad up to today.  That’s 
why for me even during repatriation time, I said I’ll 
go to Mozambique later not now.  I still have fear.  
 
In Zambia, I’m very free. But in Mozambique you 
need to have a lot of papers to move – there’s a lot to 
carry to prove yourself in Mozambique.  So for me I 
realized this type of life would trouble me even more 
further.   
 
This place is my home. No one can come and take me 
out of this land. Many people say they want this place 
if I’m to go back to Mozambique. I tell them, I’ll 
never leave this piece of land for anybody. 
 
 
As these statements clearly demonstrate, those Mozambic n refugees who made 
the decision to remain at Ukwimi did so both out of a fear to return to 
Mozambique and out of a general sense of being in place – emplaced – at 
Ukwimi.   
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Ukwimi for Zambian Resettlement 
 Shortly after the massive repatriation, GRZ, seeking to avoid the 
dilapidation and vandalism of the remaining infrastuc ure, converted Ukwimi 
Refugee Settlement into Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme.  The motivation for this 
transition came from lessons learned from other countries’ negative experiences 
after large scale repatriation.  For example, all that is left of the millions of 
dollars spent at Benaco Refugee Camp in Tanzania are few faint wheel marks 
(Harrell-Bond 2002).  After the transfer of refugees from Mombasa camps to 
Kakuma, only one health center remained for local use.  And northern Uganda’s 
Ogujebe Transit Center, complete with hundreds of businesses, homes, and 100-
bed hospital, was bulldozed within one week of repatriation (Harrell-Bond 
2002).  Well-aware of such failures, GRZ sought alternative uses for Ukwimi 
after repatriation so that the investments into the ar a to facilitate refugee-
hosting could be harnessed for the development of Zambian hosts.   
 Void of any UNHCR mandate, GRZ requested the continued presence 
and assistance of LWF in the management of the scheme.  GRZ also requested 
the joint management and assistance of the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ).  
In addition to the CCZ/LWF management team, GRZ also invited two other 
NGOs to participate in the development of Ukwimi as a resettlement scheme, 
the YMCA and the Catholic Diocese of Chipata (CDC).  On the heels of the 
repatriation of Mozambican refugees, GRZ opened Ukwimi Resettlement 
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Photograph 14: Ukwimi Resettlement Scheme 














As an agricultural scheme, Ukwimi now fell under the Office of the Vice 
President, Department of Resettlement.  Ukwimi was by no means Zambia’s 
first attempt at opening and managing an agricultural scheme.  The first 
agricultural resettlement scheme, Miengwe Resettlement Scheme in Masaiti 
District, Copperbelt Province, opened in 1975.  The majority of the rest of 
Zambia’s 70 agricultural schemes opened in the early 1990s after MMD’s 
electoral victory (Appendix C) 
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The mission of the Department of Resettlement is “to make available 
farm land for the resettlement of unemployed (youths and adults), retrenched 
and retired persons who wish to engage in agriculture as a means of livelihood” 
(Department of Resettlement 2006).  The objectives of the Department of 
Resettlement are threefold:  
1. Resettle the unemployed, retired, retrenched, displaced & 
disabled to make them self sufficient 
2. To coordinate the provision of infrastructure to schemes in order 
to make them socially and economically viable 
3. To mobilize and provide extension & support services to promote 
household food security (Mulongo 2006) 
The mission statement, together with these stated objectives, translated 
into the settlement of many disenfranchised Zambians nto the area.  In fact, at 
the onset, LWF argued the success of agricultural resettlement at Ukwimi could 
“provide a model for resettlement and an incentive o all those who have said 
that planned rural settlements cannot work” (LWF 1994: 22).   
According to district officials and LWF annual reports, CCZ and LWF 
were responsible for ensuring that Zambian settlers into Ukwimi Resettlement 
Scheme reach food self-sufficiency within the shortest-possible timeframe.  In 
an attempt to exert some control over the type of settlers in the “New Ukwimi”, 




interviews for applicants wishing to enter the settlement scheme.  Approval 
criteria included the following:  
People must be rural residents of the province who 
have been deprived of good farming land but have the 
physical resources (labour and will) to effectively 
utilise a 5 hectare block of land, one to each family 
(LWF 1994: 22)  
When taking a closer look at what is laid out above, one striking 
adjustment is apparent – a doubling of plot sizes from the refugee time (2 
hectares) to the “New Ukwimi” (5 hectares).  This is, in part, recognition of the 
continual struggles refugees faced in trying to achieve food self-sufficiency with 
only 2 hectares of relatively poor agricultural land at Ukwimi.   
Although the expansion of household plots from 2 hectares to 5 hectares 
was a move in the right direction if the objective is indeed to “promote 
household food security”, it is important to step 
back for a moment and put these 5 hectare plots 
into the wider context of agricultural resettlement 
schemes in Zambia.  In my interview with 
Manifold Mulongo, the Director of the 
Department of Resettlement, he indicated that the 
Ukwimi plots are some of the smallest plot sizes 
of all the resettlement schemes in Zambia. So 
although Ukwimi is intended to be an agricultural 
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scheme, many settlers also engage in alternative economic activities as a means 
of survival (Photograph 15 & 16).  
By the end of 1994, nearly 200 families had relocated o Ukwimi 
Resettlement Scheme and authorities were expecting 2,000 families by the end 
of 1995 (LWF 1994). However, the initial re-settlers – some of whom were 
forced to Ukwimi by their own chiefs – quickly became frustrated at the lack of 
assistance they were provided, especially when compared to Ukwimi’s former 
refugee inhabitants.  After only a few months, the majority of these initial re-
settlers gave up and returned home.  In order to drum up potential settlers, LWF 
utilized nation-wide television and radio advertisements and posters to inform 
the nation that land was available at Ukwimi.   
As retirees from every province in Zambia made their way to Ukwimi, 
they arrived with an expectation that living conditions, standards of living, and 
development investments within the settlement area would mirror the levels 
experienced during the refugee-hosting period.  While most concede that the 
development put in place during the Mozambican era continues to benefit them, 
especially clinics and schools, the lack of upkeep and maintenance of those 
developments was a constant complaint and easily viible in the landscape.  One 
interviewee remarked “these things like schools andclinics are permanent, but 
the road is not permanent” (Photographs 17, 18, & 19).  Another reflected that 
“we’re left only the buildings because those things are unmoveable – they can’t 
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be stolen”.  
In addition to complaints over title deeds (which I will address in the 
following section) and infrastructure maintenance, I also consistently 
encountered a very particular narrative about the hand-over which occurred in 
1994 at the time of repatriation.  Every settler I interviewed who was in the area 
at the time recounted the same series of events in which the UNHCR and GRZ  
(through then Vice President Christian Tembo) expressed their gratitude to the 
people of the Ukwimi area by leaving the “people of Ukwimi” UNHCR 
property.  The “property” in question varies according to each storyteller (most 
frequently including items such as an ambulance, truck, tractor, grinding mill, 
generators, water pumps, sewing machines, and othersmall items), but the end 
of the story is always the same – the disappearance of said property.  To give a 
sense of how this narrative flowed, I’ve placed twoexamples below:  
Even myself, I was there. Christian Tembo was there 
and we were given – first item those people left to us 
Zambians, #1 ambulance, #2 tractor, #3 truck, #4 
motorcycles. They said, all these things were being 
left for you settlers who’ve come to settle here.  Now 
as we’re leaving, we’ll leave these items. These items 
are yours to use all of you. But we didn’t benefit from 
those items. We were told strongly you Zambians of 
Ukwimi, these items are not only for you. These items 
belong to all the people of Eastern Province. Then t  





Photograph 17: Ukwimi Road Condition 




























The ambulance was there, even a truck and tractor 
was also there. All these items were at the Scheme 
Manager’s house. This also includes a grinding mill. 
When the Vice President – Mr. Christian Tembo –
came, he handed them over to the scheme.  I saw the 
ambulance running, the truck too, but I never saw the 
tractor running. People are trying to re-group 
themselves in satellites so that they can ask for these 
things to be back. There’s a coordination committee 
in which satellites come together and address the 
problems of the whole of Ukwimi. I heard this 
committee went there, talked to the big man there at 
the office [Musumali]. But the answer which came 
there – those things are not for you farmers. Those 
things were left to the government. They were from 
UNHCR to the government. And these are 
government property. You have no say over it. If you 
want you should produce your own things. That’s 
how the coordination committee disbanded and the 
committee was dissolved 
 
Although Musumali was not around during this particular period, he confirmed 
the “drama” surrounding the hand-over and the general confusion about who 
took ownership over the property left by the UNHCR.  However, in my 
excursion around the scheme, I stumbled across several curiously painted (UN 
powder blue?) agricultural equipment (Photograph 20) which I can neither 



















Tensions arose after the Mozambicans departed as the local people hoped 
they would recover their land and move in from surro nding villages.  GRZ’s 
vision for Ukwimi, however, did not include a village set-up but rather sought to 
settle people on individual family farms.  GRZ's strategy of individual plot 
settlement significantly altered the way in which indigenous Ukwimi residents 
lived their lives and the degree to which they could form effective community 
organizations.  
Nearly every settler that I interviewed raised the issue of title deeds, 
arguing that because GRZ wanted to settle them on individual family plots and 
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not in a village arrangement then they had a right to demand for and receive a 
title deed for their land.  Consider the following discussions concerning title 
deeds:  
This is our fourth year hearing stories of the same 
paper [title deed]. Mr. Musumali has always told us – 
wait, next year it will be processed – year after yar. 
Just cheating us… 
 
I can’t say that we have title deeds because when you 
question what you call “management” they say we are 
preparing maps…They are preparing maps up to 
now?  How long can somebody prepare title deeds?  
 
Feeling stable here will depend on the possession of 
the title deed. If it was given to us, the aim was to tay 
here forever. But I’ve been waiting [for title deed] 
since I came. We’ve made groups in the community to 
try and push Musumali. If he fails maybe we should 
try to see someone else who can help us have access 
to the document. 
 
I carried the names, about 50 names to Lusaka with 
me. These are the people [shows me list]. Now we 
could not get fertilizers because of no title deeds.  We 
referred the matter to our Zambian National Farmer’s 
Union, saying that we have an Association here and 
we are requesting for fertilizers but we can not receive 
because we do not possess title deeds.  So the farmrs 
union assisted us saying definitely according to the 
conditions they were supposed to have title deeds 
after two years, assist them. That was the answer.  
That was 5 years ago. 
 
Not even a one person has been given any title deed. 
We had been promised strongly that ‘Prepare 
K250,000, you’ll be given that’ but nothing, nothing 
completely. So it is totally, really a problem. 
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As for the GRZ Scheme Manager, Musumali maintains in the exchange below 
that the GRZ has every intention of issuing title de s at Ukwimi once the 
proper surveying has been completed and once each farmer pays the necessary 
fees:   
Gray: Is there a fee for the processing or acquisition 
of a title deed?  
Musumali: To get the title deed, when we number the 
plots we come and recommend them [farmers].  
Count one: we give the title deeds because of what 
he has done on the farm. He has put a toilet…he’s 
growing sufficient food…he’s put a permanent 
house…the surrounding is clean…he’s cooperative. 
So after that now, when we recommend now to the 
Commission of Lands will send their surveyors. 
Apart from our surveyors ourselves, the Commission 
of Lands when they come now to make sketch maps 
of that farmer indicating infrastructure that is there. 
That’s why we are saying it’s expensive because 
they’ll come with their tools and start measuring 
boundaries. That’s when it becomes expensive.  
Currently we are requesting that you keep money, 
more than K250,000, for that venture so that it 
include allowances for those people.  It will include 
also their printing of those maps. And other things. 
Because if the government is waving away such 
costs, the beneficiary is that person.  The governmnt 
should not pay money for him. Let him also meet 
those costs. So those are the costs I think which tey 
may go. The round figure will be K250,000 per 
farmer. By then after that, they will be paying those 
K10,000s each year.   
 
Gray:  How long is it going to be for the Department 
of Resettlement to process title deeds for Ukwimi 
farmers? 
Musumali: Usually they are supposed to wait for two
years. Then we assess them. Then we give them their 
title deeds. But here we have a problem with this 
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resettlement scheme. Some of the plots were 
demarcated by the different departments, like 
Agriculture.  Various surveyors came and 
demarcated. Then our office came and demarcated. 
We’ve had problems on plots that were demarcated 
by Agriculture. All the mapped plots were not put on 
the main map. The Agriculture plots only ended up 
on the sketch maps. That resulted into problems.  
Now, us? We want to capture all the plots and put 
them on the main map and then send that 
information on the maps for title deeds numbering.  
We struggled with this for a long time. They came 
and did a bit of survey work. But even up to now, I 
will have to go to Chipata next week. We have just 
said that all the plots that are on the map, let thm go 
for title numbering.  
 
However, I am in possession of a letter from W. Ndhlovu, Acting Senior 
Land Use Planning Officer for the Office of the Vice President assuring Ukwimi 
farmers that issuance of their title deeds is “long verdue”.  And that letter is 
dated 1998 (Appendix D).  In the same letter, Mr. Ndlovu assures Ukwimi 
farmers that their title deeds will be issued by 1999.  It is clear from my 
discussions that resettled Zambians at URS are frustrated by and suspicious of 
the continued delays.   
When I look over my discussion with Mr. Musumali certain red flags are 
raised (like the implication that one must be “cooperative” in order to receive a 
title deed) that make the settlers suspicions something more than simply rumors 
and conspiracy theories.  Ukwimi farmers’ desire for title deeds, coupled with 
GRZ’s apparent reluctance to process titling requests, points to the often critical 
connection between land titling and development.  Though still under debate, 
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many development experts view land titling as the essential baseline for 
developing the entrepreneurial potential of the poor (Besley 1995; Soto 2000; 
Toulmin and Quan 2000; Gilbert 2002; Home and Lim 2004; Manji 2006; 
Bromley 2009).  If the “disenfranchised” Zambian farmers at Ukwimi are in a 
precarious position regarding title deeds then the Mozambican refugees who 
remained at Ukwimi remain in the most marginalized position, given that they 
are lacking title deeds as well as any form of legal immigrant status.  
On numerous occasions, Ukwimi farmers expressed their discontent and 
disillusionment with the management of the scheme.  However, Musumali and 
his colleagues at the Department of Resettlement also have their own 
frustrations with settlers at Ukwimi:  
We have certain poor people in this place. Some of 
them came barefooted. Some of them who are 
pensioners, we ask them how much money do you 
have to start farming this year? They say “ndilibe” 
[I’ve got nothing]. So sometimes we just give up as 
management. Even if we are asked why do you 
allow such people? But the mission statement says 
you have to give the land to the poor. So maybe we 
hope that they will change. But we are trying by all 
means to see that they change though have a slow 
pace of changing. 
 
 The general sentiment expressed through institutional actors at every 
level – both in Lusaka, Petauke, and Ukwimi – was that he people of Ukwimi 
were a people who had become use to being given and h d come to depend on 
such mechanisms for their own survival.  Indeed, the idea that “Tidzadya nao” 
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[we will eat together] which had served to establish Ukwimi the first place, was 
now threatening to destroy it.  
 
Ukwimi as Space of Refuge 
The longer I stayed at Ukwimi and the more I spoke with Zambian 
resettlers at Ukwimi, it became increasingly apparent to me that Ukwimi had 
become a space of refuge not only for refugees fleeing violent conflict, but also 
for a whole of displaced Zambians. Although outside th  jurisdiction or 
protection or even concern of the international refug e relief regime, many 
Zambians at Ukwimi had experienced displacement from their regions of origin.  
Over time, many revealed that they had been pushed out of their home villages 
for being the source or cause of tension or conflict at the village level.  For 
example, one resettler reflected that:  
Many of us are people who are condemned by our 
relatives elsewhere.  But we have found refuge in 
Ukwimi.  It seems we can’t be kicked from here.  
 
They [GRZ] asked me if I like this place and I told 
them I like this place. But they insisted that I won’t 
manage because another person who earlier 
occupied this land left, saying that the soil is not
fertile.  I pleaded with them that I needed the land 
because I was desperate. Where I came from we 
always fought for land with family members. 
 
Look on the southern side at my buns and answer 
yourself [full buns]. You can see the answer for 
yourself that I’m comfortable here. But I sometimes 
go there [to Katete] to tell my parents that there’s a 
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country here where your son has found peace and 
freedom. Even if you use to say that I’m a useless 
son, I’ve found a place where we as a family can 
grow all we need. 
 
You must know and go tell the people that we live 
nicely here in Ukwimi because the plots we’ve been 
given are for people who are homeless, people who 
suffered where they came from, other people living 
here are rejected people from wherever they came 
from. But still they have found refuge and peace in 
Ukwimi. 
 
As the opening quotation reflects, Ukwimi had very much been transformed into 
a space of refuge, even for those not legally or traditionally understood to be 
refugees.  For many of these “rejected people”, Ukwimi had indeed become a 
























REFUGEES “RETURN” TO UKWIMI 
 
 
What I want is not to go home to Angola because I’m so scared. My fears are 
based on the fact that all the years of my life, I’ve learnt to know that war in 
Angola never ends because it has always been like that – it would end now and 
later on it starts, ends, starts, ends. But as it inow, it's difficult for me to be 
convinced because I’ve seen too much sufferings in Angola.  I came here and 
I've settled nicely. I wake up at my own time. My love is in this country. 
(Field Interview with Angolan Refugee 2006) 
 
Re-opening Ukwimi  
 Seven years after its closing as a refugee settlement, Zambia re-opened 
Ukwimi's doors to refugees in response to growing security concerns in refugee 
settlements on the other side of the country. In late 2001, over 1,000 former 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel soldiers 
from Nangweshi refugee camp in Western Province, Zambi , were transferred to 
the newly reconstituted Ukwimi Refugee Camp (Map 7).  According to the 
UNHCR, the transport of these Angolan refugees to Ukwimi sought to “maintain 
the civilian character of the Nangweshi refugee camp nd avoid the risk of 
militarization or recruitment in the camp” (UNHCR 2001).  In addition to the 
1,000+ Angolans, the GRZ also transferred a small population of Rwandan and 
Burundian refugees into URS.   
The arrival of Angolans and the opening up of a newly constructed 















that would prove to significantly alter the operations of URS.  As mentioned in 
the previous section, when Ukwimi transitioned into a resettlement scheme 
several new NGOs were brought in by GRZ to assist in managing the scheme.   
Over the course of those seven years, a number of events transpired 
which ultimately led to UNHCR adding Africare as an implementing partner at 
Ukwimi, tasked with overseeing community services, including HIV/AIDS 
prevention activities, agriculture and income-generating activities, and other 
community-based educational activities.  However, this shift in institutional 
control over the aid operation at Ukwimi was not simply a bureaucratic or 
Map 7: Transfer of Angolans from Nangweshi 
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arbitrary decision handed down from Geneva, it had its roots in events on the 
ground.  Consider the following exchange between myself and the Ukwimi 
Resettlement Scheme Manager, Allan Musumali:  
Gray: So the time you arrived here as Scheme 
Manager – when these NGOs were still around here – 
how were you coordinating with them, as the 
representative of the boma [GRZ]? 
 
Musumali: Usually these NGOs…there were NGOs 
that were specifically working with the government 
then there were other NGOs that UNHCR appointed 
to deal with the refugees, like LWF. I think after heir 
contract finished – it was a 3 year contract – they 
didn’t have any funding and were phasing out. So 
they didn’t have any resources to go ahead with 
assistance to the community. So when that 
[resettlement] program came I think they watched. 
And when we brought the other NGOs – like CDC – 
it brought confusion just within. And then later on 
through the problems they [LWF] were causing, 
UNHCR and government said no we are bringing 
another NGO, then they brought Africare.  
 
Gray: What kinds of problems are you referring to? 
Musumali: [problems] on themselves…I think 
they…UNHCR said that LWF has been a long friend 
in working together but because they have been long, 
they’ve also decided to…relax and misuse resources 
that were given to them. They also became big-
headed. They thought they were the only fish in the 
pond…So you find there were certain things they 
were told to implement & they’d be delayed. The 
money and everything would come. The money was 
not coming direct to the offices here it was funneled 
through the head office in Lusaka. Resources died 
with them. Those were the administrative problems 
with LWF. So they said ahhh, we’ll split some of 
these duties. You remain with camp supplies. And 
then other skills – training of farmer skills, what what 
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– we shall give it to Africare.  
 
Gray: When Africare came in, did things seem better? 
Musumali: Yeah. They divided the…because again in 
LWF they changed the Manager 2 or 3 times. They 
were required to change them out. What you did, 
you’ve been there. I think all of them performed better 
because there was competition now.  
 
Musumali’s assertion that LWF had become “big-headed” is reflected in 
several internal UNHCR documents which I was able to access at UNHCR 
headquarters in Lusaka.  For example, one internal UNHCR report called for a 
special investigation of LWF.  The report expressed frustration with LWF’s 
desire to “have it both ways” by submitting “glossy reports about achievements” 
while at the same time producing funding documents to its own donors “painting 
a sorry picture of partialized implementation” in a ttempt to solicit additional 
funding. The internal UNHCR memo strongly criticized LWF’s lack of public 
accountability.   
LWF plays the donor card by providing each donor 
with a partial version of the truth (what activities are 
LWF’s by request of UNHCR and what other donors 
provide). And then proceeds to implement activities 
as it understands them, reporting to different donors 
on activities funded indistinctly. Since religious duty 
and conscience motivate some donors, no single 
donor exercises oversight on LWF.  In that sense, 
the controls established by UNHCR have become a 
nuisance to the agency, whose staff appear tired of 
humanitarian work. 
 
The report concluded that LWF had become “bloated and dishonest” and should 
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no longer claim to be the lead agency of the UNHCR.  It was only after reading 
this report that I began to understand the resistance d lack of transparency that 
had come to describe nearly all of my interactions with LWF at that point.      
Aside from the institutional politicking that took place, the arrival of the 
Angolan refugees at Ukwimi caused concern with all of the Zambian 
communities – both the indigenous villagers and those who had resettled in the 
area.  By this time, Ukwimi had become home to approximately 6,000 resettled 
Zambians and their initial reaction to the idea of h sting Angolans was hostile.  
According to one informant:  
We were normally scared of the idea of the 
Angolans because of stories that we heard that these 
people were soldiers. There were a lot of rumors 
spread that Angolans are able to kill you anytime.  
 
If you were walking alone and you see an Angolan 
approaching you would feel scared as anything may 
happen.  So we were very careful in terms of our 
movement, staying away from their satellite and 
keeping our distance on the road.   
 
One of the most interesting explanations for the generalized resistance to the 
settlement of Angolans at Ukwimi took on a particularly geo-political 
understanding of potential conflict.  Consider the following:   
The fear was that the longer they [Angolans] stay 
around here, they would know the weaknesses of 
this country.  And in case in future this country and 
their country would have problems, they could 
easily find their ways in Zambia. Most Zambians 
did not want the Angolans to come and they really 
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wanted the Angolans to go once they got here.  
 
As such and in sharp contrast to the way in which Ukwimi was originally 
established – with integration as a key component – an entirely new satellite 
(Lusandwa) was constructed for the Angolans in order to keep a physical buffer 
between settlers and refugees. 
As settlers struggled with how to live among the Angolans, the Angolans 
themselves faced numerous challenges.  Zulu-Saymujae recounted some of 
these struggles in the following statement:  
It’s not easy...and they come to strange people. Like
those who were brought to Ukwimi from Angola. 
Strange terrain, strange environment, strange 
culture of the Nsenga, strange everything. There 
was a bunch. Those that came from the province 
adjacent to Western Province, they should have kept 
them in Western Province…for their cassava, for 
their fish. They uproot them and bring them to a 
maize belt, no fish at all, they’re not used to 
groundnuts, pounding groundnuts and putting in 
their sauces. It’s everything is different...You can 
see them really getting difficulties and pressure and
even their skin changes you know. There’s a lot of 
changes.   
 
 Although the Angolan refugees faced considerably more obstacles to 
local integration than their Mozambican predecessors, they were still determined 
to make Ukwimi into a place that worked for them – even if that meant breaking 
the “rules” that had governed refugee movement in Ukwimi in the past. 
The NGOs in charge they saw that those people 
[Angolans] never followed the rules. They were 
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always on the move. The Angolans and Burundians 
always broke the rules. Mozambicans always 
followed the rules.  In fact, I can tell you that some 
of the Mozambicans left this place without ever 
reaching Katete or Chipata. They always followed 
the rule that you should only come out when you’re 
allowed. Anytime you wanted to go anywhere, you 
would go and get passes. But these Angolans just 
go, using the bush until they’re in Chipata, even 
Malawi.  When they’re done with their businesses, 
they come back in the camp. In 2002, one Angolan 
refugee was found dead in the borders of 
Mozambique and Zambia without border passes.  
 
But not everyone viewed the Angolans efforts in a negative light.  Numerous 
Zambians expressed astonishment (and even appreciation of) of Angolan work 
ethic:  
They left us this clinic of which we were not 
expecting that we’d have that clinic. They left us 
that school of which it can take almost Grade 1 to 
Grade 12. For that point, definitely we thank them. 
If it was not for those people we wouldn’t have 
those items 
 
We learnt something from those people. Definitely 
we congratulate them because they were very strong 
to work. They were powerful people. 
 
In fact, in their efforts to make Ukwimi their own, they were able to counteract 
many of the negative assumptions and stereotypes that had characterized their 
initial arrival.   
 
Gender Politics in Refugee Camps  
In the following section, I examine the gendered politics of Angolan 
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repatriation in 2005.  However, before proceeding into that particular discussion, 
I feel that in order to fully investigate the evolving gender dynamics which 
unfolded during the repatriation of Angolan refugees, it is necessary to step back 
a bit and delve into the gender dynamics at work in refugee camp environments 
more generally.  In relation to gender politics, it is important to note that refugee 
camps are vital devices of power whereby “the spatial concentration and 
ordering of people” facilitates numerous processes, including the 
(de)(re)construction of gender relations and politics (Malkki 1995b: 498).  
Refugee camps, despite claims of being spaces of asylum and protection, are 
also unstable, violent environments (Hyndman 1998).  The instability and 
violence in refugee camps actively restructures gender relations.  It is necessary 
to examine how this restructuring affects both men and women.   
 The realities of life in a refugee camp significantly alter pre-existing 
familial and gender structures.  The artificial aspects and spaces of camp life 
challenge preconceived notions of masculinity.  Refug e women from 
Somaliland reported that “men seem to have lost their bearings about their 
family concerns, lost confidence in their abilities to maintain their families” 
(Sideris 2003: 719).  In several refugee camps in western Tanzania, Burundian 
men expressed frustration at the substantial changes to gender roles instigated by 
camp life (HRW 2000).  Prohibited from cultivating or seeking employment in 
the host country, these men found themselves unable to fulfill traditional 
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responsibilities and incapable of providing for their families as they had prior to 
flight.   
Many of these men directed their frustrations at their self-appointed 
“protector” – the UNHCR.  One man noted that the “UNHCR now provides 
housing for my family, food for my kids, and clothing for my wife.  What use 
am I anymore?” (HRW 2000: 26).  The loss of control experienced by these men 
and other male refugees in camps can give way to frustration and anger which 
sometimes translates into domestic violence, depression, and alcoholism.   
 Despite the historical construction of refugees as m le, women and their 
dependents constitute nearly 80% of all refugees world ide, making forced 
displacement a significantly gendered issue (Oswin 1999).  Yet, this widely cited 
statistic has yet to be reflected by programming and policy developments which 
fully integrate women and their particular concerns.  According to the head of 
the Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit of the UNHCR, Jeffrey Crisp, “because 
of the domestic role that they play, women are the most affected by the design of 
refugee camps.  If a water point is put in the wrong place, or a distribution point 
is put in the wrong place, it is women who suffer from that” (UNHCR 2002b: 
25).  Unfortunately, Crisp’s acknowledgement is not ecessarily linked with 
appropriate measures on the ground.  According to an African refugee woman:  
Women are left out of everything.  We do not 
participate in planning or designing programs which 
are aimed at us.  We are second class citizens when
it comes to food, water, and shelter distributions.  
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We remain the world’s invisible refugees 
(Wilkenson 2002: 7). 
 
The invisibility of refugee women results in misguided policies that do not 
adequately address their unique needs while simultaneously ignoring potential 
contributions refugee women could offer.   
 According to a special issue of Forced Migration Review, women 
refugees face a number of consequences from displacement, including but not 
limited to, the following:  
• Additional responsibilities and workloads in the 
absence of male heads of households 
• Limited access to and control over resources  
• Increased sexual and domestic violence due to 
conflict and the breakdown of customary laws (El-
Bushra 2000) 
 
The uncertainties of camp life concerning housing, personal security, and food 
often exacerbate violence and instability for the majority of women refugees.   
 Domestic violence is the leading cause of injuries to women around the 
world and is enabled by the unequal status of women in most societies (HRW 
2000: 20).  Human Rights Watch (HRW) conducted an extensive, temporal 
study of nine refugee camps in the Ngara and Kigoma sub-regions of western 
Tanzania in order to access the degree of domestic/sexual violence and policy 
responses to such violence.  HRW documented numerous situations in which 
Burundian women refugees suffered assault with fists, bottles, shoes, sticks, and, 
in some cases, machetes.  These women, bearing visible scars, bruises, broken 
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fingers, and missing teeth, felt particularly vulnerable in the camp situation 
without the availability of previously relied upon social and familial networks.  
According to the HRW, “despite the seriousness and prevalence of domestic 
violence neither UNHCR nor the Tanzania host governm t had developed 
effective programs in response” (HRW 2000: 23).   
 As noted earlier, domestic violence often stems from the loss of control 
and frustration experienced by men in refugee camps.  The domestic sphere 
becomes a space in which refugee men can exert a degree of control and power 
over their situation.  Several factors serve to discourage women from reporting 
instances of abuses.  Perhaps the most critical factor concerns access to food 
rations.  As a rule, the UNHCR issues family ration cards to male heads of 
households.  The only circumstances in which women gai access to food ration 
cards are when there is no male head of household or when a woman makes a 
special request (HRW 2000).  Often times, women do ot obtain their own ration 
cards out of fear of their husband’s reaction.  This fear can be attributed to the 
relative inaction of local police to respond to complaints of abuse.   For 
example, Gaudencia T. in Mtendeli camp reported the following account to 
HRW:  
My husband beat me and insulted me using vulgar 
and obscene language about my body.  He 
compared my body to other women’s whom he had 
before, and this was in the presence of our children.  
After beating me, he forced me to have sex with 
him.  I did not report this case to the police because 
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in the past they have not arrested him after I 
reported similar incidents (HRW 2000: 36 – 37). 
 
In addition, in cases where women did report abuse, the UNHCR was slow to 
respond.  For example, Epiphanie B. reported that: 
My husband threw me and our three children off the 
plot of land where we lived.  He now lives on that 
plot with his girlfriend, and I have nowhere to stay 
with the children.  I reported the case to the police, 
and they did nothing to help me.  I also reported the 
case to UNHCR and requested a plot and separate 
ration card.  UNHCR has not yet responded to my 
requests.  I made the requests four weeks ago (HRW 
2000: 36).   
  
Sexual violence is also prevalent in refugee camps.  Women are often attacked 
while conducting routine, daily tasks such as gathering firewood, farming, or 
seeking employment from local populations.  Although statistics on rape are 
unreliable and many rapes go unreported, a study in Kenya found that sexual 
assault and rape were daily occurrences, with over 200 incidents of rape in 
Dadaab Camp reported (Mwangi Kagwanja 2000). 
 In instances of violence in their country of origin, women relied on 
extensive social networks of family, friends, neighbors, and community leaders.  
However, once in the camps, these social networks are weakened, unreliable, 
and, in some cases, entirely destroyed.  Consider the following testimony by two 
refugee women from Mozambique:  
I found that all my relatives who were left in 
Mozambique, my uncle and his children, all died.  
This happened when Renamo was still there.  They 
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lit a fire and all the people in this house were killed.  
It is really terrible because if you know that maybe 
you have got a problem, you always go to your 
relative.  But now I have got no on, nowhere to go 
even in Mozambique (Sideris 2003: 717). 
 
 
I am not okay with my husband.  Even when he 
works and gets some money he doesn’t look after 
me and the children.  He spends his money on 
drinking.  If all these things were happening while I 
was in Mozambique, I would have left him.  I 
would have had my family to go to (Sideris 2003: 
718). 
 
In the absence of traditional social networks to deal with abuse and assault, 
women are often left with very few alternatives.  The destruction of pre-existing 
familial structures, coupled with the restructuring of gender roles, translates into 
potentially dangerous environments for refugees, contrary to popular notions of 
camps as safe spaces.   
 Investigating the relationship between gender and refugee policy reveals 
the ways in which refugee women remain marginal to the overall operation of 
refugee relief.  Although the UNHCR and its NGO partne s have written, 
published, and discussed the particular challenges facing women refugees, many 
of their guidelines and policies have not been actualized in the field.  Only by 
listening to the voices of women refugees will the int rnational refugee regime 
succeed in making them visible, and by doing so reveal the “dangers of 
subscribing to or unintentionally reproducing categories of difference, without 
attending to their practical implications” (Hyndman 2000: 63).   
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Gender Dynamics of Angolan Repatriation  
 As the previous section demonstrated, there are important reasons to 
begin to listen a bit more closely to the voices of w men refugees.  To this I 
would also argue that the women in refugee-hosting communities also have very 
critical contributions to any discussion of gender relationships in and around 
refugee camps. As noted in Chapter 1, I was fortunate enough to spend an 
extended period of time with small groups of Zambian women who had been 
married to Angolan refugees and who remained living in Lusandwa satellite 
after being left during repatriation.  Their stories, their voices, and their concerns 
add an additional layer of complexity and ambiguity to an already complex and 
uncertain narrative.   
 In late 2004, GRZ in conjunction with the UNHCR and the government 
of Angola began making plans for the massive repatriation of Angolan refugees.  
According to Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye, representative from the Angolan 
government travelled to Ukwimi in order to hold meetings with refugees and 
encourage them to return home to Angola.  For the Angolan government, the 
successful repatriation of its citizens served as alitmus test for Angola’s future 
development.   
You see, every government feels very bad to have 
refugees – to produce refugees – it’s an indicator of 
something bad happening back home.  They are 
failing to manage their own things…So when they 
can have a repatriation for their people – to have 
returnees back home – it’s a major achievement.  
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And so they benefit a lot on the international 
market. They gain a good name…They’ll be 
admitted to this and to that. So that is one factor 
(Zulu-Syamujaye 2006). 
 
The other major factor influencing the timing and nature of Angolan repatriation 
exercises had to do with donor fatigue and the UNHCR’s inability to meet its 
budget demands for maintaining camps.  And when faced with funding choices, 
the UNHCR and its implementing partners were hard pressed to justified 
continued spending on refugee populations from conflict that had been “solved”.  
As Zulu-Syamuajye explained:  
In this case, these refugees were told that at one 
point they’d have to go back home. And Ukwimi 
was...the Ukwimi that you are looking at now of the
Angolans – the one you are talking about – it was a 
special case because most of those were ex-
combatants. And there’s no war now in Angola. The 
peace talks had succeeded. There’s peace back home 
so why stay away? You know? So they had to go. 
 
Although as a matter of policy and international law, the institutional actors 
involved with this repatriation insist that the entire exercise was voluntary, 
sentiments expressed by those who witnessed the events often disagreed with 
such assertions.  For example, here are just a few of the response I received 
when I inquired whether it seemed as though the Angolans wanted to repatriate: 
They were being forced. Others refused completely 




Because of the problems facing them in their 
country, they were refusing – no, don’t take us back 
again to our home.  
 
Many felt fear to return.  They said to us that it’s
better we stay here in Zambia where it’s very nice. 
We are working hard here – they had a nice market, 
they farmed well here and bought plenty property. 
Amazing since to their life they have never come to 
that point of which they found here.  
 
 
The interesting thing here is that because GRZ was removing Ukwimi Angolans 
back to camps in western Zambia and not directly to Angola, this seemingly 
forced re-resettlement did not technically break inter ational laws regarding 
non-refoulment and voluntary repatriation.   
 In the course of organizing the repatriation of Angolans from Ukwimi, 
one major issue arose as a point of serious contention among institutional actors, 
refugees, and hosts – the issue of Angolan-Zambian marriages and the manner in 
which such unions were handled by the international refugee relief regime, 
GRZ, and the refugee husbands.  As the majority of he Angolans were 
suspected ex-combatants relocated from Nangweshi, they were also 
overwhelmingly male.  Upon resettlement at Ukwimi, any of these Angolans 
married local Zambian women and started families and life in Ukwimi.  When it 
came time for repatriation, considerable debate emerged as to whether the 
Angolans would be able (or willing) to repatriate along with their Zambian 
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wives.   Based on my interviews, it became quite clear that the institutional 
actors at Ukwimi doubted or questioned the legitimacy of the vast majority of 
these Angolan-Zambian unions.  Eularia Zulu-Syamujaye described the situation 
in the following manner:  
First and foremost, the marriages were marriages of 
convenience. Maybe we start it from there because 
those that remained definitely it was marriages of 
convenience. Those that were married and they 
meant a lot for each other, they went together. They 
were allowed to repatriate with their wives.  Quite a 
number of Zambian women went. So those that 
remained were just those that were abused and left 
there (Zulu-Syamujaye 2006).  
 
However, according to Allan Musumali (Scheme Manager), only five Zambian 
wives actually repatriated with their Angolan husband – and one eventually 
returned to Ukwimi.  Zulu-Syamjaye recounted the tension that continued to 
build in the months leading up to repatriation, as many Angolan men who 
registered for repatriation failed to list their wives on the registration manifest:  
We used to talk to couples – special couples like 
those that had taken on Zambian women. We would 
find out from them – find out from the man – 
because if in the registration manifest, we don’t see
him carrying his wife…his wife!?. Then we’d talk 
him down and find out from him – Why? Really? 
You know? Often times we’d find that there are 
some people who’d even…some people would even 
come in confidence and say no, it’s not possible for 
me because I left a wife at home, you know? I left a 
wife.  You know? And my wife ran the opposite 
direction with the kids and so I don’t think I’d go 
back with another woman. You know? That kind of 
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thing. Of course, when they lived together with their 
Ukwimi wives, it was difficult for the man maybe to 
tell them they didn’t want them after Ukwimi, you 
know?  Of course, we saw some people really 
getting hurt. Even those who had commitments 
elsewhere… getting very hurt to leave their partners 
in Ukwimi. But they had no choice. 
 
Unfortunately my sisters who were left behind 
maybe they didn’t have full knowledge of what was 
going on. I suspect so. Because a lot of them use to 
shunt between their homes and our offices. I would 
see them become very desperate. H  wants to leave 
me. And then we’d put them together. The man 
would have his own reasons. And why force a man 
to carry a woman that he might not keep very well? 
 
My general conclusion after listening to Ukwimi farmers’ version of events is 
that the institutional actors at Ukwimi may not have explicitly prohibited these 
women from accompanying their husbands, they certainly d d not encourage it.  
Many of the Zambian wives who were left at Ukwimi expressed to me that they 
felt at some level their husbands and the NGOs wereconspiring together to 
ensure these women remain stranded.  They insisted that they were told, “you 
are not a refugee, you are a Zambian and we don’t have space to carry you 
along. So you will have to remain”.  When it came to the actual days of 
departure, the tensions around Ukwimi A headquarters w re extremely 
emotional and tense.  Consider the two following narratives of departure day by 
Musumali and Zulu-Syamujaye, respectively:  
I saw one man, for instance, ready to go home who 
had taken on a Zambian woman from the Lozi 
borders in Western Province as a wife.  And so time 
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came for him to go back home. He didn’t even tell 
the authorities that he’d left a dying woman [his 
wife] in the hut. He just jumped on the bus and then 
somebody came “This bus should not go because he 
has left a woman dying in the house”. We had to halt 
the convoy to go and check. We went and checked 
and there was a woman who was a stretcher case. 
And we took her to the clinic at A and we asked this
man not to go. And this man had two big girls and 
the big girls were very upset. They didn’t 
understand why they were not going to go home. 
But you see here is a man who had left his wife in 
Angola who came with his two daughters who were 
now big and he had taken on a Lozi woman from 
the borders of Zambia and now he didn’t want to 
have anything to do with her. But unfortunately he 
was going to leave her dying and no one of us 
knowing. 
 
Some were getting very hysterical. I mean, the 
husband is on the bus and she’s screaming. But what 
could we do? And the kids are crying “Dad, Dad, 
Dad, Dad”.  And then we also have in the opposite 
direction, we have a woman from village 10 who 
went with two of her own children to Angola and 
this man while he was here he was saying “No, no 
problem”. But we knew that back home he might 
have a wife…and that wife might give hell to that 
woman and her two children.  But you know there’s 
very little you can do as refugee workers. You let 
go.  
 
 In the aftermath of all of the tension surrounding repatriation, the GRZ 
and Musumali were left with questions about how to handle the Zambian wives 
left at Ukwimi.  According to Musumali, the GRZ had to ask itself if it should 
chase these women off the land because they came into the settlement “only 
because of marriage”.  Fortunately for the women involved, the NGOs at 
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Ukwimi (who had played a role in discouraging their husbands to travel with 
their Zambian wives) now intervened on behalf of the wives, insisting that GRZ 
give these women the land.  Musumali and the Departmen  of Resettlement 
agreed to transfer the Angolans’ plots into their wives names. But in all the time 
I spent with these women, their focus was never on the land but rather on 
reconnecting with their husbands.  Many of the women actually expressed 
anxiety over managing to hold onto their land and farm it at the level expected 
by GRZ.  One woman stated that as a group  
We remain here, like stagnant water with our 
children.  We are suffering and still in problems.  
These are the disadvantages of hosting those people.  
We’ve been discarded by our men, by our relatives, 
by our boma [government], and even by our 
neighbors.  This is our thank you.  
 
The lingering tension and suffering out at Lusandwa satellite permeates out into 
the rest of the scheme.  Many Ukwmi residents raised th  issue of the Lusandwa 
wives as an example of the lasting negative consequences of hosting Angolans:  
Gray: would you be happy if they reopened this place gain 
for refugees? 
Zef: We wouldn’t be happy. We cannot be happy, ahhhh ! 
We are looking at both sides – the advantages and 
disadvantages.  Now the disadvantages of which we are 
talking about: they come here, showed us love, got married 
to our Zambian women and leave them with children. But 
the government were marrying these people in love and 
happily. But when it is time to go, they just go. No 




“After Everyone Leaves” 
By the time I arrived in at URS in November 2005, the Angolan refugees 
had been officially repatriated, Ukwimi had once again closed its doors as a 
refugee settlement, and the Department of Resettlement was managing the 
scheme yet again.  Although I did not personally observe how URS functioned 
as an operational refugee settlement, I am confident that I witnessed enough of 
the lasting impacts that refugee operations had in the area to gain a clear picture 
of the principle role refugees played in the construction, destruction and in some 
cases, reconstruction of what it meant to make Ukwimi home, if even only 
temporarily.   
Many of the very same questions, complaints, and challenges which 
faced the Ukwimi community during the Mozambican repatriation in 1994 were 
fresh on the minds of Ukwimi residents when I arrived.  Fears about what 
happens, as one Zambian instructor at Ukwimi Trades Technical College 
phrased it, “after everyone leaves” were palpable.  The “everyone” in this case is 
not only in reference to the refugees, but perhaps more pointedly, a reference to 
the mass exodus of aid agencies and the kinds of capital nd investments they 
take with them.   
Everywhere I went in URS, I heard and collected stories of people’s 
struggles to make a go of it at Ukwimi and the consta t obstacles they found in 
their way.  Consider the following snapshot of some of the most frequently 
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raised issues:  
But kuno ku [here in the] scheme definitely we’re in 
problem. The problem we are facing….we don’t 
have place or somebody who can buy our produce 
when it grows. So that is the problem which we are 
facing. If we want to sell something we make a 
journey going to Petauke – selling just a small thing 
like Irish potatoes, cassava, groundnuts, just like
that. But the NGOs which we have here definitely 
ahh….there’s completely nothing of which they are 
helping with. 
 
We are in a problem indeed. Just imagine people 
they are traveling almost 2 km looking for water. 
Women suffer looking for water. Others walk 3 to 
4km, all that side in the hills are people living there. 
People are suffering here 3km looking for a place 
where they can draw water for…we’ve even 
forgotten how to bath. 
 
People are suffering in the bush and all over. They 
are willing to farm but…They’re not lazy, they are 
willing but…The refugees, they were comfortable – 
as if they were the owners of this country Zambia, 
but we, the owners? We are suffering as…ahhhh…. 
You can’t like it.   
 
Now that they’re going even the government has 
forgotten about us here – the Zambians – they’ve 
forgotten that there are Zambians here. Up to date, 
we are still suffering. Maybe the government is 
thinking of that we are animals, I don’t know, that’s 
the problem of which we are still facing. 
 
At the time, and for a long time afterward, the list of needs and concerns 
were all too overwhelming to completely wrap my head around.  After taking a 
step back and while discussing some of what I encoutered with a Zambian 
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colleague, I realized that trying to fully understand the enormous obstacles 
facing Ukwimi residents one-by-one is a potentially pathy-inducing and 
certainly overwhelming exercise.  It is perhaps easier and more effective to 
understand the concerns and worries of the people of Ukwimi in the aggregate – 
ultimately as concerns over accessibility – access to markets, access to water, 
access to title deeds, access to education, access to fertilizers, access to 
transportation, access to hospitals, etc.  Over the last 50 years, NGOs served as 
the sole gatekeepers of development and access in and around URS, so it should 
not be entirely shocking that the people of Ukwimi are worried about what their 
























CHAPTER NINE  




Understanding, as distinguished from having 
correct information and scientific knowledge, is a 
complicated process which never produces 
unequivocal results.  It is an unending activity by 
which, in constant change and variation, we come 
to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality – 




This dissertation opened with the recognition that t e path on which I 
chose to walk was “long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally 
situated” (Cerwonka and Malkki 2007: 177).  And yet, as I come to the end of 
this particular narrative, Arendt’s assertion that understanding is an “unending 
activity” feels increasingly true. Coming to terms with this reality has also been 
a “long, often meandering, inescapably social, and temporally situated” journey.  
So although I fully realize my attempt to understand Ukwimi was and will 
continue to be “unending” and “meandering”, I also believe that I have made 
considerable strides in my desire to emplace Ukwimi “at home in the world”.  
And in doing so, I am able to make certain conclusion  based on my own 
experiences and the experiences of those I met along the way.   
The conclusions that I’ve come to regarding Ukwimi run along the three 
contours outlined in the opening chapter of this dissertation. First, in expanding 
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the temporal scale, I was able to provide a much fuller and richer understanding 
of Ukwimi which recognized a long history of migrations and connections 
which played out without regard for the same spatial boundaries in existence 
today.  Additionally, the longer historical view enabled this narrative to achieve 
two very critical goals: 
1) Recognition of the fact that many of the Ukwimi 
refugees had in fact experienced a series of 
displacements prior to their resettlement at Ukwimi.  
Because of this, a narrative of Ukwimi that takes as 
its starting point May 20, 1987 (opening day) is 
missing a significant portion of the story. 
2) Move away from the crisis narratives usually 
written about refugee experiences and 
environments.  Instead of using a sharply focused 
temporal lens, I consciously chose to soften the 
focus and in doing so take a more complete picture.  
 
The second contour that I used to map this story involved the expansion 
of the spatial scale to include actors and places that extend far beyond Ukwimi – 
to Geneva and back again.   My observations of the evolution of cultural 
landscapes at Ukwimi highlighted the ways in which displacement is an 
inherently  geographic experience – meaning that it is not simply a process that 
affects refugees but one that affects a whole host of individuals, organizations, 
and communities situated within (and part of the construction of) particular 
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landscapes.   
  The third, and final, contour enframing my examination of Ukwimi 
depended on an understanding of emplacement and displacement being 
integrally tied together in constant motion as part of the same narrative.  My 
experiences at Ukwimi reinforced nearly everyday the degree to which whether 
an individual is “in” or “out” of place is not static – it fluctuates, it shifts, it is, in 
fact, in motion.  Ultimately, displacement is not just about the loss of place, but 
also inevitably about the struggle to make new places (Turton 2004: 26).  So 
although Malkki argues that displacement is the “flip-side” of emplacement 
(1995: 517), my conclusion is that they are actually one and the same – not 
opposing narratives, but actually part of the same narrative. 
By examining some of the processes of place-making in Ukwimi, this 
dissertation hopes to move us beyond crisis narratives concerning refugees to 
new, and more productive, understandings of displacement which focus attention 
on the ways in which refugees and their hosts create and alter their landscapes.  
In fact, I strongly contend that focusing only on the destructive capacity of 
conflict does not accurately or fully capture the realities on the ground.  As Boas 
contends, “conflict zones represent not only the disruption/destruction of 
previous existing social systems, but also the creation of new systems” (2003: 
78).  It is these new systems – or more geographically, these “striated” spaces 
and “entangled” landscapes (Moore 2005: 22) – that I was most interested in 
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exploring.  
In this closing chapter, I would like to step back out of URS and once 
again widen the lens in order to examine the current r fugee-hosting landscape 
as it is operating in Zambia today.   And to address Kuhlman’s critical 
observation and question:  
UNHCR and other members of the humanitarian 
community have a natural tendency to concentrate 
their attention on … new refugee emergencies and 
large-scale repatriation programmes. But the 
majority of UNHCR’s beneficiaries find themselves 
trapped in protracted refugee situations, unable to 
go home and without the prospect of a solution in 
the country where they have found asylum. Such 
situations, which are often characterized by long-
term care and maintenance programmes and the 
confinement of refugees to camps, are not in the 
interest of the refugees, local populations, host 
government or donor states. And yet they have been 
allowed to persist. Why is this so and what can be 
done to remedy this situation? (Kuhlman 2002: 1, 
emphasis added) 
 
From Exclusion to Inclusion – The Zambia Initiative  
 Before delving into the future possibilities of Zambia’s unique 
alternative to emplacement and displacement, I would like to take a moment and 
step back to 1966 and consider the following excerpt from President Kenneth 
Kaunda’s speech at the opening of the University of Zambia:  
There is one constant danger I have observed facing 
this young country of ours. This is a tendency to 
keep to the beaten track. We must be original. I 
repeat-just because a system is there does not mean 
 245 
that it is good. It may have been appropriate in the 
past. It may still be the suitable system in some 
other country. But the real test is whether it is the
best system for Zambia of 1966-or 1976. We must 
be courageous in breaking with outmoded traditions 
and determined in our efforts to explore new paths 
into the future (Kaunda 1966).  
 
Although Kaunda was not talking about the challenges of refugee-hosting, the 
sentiment he expressed here – an plea to be “original” – takes form in Zambia’s 
markedly new approach to minimizing the burdens and optimizing the 
opportunities that protracted refugee-hosting presents.  Finding alternative 
narratives of emplacement/displacement – or “spaces of hope” – requires “actual 
engagement with emancipatory politics” (Daley 2008: 235).  And in some very 
interesting and innovative ways, Zambia may just be creating “spaces of hope”.  
 As the refugee population in Zambia expanded, reaching its peak at 
280,000 in 2001 and the pressures of protracted refuge -hosting increased, GRZ 
began to seek out alternatives to traditional understandings of refugee camp 
management structures. GRZ focused its attention on Western Province, home to 
Zambia’s largest refugee populations and the least developed region of Zambia. 
According to the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) conducted by 
the Central Statistics Office in 2000, Western Province exhibited the highest 
poverty levels in Zambia (CSO 2000). As demand on the limited resources in the 
area intensified, friction grew between refugees and their host communities, 
increasing xenophobia and insecurity in the area (GRZ 2006: 4).  
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 Within this context of increased hostility, GRZ, in cooperation with the 
UNHCR, developed the Zambia Initiative (ZI), an innovative pilot project aimed 
at reducing the negative socio-economic impact of refugee-hosting while 
promoting self-sufficiency and reducing poverty of both host populations and 
refugees. According to my interview with the ZI National Coordinator, Dr. 
Dominic Minyoi, ZI is: 
based on the concept of development through local 
integration which promotes a holistic approach to 
addressing the needs of refugee-hosting areas and 
enhances integration of refugees with their host 
communities (Minyoi 2006).  
 
 The Zambia Initiative has been lauded as the model for donor 
coordination in linking refugee aid to national and local development planning. 
Research on refugee hosting is well-served by examining the Zambian case, as it 
is the first case in which a national development program has explicitly focused 
on the interests of and cooperation among refugee populations and their local 
hosts. For example, in a statement to a visiting United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) delegation, the Minister of Home 
Affairs, Lackson Mapushi, highlighted the potential utility of linking the 
management of protracted refugee situations with development projects: 
..this initiative is not only an effective way of 
burden sharing, but also an effective exit strategy by 
the international community from the perpetual aid 
handouts to refugees in Africa, as it is aimed at 
equipping refugees to be productive and ensuring 
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the enhancement of the socio-economic situation in 
refugee hosting areas thereby combating poverty, as 
well as improving the integration between refugees 
and host populations as a way of addressing the 
protracted nature of our refugee problem (UNHCR 
2002a: 17). 
 
 The Zambia Initiative was designed to enable participatory, bottom-up 
approaches to development by promoting and aiding i the creation, 
formalization, and legalization of Local Development Committees (LDCs) 
throughout Western Province. In late 2002, the GRZ, ZI Program Unit, Ministry 
of Home Affairs, and the LDCs signed a memorandum of understanding 
constituting the institutional framework for the operation and management of ZI.  
ZI targets four major areas of intervention – agriculture, health, education, 
infrastructure and natural resource management – and identifies three themes – 
governance, gender, and HIV/AIDS – which cross-cut each of the four target 
areas. The bulk of ZI’s initial intervention occurred in four particular districts 
within Western Province – Kaoma District (near Mayukwayukwa), 
Senanga/Shangombo Districts (near Nangweshi Refugee Camp), and Mongu 
District (provincial capital).  ZI reporting assessd the overall financial 
requirement for the period from 2003 through 2008 to be approximately US $55 
million, much of which required donor funding.  
 248 
 In the first three years of its implementation, the ZI successfully 
implemented a number of programs and projects which ave positively impacted 
refugees and their hosts. In fact, the majority of the development inputs created 
under the ZI have been, and continue to be, accessibl  to host communities and 
have gone a long way in preventing conflict between refugees and their hosts. 
Table 11 clearly demonstrates the degree to which Zambian hosts have benefited 
from this innovative, and markedly inclusive, approach to refugee management. 
In 2005, ZI extended its geographic reach into Northwestern Province, near 
Meheba Refugee Camp.  
 
Conclusions  
 The overwhelming majority of research conducted within refugee studies 
is focused on the experiences, challenges, and needs of refugees, with little to no 
sustained efforts to understand the experiences, challenges, and needs of their 
hosts. I maintain that such privileging of the refugee within our research is 
detrimental to our ability to understand the realities on the ground in any place 
Table 11 
Beneficiaries of Zambia Initiative 
Area Zambian 
Community 
Refugee Community  
  Self-Settled Camp-Settled Total 
Kaoma 160,950   (75%) 30,500 21,878 213,328 
Senanga  192,987   (74%) 40,000 26,573 259,560 
Mongu 166,609   (99%) 500 0 167,109 
Total 520,546   (81%) 48,451 71,000 639,997 
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that finds itself hosting refugees. Whether the goal of a particular research 
project is to provide a critique of refugee relief aid, or to incite policy change at 
the international level, or to contribute to geography's concern with the 
construction of places, we cannot achieve such goals without explicit, direct, and 
substantive attention to refugee-hosting communities. As argued by Bakewell: 
For the people who live in the villages on 
both sides of the border, the focus on the 
‘refugee problem’ deflects attention from the 
difficulties which they share with all the 
other residents of this isolated area of Africa. 
For the most part, people’s major worries are 
not special problems for refugees but 
problems shared by all (2000: 371) 
 
 By calling for increased attention to hosts, I want to make clear that I am 
not advocating for yet another essentialist representation (Bracken et al 1997; 
Eastmond 1998) which would add “refugee/host” to an already burgeoning list 
of binary (and often oppositional) representations (victim/survivor, 
resilient/vulnerable, bogus/genuine, regular/irregular, 
displacement/emplacement, rooted/uprooted, deserving/undeserving, 
outside/inside, asylum seeker/citizen, problem/resource). Instead, I am simply 
arguing that nearly every piece of refugee-centered research (and policy) would 
have been better served had it been more inclusive of host communities. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have borrowed concepts and ideas from a 
variety of different trajectories within geography, as well as within refugee 
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studies and development studies.  In my journey to constructing Ukwimi’s story, 
I came to appreciate Myers’ reflection that 
Despite all of the varied efforts of power structures 
draped in different ideological banners…African 
conceptions of space not only endure. Within 
circumscribed areas and often within repressive 
parameters of their own, they remain powerful 
forces… (2003: 167).  
 
Ultimately, the task has been to construct a humanist geography not only 
of Ukwimi but also of the various experiences of displacement.  Such a task has 
been and continues to be anchored in an understanding of humanist geography 
to be “the move from 'knowing about' places in an objective way, their facts and 
features, to 'understanding' places in a more empathetic way, their characters and 
meanings” (Daniels 1992: 311).  It is precisely in our encounters with such 
“characters” and their “understandings of place” that I as a geographer came to 
understand Ukwimi and that we as geographers can make significant 
contributions to contemporary understandings of and solutions to forced 
displacement. Contributions which demonstrate that t e process of displacement 
actively creates and recreates places – displacement, it turns out, emplaces itself 
in particularly “entangled” cultural landscapes.  
We know that places differ and that these differences are not imaginary, but rather are 
actual features of the world. We also suggest that these differences matter, and we self-
consciously employ this knowledge in our everyday lives.  It is only when we begin to 
go behind appearances and ask questions concerning why places differ and what 
effects these differences have on actions and events that we encounter difficulties 
associated with the ambiguities of the concept 
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African Signatories to Refugee Conventions 
 
 UN UN OAU 
Country 1951 1967 1969 
Algeria 1963 1967 1974 
Angola 1981 1981 1981 
Benin 1962 1970 1973 
Botswna 1969 1969 1995 
Burkina Fasco 1980 1980 1974 
Burundi 1963 1971 1975 
Cameroon 1961 1967 1985 
Cape Verde  1987 1989 
Central African Republic 1962 1967 1970 
Chad 1981 1981 1981 
Comoros    
Congo 1962 1970 1971 
Cote d'Ivoire 1961 1970 1998 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 1965 1975 1973 
Djibouti 1977 1977  
Egypt 1981 1981 1980 
Equatorial Guinea 1986 1986 1980 
Eritrea    
Ethiopia 1969 1969 1973 
Gabon 1964 1973 1986 
Gambia 1966 1967 1980 
Ghana 1963 1968 1975 
Guinea 1965 1968 1972 
Guinea-Bissau 1976 1976 1989 
Kenya 1966 1981 1992 
Lesotho 1981 1981 1988 
Liberia 1964 1980 1971 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya   1981 
Madagascar 1967   
Malawi 1987 1987 1987 
Mali 1973 1973 1981 
Mauritania 1987 1987 1972 
Mauritius    
Morocco 1956 1971 1974 
 273 
Appendix A 




















 UN UN OAU 
Country 1951 1967 1969 
Mozambique 1983 1989 1989 
Namibia 1995   
Niger 1961 1970 1971 
Nigeria 1967 1968 1986 
Rwanda 1980 1980 1979 
Sao Tome and Principe 1978 1978  
Senegal 1963 1967 1971 
Sierra Leone 1981 1981 1987 
Somalia 1978 1978  
South Africa 1996 1996 1995 
Sudan 1974 1974 1972 
Togo 1962 1969 1970 
Tunisia 1957 1968 1989 
Uganda 1976 1976 1987 
United Republic of Tanzania 1964 1968  
Zambia 1969 1969 1973 
Zimbabwe 1981 1981 1985 
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Agricultural Schemes in Zambia 
     
CENTRAL PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Muswishi Chibombo 1992 N/A N/A 
Lukanda Kapiri Mposhi 1999 425 20 
Kanyesha Mkushi 1989 229 15 
Maimwene Mumbwa 1992 203 10 
Katikulula Serenje 1990 429 10 
Kapumbu Serenje 1990 205 10 
     
COPPERBELT PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Milashi Chililabombwe 1992 35 5 
Mutenda Chingola 1992 1999 10 
Musakashi Kalulushi 1992 50 5 
Kakolo Kitwe 1992 110 5 
Chifulube Luanshya 1992 128 5 
Kambilombilo Lufwanyama 1989 435 8 
Miengwe Masaiti 1975 212 N/A 
Luswishi Lufwanyama 1992 75 N/A 
Lukanga North Mpongwe 1995 800 10 
Mutundu Mufulira 1992 31 N/A 
Kafubu Ndola 2004 N/A N/A 
     
EASTERN PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Mlolo Chadiza 1992 32 N/A 
Kaozi Chama 1992 138 10 
Chipangali Chipata 1992 284 10 
Kapeya Katete 1992 76 10 
Mtilizi Nyimba 1992 225 10 
Msanzala Petauke 1992 49 10 












Agricultural Schemes in Zambia 
     
LUAPULA PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Mukange Mwense 1992 50 15 
Kapako Nchengele 1992 60 10 
Mano Samfya 1992 61 5 
     
LUSAKA PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Kanakantapa Chongwe 1988 1200 4 
Rufunsa Chongwe 1992 129 10 
Yapite Luangwa 1992 96 5 
Chitope Luangwa - N/A N/A 
Kasenga Lusaka 1992 322 10 
     
NORTHERN PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened # of HH Average Hect 
Musanya Chinsali 1992 260 10 
Milongo Isoka 1997 54 10 
Lupandizi Isoka 2004 N/A N/A 
Kanga Kaputa - N/A N/A 
Lukulu Kasama 1993 200 10 
Lufubu Luwingu 1992 84 10 
Musombizi Mbala 1992 25 10 
Kanchibiya Mpika 1992 245 10 
Mufubushi Mpika 1994 99 10 




Agricultural Schemes in Zambia 
     
NORTHWESTERN PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened 
# of 
HH Average Hect 
Chibombo Chavuma 1992 20 10 
Litoya Kabompo 1992 100 10 
Kafufula Kasempa 1992 84 10 
Kikonge Mufumbwe 1992 60 10 
Mudwinji Mwinilunga 2000 27 10 
Solwezi State Farm Solwezi 1992 112 10 
Solwezi State Ranch Solwezi 2004 528 10 
     
SOUTHERN PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened 
# of 
HH Average Hect 
Sibanyanti Choma 1992 68 20 
Harmony Choma 1998 126 10 
Siamambo Choma 2002 82 5 
Kalomo West Kalomo 1992 123 20 
Kabuyu Livingstone 1992 65 10 
Kasiya Livingstone 1999 366 10 
Nega-Nega Mazabuka 1992 38 10 
Masasabi Namwala 1992 164 20 
Ngabo Namwala 1992 38 10 
     
WESTERN PROVINCE 
Scheme District Opened 
# of 
HH Average Hect 
Lutwi Kalabo - N/A N/A 
Kalumwange Kaoma 1990 1000 10 
Lombe-Lombe Kaoma 2004 20 20 
Kamilende Lukulu - N/A N/A 
Dongwe Lukulu - N/A N/A 
Muuyi Mongu - N/A N/A 
Kanja Senanga - N/A N/A 
Nanga Sesheke - N/A N/A 
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